Introduction

The last decade has seen the EU move decisively into the fields of security and defence. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed speedily, leading to European armed forces under EU command being involved in peace-keeping operations throughout the world. The evolution of ESDP has been underpinned by the creation of new intergovernmental military institutions such as the EU Military Staff, Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Civilian-Military Cell, planning cell, European Defence Agency and an EU operations centre. The intention has been to increase European capacities in security matters. Capabilities generation has thus proved to be a major focus for the EU’s activities in the ESDP, even if, thus far, results have been not particularly impressive. The list of actions is long: since 1999 we have seen the Headline Goal 2003, Headline Force Catalogue, the European Capability Action Plan process, Headline Goal 2010, the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and its Long Term Vision and Commission legislative activity in the fields of security research and defence procurement law. Indeed, in an EU left floundering following the no votes in the Constitutional Treaty referenda in France and the Netherlands, ESDP seemed, between 2004 and 2006, to represent the only reference point for European integration that was thriving; a state of affairs that led even a prominent supporter of ESDP, Alyson Bailes, to question whether that was entirely desirable (Bailes, 2008). Some regard this Europeanisation of security (and increasingly defence) issues as unquestionably positive, but others have been much more critical of ESDP’s attention to armaments issues, suggesting that the EU risks becoming a military-industrial complex (Slijper, 2005).

Meanwhile, the EU’s role in the field of justice and home affairs has also expanded extremely quickly in the last decade. The Tampere and Hague programmes have extended EU action into the fields of immigration, asylum, border control, counter-terrorism and legal and police cooperation. This required new structures, legitimised the role of new actors in the policy and regulatory process and will draw on new types of technologies, such as those being developed in the EU security research programme. For civil liberties campaigners, the last decade of EU action has been viewed as damaging to civil liberties and the democratic process, and they are far from optimistic about the future. Again concerns have been raised about the technologies proposed to bolster internal security such as linking databases containing personal data and surveillance technology. Just as in the USA new funding opportunities are attracting industrial interest in the security agenda, which impacts on a growing number of policy fields. As Ben Hayes (2006) has put it, the EU could also be viewed as a security-industrial complex. In fact, for some commentators, the question of whether ESDP represents a retrograde militarisation of the EU is of much less ethical concern, than what is seen as the securitisation of many fields of EU policy.

“The real issue is not so much about ‘militarization’ of the Union as about an increasingly salient securitization of its entire identity and image, which the EU as a conscious organism is not yet

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1 Critics would argue that all of this has not in fact produced any actual armaments. This is true but the cross-institutional vigour that this agenda is being pushed by is remarkable.
equipped to recognize, let alone to handle maturely, and from which the ESDP’s small do-gooding adventures can come almost as a relief.” (Bailes, 2008: 119)

In other words, the EU has ‘mainstreamed’ security into many policy areas, created new bodies and involved new actors in EU politics, but has yet to really develop a clear sense of what it does and does not wish to do in security terms. This may prove to be problematic.

Given that a succession of publications\(^3\) have noted this creeping securitisation of the EU policy agenda (in areas like research, industrial and justice and home affairs policy as well as the more obvious and member state driven development of the European Security and Defence Policy), both within the Commission and Council, it seems necessary to critically examine the ways in which this is occurring. While the theory of securitisation has inevitably led scholars to pay particular attention to the evolution of the EU’s discourse on security, Balzacq (2008) has argued that a focus on the ‘policy tools’ of internal and external security policies, rather than simply on the construction of security discourse, can offer useful insights for those concerned about the securitisation of the EU. Critical activists such as Slijper (2005) and Hayes (2006) have drawn particular attention to the technological and industrial dimension in their claims about the militarisation / securitisation of the EU. This link is not new; indeed as Regan (1994) points out the links between technological development and militarisation are frequently made in Cold War era literature. The paper proposes therefore that one way of investigating whether there really is a problem, is to revisit the analytical frameworks that informed research into the military technology during the Cold War and afterwards.

In other words the paper proposes to investigate the way in which policies surrounding the research, development and procurement of security and military technologies are emerging. Such a focus means consideration of issues such as the technological imperative, industrial and science lobby groupings, the state of relations between bureaucrats, defence and security firms and military and security actors and the role that international competition plays\(^4\). It thus also emphasises the role of elite politics, in direct response to the concerns about democratic accountability raised by critics of both the ESDP and the JHA agendas. In particular, it should help shed light on whether the EU should be regarded with concern by those worried by accusations of a growing and unhelpful militarisation and securitisation of EU politics\(^5\). The paper will begin by considering some of the analytical issues involved in using theoretical frameworks designed predominantly to explain US military technology decisions during the Cold War to consider the EU. It will then move to analyse the EU by drawing upon two competing sets of theories developed to explain the arms dynamic; those that emphasise the domestic pressures and those that concentrate on the ways in which the international environment causes change. Finally, it will evaluate what the value of such a focus might be in adding to our composite picture of EU security politics.

**Military/Security Technologies and the EU: Parameters of a Research Agenda**

During the Cold War various theoretical frameworks were proposed to explain why states, particularly the USA and USSR, devoted such a large proportion of their financial, economic and scientific resources to maintaining and expanding the military sector. They fell predominantly into two main categories of explanation. Firstly, there were those that emphasised domestic pressures in the shape of the rather nebulous military-industrial complex (MIC): these theories tended to either follow C Wright Mill’s concerns about an unaccountable power elite, and emphasise either Weberian bureaucratic politics or the processes of interest coalition formation, or they drew on Marxist perspectives to look at the role of military expenditure in the development and maintenance of a capitalist system. Secondly, there was a

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\(^3\) See for examples Manners (2006); Bono (2004); Mawdsley (2004), Huysmans (2000); Hayes (2006) and Bailes (2008).

\(^4\) While there has been a proliferation of scholarly articles and books on the ESDP, comparatively little attention has been paid to the classic strategic studies fields of enquiry such as military spending, technology, force posture and threat response. These questions have been left predominantly to practitioners and the small defence and peace economics community. Instead, ESDP scholars have debated whether ESDP is compatible with an EU understood as a normative or civilian power, looked exhaustively at the new institutional arrangements and the first military and civilian operations, and considered the ‘Europeanisation’ effect on individual member states’ security policies.

\(^5\) This has for example been an issue pushed by the Libertas group that successfully campaigned for a no vote in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty and now has become a pan-European movement to campaign in the European Parliament elections of June 2009.
considerable amount of work that considered the effects of external pressures, developing action-reaction models to show how states responded to changes in military posture from enemies and allies alike. Perhaps the best known work in this area focussed on arms-racing. Drawing on these frameworks though raises a number of analytical problems for a contemporary study of the EU, namely the need to account for the rise of a substantial security industry alongside traditional defence firms due to the ‘War on Terror’; the question of whether US-centric MIC theory works to analyse the EU; and finally whether ideas about action-reaction models help us understand an EU that is very careful not to define states as threats, and whose member states have largely not increased defence expenditure\(^6\) since 2001 in line with their key ally, the USA.

Firstly, is it appropriate to use theories designed to look at the military technology sector to look at the entire security technology sector? Since 9/11 issues of internal and external security have become almost inevitably intertwined across the EU (this change is more significant in those states with little experience of terrorist attacks). It is not simply a question of whether we are more concerned about a growing militarisation or a securitisation of the EU: the two processes are symbiotic, involve many of the same actors (particularly industrial ones) but also show different dimensions of way in which EU institutions are evolving in response to this agenda. While the pillar structure currently governing the division of responsibility between institutions in EU policy-making (community, shared or intergovernmental) has brought about a system whereby external military security policy i.e. ESDP remains predominantly intergovernmental and thus located in the Council\(^7\), and the Commission is rapidly expanding its role in internal security policy-making through the work carried out by DG-Justice, Freedom and Security and in other DGs such as DG-Enterprise, which manages the security research programme; this does not mean that there are no links. Both agendas have strong technological dimensions and indeed, in some cases, both the European Defence Agency (EDA) and DG-Enterprise’s security research programme\(^8\) come together to investigate slightly varying aspects of the same technology e.g. technology to protect both naval and civilian shipping from terrorist attack or drones deemed as potentially useful in tracking illegal immigrants as in battlefield surveillance. Moreover, one of the weaknesses of research into ESDP is that the Commission’s role is often underplayed. It seems therefore that any analytical attempt to use technology as an investigative lens to interrogate EU security politics must consider both internal and external security technologies.

The second question that needs consideration is whether the predominantly US-centric models of the domestic pressure explanation can be reasonably applied to the European context. Does military-industrial complex theory travel in other words? According to Rosen the key proposition is that high levels of defence expenditure have given rise to powerful domestic groups which have vested interests in the continuation of high military spending and international conflict (Rosen, 1973:2-3). The domestic groups that comprise the military-industrial complex are the professional soldiers, managers and owners of industries engaged in defence supply, high governmental officials whose careers and interests are tied to military expenditure and legislators whose constituencies benefit from defence procurement. These core groups are supported by associated groups such as scientists and engineers engaged in defence-\(^6\) Moreover, given one of the recently agreed protocols to deal with the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon reads “It does not affect the right of Ireland or any other Member State to determine the nature and volume of its defence and security expenditure and the nature of its defence capabilities”, there is little chance the EU will be able to determine levels of defence expenditure in the near future.\(^7\) There are some exceptions such as the European Commission’s success in gaining regulatory power over some defence procurement and DG-Enterprise’s role in furthering the defence and aerospace sector.\(^8\) This rather obscure research priority of the EU’s 7\(^{th}\) Framework Programme for research deserves more attention that it gets. The security research priority only carries a budget of a mere €1.4 billion across the seven year programme, which is dwarfed by the €9 billion for information technology or the €6billion for health research and is one of ten thematic areas for research funding. However, the European Union is correct when, on its CORDIS (Community Research and Development Information Service) website, it described the security research priority as “an important building block for supporting European freedom, security and justice.” CORDIS claims the priority will “contribute to developing technologies and capabilities in support of other European Community policies in areas such as transport, civil protection, energy, environment and health”, while close links are being maintained to defence procurement and research being carried out within the European Defence Agency (EDA).
related research and trade unions representing those employed in the defence industry. These people are said to occupy important positions within the internal political structures of the major arms-producing states and

“This exercise their influence in a co-ordinated and mutually-beneficial way to achieve and maintain optimal levels of military expenditure and war preparation, and to direct national security policy.” (Rosen, 1973: 3)

Their power is seen as outweighing any countervailing forces. The theory also implies the permanence of such power; that is to say that it does not depend on the politicians in power at the time. According to Rosen the military-industrial complex rationalises high levels of defence expenditure with a theory of international relations that mirrored the ideology of the Cold War (Rosen, 1973:3). Theorists disagree on whether this ideology is caused by a deliberately manufactured version of the world made up by the military-industrial complex to further its own aims or whether it is caused by a military false consciousness of threat that arises automatically as a result of high defence spending. In the latter case the military-industrial complex is regarded as mistakenly acting in what it thinks is the national interest rather than purely for their own self-aggrandisement. In either case however the complex requires a belief in the inevitability of international conflict to exist in order for it to survive. In other words, it requires what Cunningham (2004) calls the domestic hegemony of US militarism.

I have argued elsewhere (Mawdsley, 2000) that analytically this does not work as well in Europe. The level of military permeation of US society at all levels is simply not replicated in any European state at present, which reduces the number of those gaining from the situation and the importance of the lobby group. Moreover, the level of state involvement in and ownership of European defence firms is different to the situation in the US where defence industry is and has almost always been in private hands: despite the privatisation of many European defence firms and large-scale mergers of firms similar to those seen in the 1990s in the US, such mergers have tended to be politically rather than financially driven (with the exception perhaps of BAE Systems more recent development). The directorial role of the state is still important and this alters the way in which the actors involved in the MIC behave. For example, unlike in the US, there has not been a consistent and coordinated definition of common interests between European militaries, MoD officials and defence firms. European military officers have often favoured US defence technology over homemade equivalents for example but have been forced to accept sometimes substandard domestic products by politicians. Finally, while there is certainly an argument that the Europeanisation of the military and security technology policies brings policy-making to a Brussels, which offers a lobbying culture not dissimilar to that of Washington, defence and security budgets remain in the hands of the member states not the EU institutions and have not mirrored the large spending increases seen in the US since 2001 remaining historically fairly low. This means that whether or not an MIC exists in Brussels, it does not have much financial power.

Does this mean MIC theories have no place in an analysis of the EU? The paper wants to make two arguments, namely, that it is still worthwhile to look at the types of relationships MIC theorists highlight,

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9 It should be noted that the military-industrial complex theory was largely developed to explain the American case and, to a lesser extent, that of the former Soviet Union during the arms races. The US-centric nature of the theory is clear see (Lens, 1971; Koistinen, 1980 or Higgs, 1990) for examples of this.

10 This is not to downplay the significant amounts of money being spent on security and defence within the EU institutions: within the financial perspective of 2007-13, €7.74 billion is planned to be spent on EU external security policies from the EU budget (€3.4 billion for Galileo of which €2.4 billion has been reallocated from other areas of expenditure, €1.2 billion for Global Monitoring for the Environment and Security, €1.4 billion for security research and at least €1.74 billion for common foreign and security policy expenditure) (figures taken from European Parliament records). In addition the European Defence Agency annual budget is around €30 million and the official funding for the security research programme is only a part of the money being spent by the EU on security technologies. In 2007 for example DG- Information Society and Media funded projects worth €89 million in the field of ICT security. There are likely to be a further three ICT security-related calls during the 7th Framework Programme. A further joint call closing in November 2007 with DG-Enterprise and Industry for projects on critical infrastructure protection had a budget of €40 million (Security Europe, 2008). It is unclear how much of DG-Justice, Freedom and Security's €5.3 billion programme budget for 2007-13 will go on the development of security technologies but it is likely that they will play a role. However this is still low compared to British, French or German national budgets.
and also that given the new ESDP institutions are operating in a largely strategy-free zone, as there is not sufficient agreement among member states on security threats and responses to have established a strategic culture\textsuperscript{11}, coupled with the Commission’s desire to expand its role in this policy field, the situation could easily lead to mission creep. Firstly, as Lovering argues,

“The implicit ahistoricism, ethnocentrism (or US-centrism), and empiricism underlying the concept of the MIC mean that at best it only describes, rather than theorises, the organisational relationships to which it directs attention\textsuperscript{12}.” (Lovering, 1986: 2)

However, this is not to say that close attention to the relationships detailed by MIC theorists is not appropriate in the EU of today. My work on individual member states suggested that following this domestic pressures logic, meant attention needed to be paid to state-defence industry relations, state-military relations in the form of strategic culture and to the way in which officials tasked with managing the interface between defence firms and the military understood their role. Clearly, the complicated governance of security within the EU does not lend itself easily to such an analysis. Nevertheless, it seems worth considering the relations between EU institutions and defence and security firms; the understandings of their own role held by, for example, EDA officials and Commission officials commissioning security research; and finally the impact of the EU not having a strategic culture on its emerging policies on security and military technology. Secondly, critical studies of militarism correctly point to the importance of the way in which institutions and processes and then the public can be socialised by a determined elite into thinking primarily in terms of security. Most famously for example, in his work C Wright Mills linked,

“the war danger to the emergence of a society dominated by a power elite, in which thinking, participating publics were being transformed into powerless masses...Sociological explanation consisted not in reducing militarism to prior socio-economic causes, but in analysing the permeation of social processes and social institutions by war preparation.” (Shaw, 1984: 6-7)

If the EU’s new security institutions are really acting in a strategic vacuum but need to justify their existence, this, coupled with the Commission’s desire to expand their competence in the security and defence field, may mean that the EU institutions would be particularly vulnerable to such socialisation if such a power elite can be identified.

A similar re-consideration needs to take place with the models used to understand international pressures impacting on the military sector for them to have much purchase on the contemporary EU. In much of the strategic studies literature this phenomenon is generally unhelpfully conceptualised by arms-racing. As Buzan and Herring (1998) point out, this suggests periods of intense competition between states to gain or regain supremacy in military technology. This is not an accurate representation of EU security politics. However, while there is no real agreement between member states on whether or not there is a state-based threat against which the EU must compete in terms of military preparedness and sophistication, various member states do have these concerns domestically\textsuperscript{13}. There are also two arguments that suggest action-reaction models may have some validity. Firstly, given the EU is generally faulted for lacking a strategic culture (Rynning, 2003), then it is perhaps inevitable that its security actions are more likely to be reactions to other actors, be it in the form of following the USA down particular tracks such as the adaptation of armed forces into an expeditionary warfare model (Forster, 2006), or strengthening security in response to a perceived threat such as the counter-terrorism policy responses after both the Madrid and London bombings. Secondly, as military and security technologies in recent years have spun out of civilian technologies, the EU’s longstanding rivalry in civilian technology with the USA (increasingly too China is viewed as a potential rival) might also bring competition into the picture (James, Mawdsley and

\textsuperscript{11} When we think of national strategic cultures, analysts draw on nationally specific attributes of security beliefs and policies generated by historical experience, the shared attitudes and beliefs which inform policy-making and the continuities and trends that can be observed in national defence policies.

\textsuperscript{12} Dunne (1995: 411) agrees arguing that, "There is no clear conceptualization of the MIC. Indeed the concept appears to be most of value as a descriptive rather than an analytical concept."

\textsuperscript{13} For example, East European states are very concerned about Russia, and some French politicians are keen to the EU to catch up with the USA in military technology.
Citi, 2009). Moreover, nowadays competition in military and security technology means not just competition about possession of the technology, but also the means to control or regulate the environment in which the technology will be used. Regulatory power is crucial for the EU’s international stature and thus this does matter. This means that the idea of an action-reaction model, whereby the EU and its member states change their security posture and their analysis of the security and military technologies needed to sustain it in response to another state or non-state actor’s actions, may have some value. The paper will therefore also consider the way in which the EU’s military and security technology agendas respond to external pressures.

**Domestic Pressures**

**The EU and Defence and Security Industry**

Without a doubt, whenever the EU enters into a new policy field then organised interest representation will soon follow. Mazey and Richardson (2006: 248) suggest that in general when the EU becomes a significant venue for policy-making then a certain trajectory of institutionalised interaction between the EU and interests groups follows. They make three theoretical assumptions: bureaucracies tend to construct relationships with interest groups to stabilise the policy environment; interest groups prefer state bureaucracies as a venue to learn about and influence policy; and interest groups will try to exploit new opportunities (structures or venues) to increase their ability to shape policy. This model appears to work when the EU and military or security technology policy is considered.

Let us look at the way in which relations between EU institutions and defence and security firms operate. Given there is a widespread acceptance that democratic control of armaments policy at the national level is far from perfect (Blunden, 1989), it is unsurprising that the spectre of a EU military-industrial complex dominated by the interests of several large transnational or multinational defence firms, has been raised by some. Jünemann and Schörning (2002) argued that particularly within the aerospace sector, where political and economic pressures have forced mergers to create three heavyweight firms in the shape of EADS, Thales and BAE Systems, large defence firms have a disproportionate and undemocratic impact on EU policy-making in this area. They also suggested that the Commission’s desire to gain influence over the defence market is leading them to collude inappropriately with these firms in policy-making initiatives such as the Star 21 Report on the future of aerospace industry and the Group of Personalities report on security research. As Giles Merritt notes:

“To ensure that the Commission should not appear a lone voice crying in the wilderness, it has set about recruiting allies in industry to reinforce its message on defence cooperation” (Merritt, 2004: 238).

The ease of access that EADS, Thales and BAE Systems especially, but also other defence firms, have to the decision-making levels of the EU should not be underestimated. This is not just through their traditional political supporters in their ‘home’ markets to the Council but also to the Commission. It has become increasingly clear that these three firms are trying to set the agenda of defence industrial policy-making in Europe. Acting either individually or as a group of three the companies have become ever more open in their attempts to mould any emerging European defence industrial policy in a manner favourable to their interests. The stress laid by European states on the creation of large prime contractors, has meant that the results enjoy better access to national and European decision-making structures than their peers, thus forming an important lobby group that is largely unopposed, and this imbalance has impacted on policy. Many defence firms have also recently invested in growing capacities in security technology, and there is a marked crossover between those contributing to the making of defence industrial policy and those on security industry.

Individual firms’ actions are also strengthened by the presence of a powerful lobby organisation in Brussels; the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), which represents the

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aeronautics, space, defence and security industries in Europe. ASD is far more than just a lobby group although it does coordinate the lobbying efforts of the equivalent national associations. As its website shows it coordinates Commission funded research projects like SETRAS, a research study about enhancement of critical infrastructure protection measures and security standards. It also manages cooperation projects with third countries for the Commission. This shows how mutual dependence starts to exist between groups like this and the Commission.

Finally, the European Commission makes heavy use of expert groups to ‘guide’ security policy development. Here DG-Enterprise’s security research programme offers a good example. There is an official Security Research Advisory Group (SecAG) of experts, nominated by the Commission to guide the Commission in planning future security research programmes. Out of twenty members, the composition is seven large defence firms, three security firms, EDA, four end-users (Poland, Malta, Romania and Estonia), three research institutes (Finland, Israel, Netherlands), Swedish defence research agency and the Austrian Red Cross. There is also a European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) consisting of seventy members nominated by the Commission and member states, who are tasking with drawing up a medium to long term strategy for security research. Given that the security research programme is meant to be civilian, again there seems to be an over-representation of defence firms and interests.

Turning to the EDA, industry links are also clear and inevitable given the EDA is tasked with ensuring the future of the European defence technological and industrial base. Interestingly, the EDA seems rather more careful than the Commission in its relations with defence firms. Possibly the multidimensional role it has been asked to undertake makes it more aware of potential conflicts of interest. It publishes (in an easy to find location) an annual list of all the contracts it has entered into and it seems genuinely open to all with expertise to participate in its CAPTECH network (the main task of a CapTech group is to propose R&T activities in response to agreed Defence Capability needs, to generate collaborative projects and oversee their management). However, as the first defence technology projects are still in their infancy, it is unclear whether the first projects will spawn other larger projects that would be more lucrative to industry. The EDA has only been running since 2005 and so has a much shorter history of interaction with defence firms than the Commission. It is not yet clear whether the EDA’s intergovernmental nature will ensure that national defence industrial interests will be pursued by each member state as in the past within the WEU, or whether the EDA will develop sufficient agency to be viewed as an actor in its own right, in which case its relations with specific firms will become more important.

What does this evidence tell us about the representation of defence and security industrial interests within the EU? Ojanen has suggested that a constituency pressing for defence integration on its terms now exists, composed of defence industrial interests and the European Commission, which not only claims competence in the civilian side of crisis management but has claimed a growing number of powers over defence procurement, defence research and defence industrial policy (Ojanen, 2002). This is perhaps only a very limited form of an MIC but it does seem to share some of its characteristics. Moreover, some MEPs have long been vociferous supporters of defence technology. Karl von Wogau is perhaps the most prominent, being the chair of the EP defence sub-committee and amongst other things an advisory board member of the “Security and Defence Agenda”, a “think-tank” nominated in Corporate Europe Observatory’s inaugural “Worst EU Lobbying Award” (2005) for “being the arms industry’s weapon of mass disinformation” (Hayes, 2006). The Security and Defence Agenda provides a meeting area for this advocacy coalition– its parent organisation is the consultancy firm Forum Europe, but security and defence industrial and other corporate sponsorship fund its activities.

The Motivations of the Commission and EDA

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15 http://www.asd-europe.org/content/default.asp?PageID=1
16 Israel is an FP7 participating state and is strongly represented in security research.
If Ojanen (2002) is correct, and the European Commission is proactively fostering the interests of defence and security industry in its policy-making, the question of why must be asked. Is the Commission simply trying to expand its competence and recruiting allies from industry as Merritt (2004) suggested? There certainly seemed to be an element of institutional empire-building in the Commission’s behaviour, but careful consideration of the documentation suggests that they also have another understanding of their rationale for expanding their activities in this field; namely a conviction that a thriving defence and aerospace sector is crucial for Europe’s future economic and technological strength. It is in effect viewed as a strategic industrial sector. They also appear to view rivalry with the United States as key. This is unsurprising: EU-US trade relations have long been that of rivalry and both compete to regulate global markets, while on the military side EU-US relations are much more cordial and cooperative thanks to NATO, it is not surprising that the Commission working from a civilian trade perspective might view this somewhat differently.

The former Enterprise and Information Technology Commissioner Erkki Liikanen for instance clearly linked aerospace development with the EU's security-political ambitions, and hinted at the rivalry with the United States when presenting the Star 21 report on the future of the aerospace industry. “At successive European councils, Europe's leaders have defined ambitious economic, political, and social goals for the EU. This requires a competitive industrial base to meet these goals. We need to maintain a strong technological and industrial base in support of the European Security and Defence Policy. (The) aerospace (sector) makes a central contribution -- it is a high-tech industry requiring a highly skilled workforce, a heavy investment in research and development which has important spin-off benefits in many other areas. The industry has to compete on a global scale, and the competition is fierce -- naturally, especially from the United States.18n

It does seem very clear that the Commission are convinced that military and security technology is absolutely critical for the EU’s future and so must be furthered. One can easily analyse the security research programme as a cynical drip-feed of money to defence firms to keep them friendly with the Commission, as it manoeuvres to try to gain more power in the ESDP. However, interviews carried out by the author in Spring 2008 suggested very strongly that the Commission was convinced a) that security could be gained through technology and b) the security technology research needed to be funded to create an internal security technology market, which in turn would allow the Commission to regulate the security technology field and thus to control entry to it. Member states did not share these convictions with only Austria and Sweden having security research programmes prior to the Commission’s initiative. This does suggest a very strong technological imperative at work.

The EDA is also interesting in its understanding of its relationships to defence firms. The EDA is intended to give strategic focus to EU armaments efforts and so move towards solutions towards Europe’s armaments problems. There is a remarkable unanimity amongst all concerned though about the key problems to be addressed and the solutions to them:

- The supply side of the European defence market was too fragmented. Industrial consolidation and mergers were required in all sectors19.
- The demand side was also too fragmented and both national procurement regimes and military requirements needed to be harmonised20.
- The US concentration of military spending on procurement and most especially on research and development was desirable and needed emulating in Europe21.

18 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/
19 The problems for procurement officials in the future of dealing with the private monopolies that as Schmitt (2003) predicts will almost certainly be produced by this strategy, have thus far been tacitly ignored. Recent experience of private monopolies in other sectors e.g. Railtrack in the UK, suggests that this may be short-sighted.
20 The assumption that this is a major problem causing a major barrier to community trade, as the Commission claims (Commission, 1996:1997:2003a: 2003b), is difficult to verify especially given that the vast majority of defence procurement spending and arms production (including multinational collaboration) is concentrated in the same few member states, which have (in the 2000 Framework Agreement on defence industrial restructuring) agreed to remove many barriers to defence trade between them. Hartley (2006) attempts to quantify savings but readily admits that the figures are primarily from the early 1990s and that his assumptions could be challenged.
However, there is a very noticeable split between the two key member states, Britain and France, on what the role of the EDA should be doing. The British want the focus to be on increasing military capabilities through more efficient spending of existing resources, whereas the French want the EDA to act as an armaments agency and thus play a much greater role in supporting European defence industry. This disagreement has meant that the EDA has only been granted a limited budget and has not been able to play the sort of decisive role, that some of its proponents had hoped for.

Given the limited resources and lack of a clear strategic vision of its role, the EDA has attempted to begin to define its tasks itself. One key document that it has produced is the 2006 Long Term Vision report, which is meant to serve as a guide for defence planners. In a marked contrast to the European Security Strategy, which admittedly is not very strategic, the Long Term Vision report offers a gloomy picture of Europe’s future security needs. To quote from the Executive Summary:

“The global context is sobering, with the central predictions of demography and economics foreshadowing a Europe which, two decades hence, will be older, less pre-eminently prosperous, and surrounded by regions (including Africa and the Middle East) which may struggle to cope with the consequences of globalisation. Defence will need to contend with public finances under pressure from a growing pension burden; a shrinking recruitment pool; and societies increasingly cautious about interventional operations, concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force, and inclined to favour “security” over “defence” spending... Continued developments in micro-electronics, communication and sensing technologies, bio- and material sciences and energy technologies will provide modern Armed Forces with great advantages. But the adversary will work hard to adopt and exploit our own advances against us. Increasingly, defence will need to draw from the broadening flood of civil technological progress.” (EDA, 2006)

In many ways, the Long Term Vision report fits very well with MIC theorists’ claims about MIC actors creating a perception of threat as a way of claiming more financial and scientific resources to serve their own interests (perhaps in the EDA at the expense of the security technology agenda pushed by the Commission). But it also surely shows that there is a danger in creating an institution like the EDA, without having a clear idea about what it should do, and without the resources to even begin to really tackle Europe’s armaments problems. Frustration among EDA staff is thus inevitable. However, unless the EDA is given resources, it seems unlikely to replace the Commission as defence firms’ interlocutor of choice. The Long Term Vision report’s gloomy threat perceptions though also show the need to consider the impact of international pressures on the way that the EU tackles the security and defence technology agenda.

**International Pressures**

Thinking in terms of an action-reaction model may also help to understand the way in which EU policy on defence and security technologies is developing. There is after all a security rationale underpinning the decisions being made. The question is, if the EU lacks a strategic culture (Rynning, 2003), and is accused of operating in a strategy-free zone in external policy, does this make it more prone to over-react to external threats? As Cooper (2004) points out, the EU has deliberately focused itself on internal policies (given its formation was about abandoning traditional foreign policy in the shape of alliances and conflict, this is scarcely surprising), and its external policies are often little more than an external consequence of an internal policy. The 2003 European Security Strategy, despite articulating a number of interrelated ‘key threats’ – terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; state failure; and organized crime – fell short of addressing, beyond a vague common commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ and intervention, exactly how these perceived threats were to be managed. The ESS does not contain any ‘strategic objectives’ or ‘policy implications’. Does this lack of a strategic culture and indeed strategy matter? Clearly, the EU does not have centuries of military history and well-established security institutions to base its policy on: as Glasius and Kaldor (2005:63) point out the fact that ESDP

21 Although many US economists are rather less sanguine about US defence spending.
“is not mired in the institutional legacy of past wars and past military traditions” can be seen as a liberating factor. However, the EU also lacks the internal brake that a national strategic culture has on certain actions (military disasters can be useful). Responses to external security challenges will inevitably have an ad hoc element as the first military and civilian ESDP operations show. This lack also begs the question of whether excessive securitisation is actually more likely in an entity without an established strategic culture, and thus the maturity to recognise the danger or to deal sensibly with it (Bailes, 2008: 119). Certainly the overt rationale for the security research programme for example is a response to Al Qaeda and the threat of international terrorism, but increasingly the EU talks in terms of security across a bewildering array of policy fields. We have policies, committees and legislation on aviation security, border security, energy security, environmental security, food security, health security and social security to list just some. Security has been mainstreamed.

But if over-reaction to external threats is one way in which we can think of the EU’s security technology response, we also need to consider the other key argument that those using action-reaction models to explain growth in military sectors make, namely the important of competition with other states. There is a long-standing loose coalition of actors at the EU, often connected with the Kangaroo Group, who have argued that there is a clear link between security, economic growth and competitiveness, and research and technology (dating back to Servan-Schreiber’s 1967 seminal essay "Le Défi Américain"). Their competitive focus has one main focus: the USA. The enormous gap between US and European spending on defence technology has been a worry for West Europeans since the 1960s (James, 2006). Initially, this fear was expressed in military terms: could the military technology gap have a negative impact on the ability of West Europeans to fight effectively alongside the USA in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact? But there were wider concerns too. In an era where the US was making massive civilian technological advances based on the science produced by its huge defence technology programmes, the consequences of the transatlantic defence technology gap for European civilian scientific and business competitiveness was worrying. European politicians feared a “brain drain” of scientists and engineers to the US (Salomon, 1977). The economic challenge posed by growing US dominance of the emerging post-war industrial sectors was also a source of worry (Servan-Schreiber, 1967). While it could be argued that the technology gap has been much exaggerated, European anxieties have reappeared time and again. The Reagan Administration’s “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s generated concern in Europe about the implications for European high technology industry, as has increased spending on defence and homeland security R&D under the Bush Administration 2001-2009 (James, 2006). While objections to this hypothesis are clear: Japan was equally technologically successful in the 1980s without spending on defence technology, and as Pavitt (1998) points out the transatlantic technology gap is actually open to question: the assumption that high defence research spending equates to innovation is very questionable in an era where civilian technologies are being spun into defence rather than the other way around: it has produced an advocacy coalition around the idea that the EU must invest substantially more in defence and security technology to maintain a competitive advantage.

The way in which the ‘technological imperative’ is functioning as a driver of policy in the EU in this field is interesting. Overt comparisons with the US are made in every report on military or homeland security spending (it is rare that any critique is made of the way the US spends in these areas or a comparison made with any other state), and European states are found to be sadly wanting. However, there also seems to be a tacit acceptance that in terms of absolute spending, the gap will not be closed. Instead, the driver seems to be a) keeping at least in touch technologically with the USA and ahead of future rivals like China and b) avoiding ceding regulatory power over new technologies in the security and defence field to the USA. Thus, we can see high levels of funding dedicated to Galileo, arguments with the US over access to crucial technologies in the Joint Strike Fighter project and unwillingness amongst Europeans to completely reject US missile defence plans. One rationale for the security research programme given by interviewees was the need to prevent the USA from having free rein to decide on how the internal security environment should be regulated by setting the standards for new security technologies. The EU derives much of its power from being a regulator, so this aspect of competition is perhaps to be expected. It is perhaps the way in which the loose coalition making the case for a link between security, economic growth and competitiveness, and research and technology to be made in EU policy, has successfully
persuaded the EU elite to accept this logic almost unquestioned (despite the fact that is potentially quite problematic), that we can see visions of C Wright Mill’s power elite.

**Conclusions**

Balzacq (2008) argued that a focus on the ‘policy tools’ of internal and external security policies, rather than simply on the construction of security discourse, can offer useful insights for those concerned about the securitisation of the EU. This paper has focussed on the formulation of policy on security and military technologies as they act as enabling tools for internal and external security policies. It suggests that a strong industrial lobby group has become an intrinsic part of the policy-making network in this sector as it has been co-opted by the European Commission. This lobby goes largely unreported in the main literature on both ESDP and JHA, which is unfortunate as it raises questions about the democratic accountability of an elite security policy-making process that makes extensive use of expert industrial actors but excludes critical voices. However, this narrative is not just the familiar one of the over-influence of defence and security firms on security policy. There is also evidence that a technological imperative is influential in shaping the policy assumptions of the European Commission in particular. The belief that defence and security technologies are crucial to European economic and scientific competitiveness appears to be an important driving force. This too is absent from most of the available literature. The rhetoric of competition with the USA for example may help explain some policy decisions. Finally, the paper has briefly questioned whether the EU’s lack of a strategic culture may make these early signs of concerning developments more problematic. The initial conclusion is that this might indeed be the case. Lacking the emergency brake a strategic culture can offer, the EU is making policy on military and security technologies without a clear vision of what they should be used for (or if such a picture does exist within policy-making circles, it is not one with popular consent), this would seem to be potentially dangerous. Moreover, creating security institutions, such as the EDA, but not giving them clear tasks and resources, might run the risk that such institutions will inflate threats in order to legitimise their own existence and to gain extra resources.

The paper has drawn on insights from theories designed to explain the expansion of the military sector in the US and USSR during the Cold War to consider whether there really is cause for concern about the militarisation or securitisation of the EU. They have helped to show that there is evidence of a common agenda emerging between key defence and security industrial figures, the European Commission and some European politicians in the Parliament, around the need to support the defence technological and industrial base. However, there is not much evidence of military involvement. While the growing proportion of the EU budget being spent on internal and external security policies is a matter of concern as there seems to have been little open debate on the question, it is clear that security and defence expenditure is still predominantly carried out at the national level, which perhaps limits the problem. However, the secretive and elite driven policy-making on security and defence technologies is not sufficiently accountable either at the national or European parliament level. Unless scrutiny improves and more critical questions are asked about the assumptions underpinning policies, then these developments could indeed be problematic.

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