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Electoral Systems with Majority Bonus as Mixed Systems

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Abstract:

Among the large family of mixed electoral systems, list systems with majority bonus have largely been overlooked. Based on a comparison of regional elections in France and Italy, this article shows that these systems fit well in the typology of electoral systems as mixed systems. Their impact on the patterns of party competition can also be viewed as mixed, proportional and majoritarian dynamics being articulated by electoral coalitions. Because of these coalitions, disproportionality stands at an intermediate level between proportional and majoritarian systems.

Electoral Systems with Majority Bonus as Mixed Systems

Introduction

In the vast world of ‘exotic’ electoral systems, list systems with majority bonus have been largely overlooked. The majority bonus is seldom used at the national level, the main contemporary exceptions being Greece, and Italy since 2005. Since it is not often used, it is rarely included in classifications of electoral systems and even the terms or concepts to describe this system are not firmly established in the literature. Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) describe this system as ‘majority-assuring’, using the example of the Mexican electoral systems of 1988 and 1991 in which the party with the most single member tier seats gets automatically whatever number of list seats necessary to reach an absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber. They dismiss this category of electoral systems arguing bluntly that ‘these systems are rare and are likely to be found in countries of dubious democratic credentials’ (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 14).

This article argues that list systems with majority bonus can in fact be regarded as mixed systems, both in terms of taxonomy of rules and in terms of effects. Of course, and as most electoral systems categories, systems with majority bonus are vastly heterogeneous. We focus here on systems with three main characteristics: they include a list-based tier, they encompass a significant bonus, and provide explicit provisions for electoral coalitions. In this case, empirical observations mostly based on the Italian case have shown that disproportionality remain limited despite the bonus (D’Alimonte and Chiramonte 2010, Floridia 2008, Newell 2009). Because disproportionality depends not only on the electoral system but also on the spatial distribution of preferences, parties’ strategies and voters’ coordination, we aim at assessing the extent to which this outcome can be actually attributed to the working of this type of electoral system.

We do so by a comparison of regional elections in France and Italy. France and Italy are among the few countries which have implemented a list electoral system with majority bonus. France adopted a system with two rounds and a majority bonus of 25% of the seats in 2003 for regional elections. Italy has used a system with majority bonus at the regional level since 1995 for the same type of elections. Regional elections in these countries have interesting features in this regard. They present a generally similar context (same type of electoral system, same type of fragmented party system, same type of issues linked to regional elections) with interesting variations in the details of the electoral system. Moreover, building on regional elections means working with more cases, i.e. each region being considered as a single unit, even if we easily acknowledge that these cases are not truly independent from one another. To some extent, the format of the party system can also be considered to be partly exogenous from the regional context, as it derives more closely from the national dynamics. This should foster the specific impact of the electoral system on electoral outcome, circumventing partly the general issue of endogeneity in the study of electoral systems (Benoit 2002).

We proceed in four sections. The first section examines the issue of classification of this type of system and describes the two regional systems used in Italy and France. The second section provides a short theoretical discussion on the expected impact of electoral systems with bonus on patterns of party competition with application to the French and Italian cases. The next two sections propose the empirical study of respectively Italy and France. The last section concludes by a discussion of the classification of this type of system.

The taxonomy of systems with majority bonus

Considerable efforts of classification of electoral systems have been made in the two last decades to overcome the traditional divide between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, mostly as a result of the adoption of mixed electoral systems in various established and new democracies. After presenting the two main competing definitions of mixed systems, we argue that system with bonus represent a specific sub-type of mixed electoral system. Secondly, we present the electoral systems used in France and Italy for the regional elections, and how they illuminate defining characteristics of mixed electoral systems with majority bonus.

Mixed electoral systems

There are two main definitions of mixed electoral systems in the literature. The first one, that is also the broadest, was developed by Massicotte and Blais (1999). They consider that a given electoral system can be characterized as mixed “if its mechanics involves *the combination of different electoral formulas (plurality or PR, majority or PR) for an election to a single body*” (Massicotte and Blais 1999, 345). They add that mixed systems in their essence must “incorporate opposed principles”, i.e. the mix of majoritarian and proportional principles. Later definitions have argued that this initial definition is too broad, because it is extremely common for countries using proportional electoral systems to use also plurality or majority formulas in some specific electoral districts. Therefore, Shugart and Wattenberg proposed the following definition: “mixed electoral systems are defined as a subset of the broader category of *multiple-tier* electoral systems. (...) with the specific proviso that one tier must entail allocation of seats *nominally* whereas the other must entail allocation of seats *by lists*” (2003, 10). This second definition is more specific in that this entails the existence of two different mechanisms of repartition of the seats for each tier. The authors also distinguish between mixed majoritarian electoral systems, in which there is no linkage between the two tiers, leading to a *parallel* distribution of the seats, and mixed proportional electoral systems, in which the number of seats attributed in the list part depends partially on the number of seats attributed in the nominal tier. These later systems have often been qualified as *compensatory*, the national German electoral system being the most prominent example.

Where do electoral systems with majority bonus stand in these definitions? These systems can be defined as *electoral systems combining the proportional allocation of seats to lists with the allocation of a bonus of seats to the forefront runner in the election*. This subset of systems offers

a great number of variations. The bonus can be ‘compensatory’, linking the size of the bonus to the results obtained by the winner or the size of the bonus is fixed *ex ante*. In that case, the bonus is parallel. These systems can use single or multiple tiers. The bonus can be attached to a list in a proportional competition, to the aggregate number of seats won in single member districts, or even to an election for another office. Finally, the size of the majority bonus can vary, from a few seats to an overwhelming majority in the assembly.

The literature on mixed electoral systems has been rather elusive when it came to this type of systems, as they do not fit very well the existing definitions: indeed, they do not necessarily use a combination of electoral formulas or multiple tiers, so that in principle, some of them can be described as mixed electoral systems, and some not. Yet, these systems undoubtedly combine majoritarian and proportional principles in the allocation of seats, as all of them are the results of the double objective of representing a large spectrum of parties *and* ensuring a stable governing majority.

Massicotte and Blais do classify these systems within the category of mixed-systems using “conditional dependent combinations” (1999, 357). They use the two historical examples of the 1923 and 1953 Italian electoral laws, the “legge Acerbo” and the so-called “legge truffa”.¹ The law of 1923 specified that two thirds of the seats would be awarded to the party obtaining a plurality of the national vote in the list part, provided that this party gets at least 25% of the votes. The 1953 electoral system followed the same logic: the party getting the plurality of the national vote would automatically get two thirds of the seats.

Mixed systems with majority bonus are still in use. At the national level, Italy has implemented it since 2005 through a system that has been qualified as ‘bonus-adjusted proportional representation’ (Renwick 2010), where the winning coalition gets 55% of the seats in the lower chamber,² and Greece since 1990 through what has been labeled as “reinforced PR”. In this system, proportional representation is complemented by a bonus of 40 seats out of 300 for the party winning a plurality of the votes. This type of system exists for local governments as well, and especially for municipal and regional elections in France and Italy.

Electoral systems for regional elections in France and Italy

Since 1995 in Italy and 2003 in France, regional councils are elected by mixed electoral system with majority bonus. Variants of this system are used at the municipal, provincial, and even the national level for the lower and the upper houses since 2005 in Italy. France has been using a system with majority bonus for municipal elections since 1983.

France uses a two-round electoral system with PR and majority bonus for regional elections. The council is elected for 6 years, and the lists compete at the regional level. If a list gets an absolute

¹ Literally, “Scam law”.

² For the higher chamber, Italy has also a system with a majority bonus. The bonus is however distributed on a regional basis, hence the difficulties encountered since the elections of 2013. See Minaldi, Riolo, 2013 for instance.

majority of the votes in the first round, it gets twenty five per cent of the seats, while the rest of the seats is attributed to all lists getting at least 5 per cent of the votes, including the winning list. If no list gets a majority of the votes, a second round is organized, in which only the lists above a threshold of ten per cent of the votes in the first round can compete. Between the first and the second round, lists which got between 5 and 10 per cent of the votes can merge with the lists competing in the second round. In the second round, the list getting a plurality of the votes is automatically allocated twenty five per cent of the seats, while the rest of the seats are allocated proportionally between all of the lists that got at least 5 per cent of the votes (including the winning list). In other words, the French regional electoral system uses a single tier, a bonus that is fixed and rather high electoral thresholds.

The Italian case is more difficult to grasp, as not only the system is extremely complex, but not all regions use the exact same system. For simplicity reasons and space constraints, we describe here only the most general system for ‘ordinary’ regions without specific adaptations (for details on the other cases, see appendix and Floridaia 2005). The general pattern is provided by the so-called “legge Tatarella” of 1995, putting in place the direct election of the president of region and the implementation of the new electoral system. The general principle is that voters are given two votes: one to choose a list at the provincial level (list vote), and one to choose a candidate for the presidency of the region elected with a plurality system (nominal vote). Notice however that candidates for the presidency are at the same time head of a regional list. Usually, provincial lists are run by parties. Regional lists generally represent coalitions of parties running the provincial lists.

All provincial lists are linked to a candidate for the presidency. The voter can choose to cast one, or two votes (one for the provincial list, one for a candidate, or both), and has a right to choose a different list and candidate. Eighty per cent of the seats are allocated to provincial lists through a proportional system using the Droop quota. The threshold to get seats is either 3 per cent of the votes at the provincial level list vote or to be part of a coalition getting at least 5 per cent of the list votes. The remainders are then allocated to a higher regional tier, called *collegio unico regionale*.

The twenty per cent of the seats not linked to provincial lists are allocated to the regional lists. If the winner of the regional presidency election is elected by less than fifty per cent of the votes, all seats go the regional list she is heading. If the winner of this regional presidency election is elected by more than fifty per cent of the votes, the list she is heading gets only half of these seats (meaning ten per cent of all assembly seats), whereas the ten remaining per cent are distributed proportionally in the *collegio unico*. In any case, the coalition supporting the winning candidate is guaranteed fifty five per cent of the seats of the regional council if the provincial list gets less than forty per cent of the votes and sixty per cent of the seats if the provincial lists gets more than forty per cent of the votes. Therefore, if after the attribution of the bonus, the number of seats obtained is inferior to fifty five or sixty per cent, new seats are created until these thresholds are met.

The regional Italian electoral system is therefore particularly complex, even in the simplest case. The “standard” Tatarella system uses three different tiers (province, *collegio unico regionale*, region), the bonus is ‘compensatory’ and majority-ensuring at once, its size varies according to the votes obtained in the proportional part, and it associates a proportional formula with a

majoritarian formula. The regions in which variations to the 1995 electoral law have been adapted all share these characteristics as well (multiple tiers, compensatory bonus and the existence of two distinct electoral formulas).

Despite significant differences, the French and Italian electoral systems for regional elections offer similar characteristics: they include a significant bonus for the winner, usually a coalition of parties, and leave room for representation of minorities. These two aims are made possible by the intermediation of (pre)-electoral coalitions, between rounds in France, between the provincial and regional levels in Italy. The working of these coalitions is our key focus to understand the impact of mixed systems with majority bonus in France and Italy.

Systems with majority bonus: expected outcomes

As pointed out by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), electoral systems with majority bonus are, by definition, “majority-assuring” systems. This does not mean that the party with most votes always secures an absolute majority of seats in the assembly, except for a specific provision, as in Italy. A majority of fifty five (or sixty) per cent of the seats of regional councils is automatically awarded to the winner. In France, if not automatic, the likelihood of not having a majority is extremely small for the front-runner in the election. It entails a conjunction of unfavorable factors and high fragmentation of the electorate among several middle-sized parties. Since the bonus represents twenty five per cent of the seats of the regional assembly and there is only one regional tier for the decision on the bonus, the front runner needs only twenty five per cent of the votes to be certain to get a majority. Taking into account rounding effects, those of the D’Hondt method used for the proportional apportionment of seats, the threshold of ten per cent to move to the second round, and the limited probability of having several lists with exactly the same electoral support, having a hanged majority is simply implausible.

In most majority bonus systems, the allocation of the bonus is then almost decisive for the outcome of the election. In this perspective, this type of system follows a strong majoritarian logic, making it possible to manufacture a majority with an equivalent vote share or even less than in a plurality system for instance. In this regard, if this mechanical effect is rightly anticipated by parties or voters, the equilibrium of the game is a two-party competition, the actual prize of the race being the bonus.

However, the majority bonus systems of interest here are also based on a proportional allocation with moderate thresholds of representation. Fragmentation should therefore be significantly high (Cox 1997, Taagepera and Shugart 1989).

These two readings of the system of bonus are both inadequate because both hold part of the truth. And this does not mean that disproportionality reaches unprecedented levels under such systems as this could be expected from majoritarian systems in fragmented party systems. Systems with majority bonus under consideration here can accommodate the two logics thanks to the existence of coalitions. They allow both fragmentation in the proportional component of the system and coordination through coalitions or blocks in the competition for the bonus. Multiple

parties can compete in the provinces of Italy or in the first round of French regional elections and coalesce at the regional level in Italy or in the runoff in France. And the impact of such a configuration on disproportionality should in fact be intermediary between pure proportional or majoritarian visions because of the working of coalition building.

A more precise set of hypotheses on fragmentation and disproportionality can now be achieved by looking at the details of the Italian and French systems.

Considering fragmentation first, an initial reading of the incentives to capture the bonus leads to predict the emergence of a two blocks competition while the proportional component foster multiparty competition. Notice however two important differences between France and Italy. In Italy, the bonus is decided in an almost pure³ majoritarian competition, the election of the President of the region. In France, the runoff structures the distribution of all seats. Then, an incentive exists either to exclude smaller parties from the coalition if they are not needed to get the bonus so as not to share it with them or, for smaller parties, not to enter coalition if they think they can be better off by not entering coalition⁴. Looking at fragmentation of parties now, the viability of parties is determined is determined by the explicit thresholds of the two systems, as both are based on districts of large enough magnitude. The threshold in Italy is in fact quite low because any party being part of a coalition making at least 5 per cent of the votes is eligible in the seat distribution, meaning effective thresholds (Lijphart 1994) extremely low. In France, on the contrary, the threshold of 5 per cent to get seats is in fact not the decisive threshold. As, in most cases, not party reaches an absolute majority of the votes in the first round, the threshold of ten per cent of the votes to move to the second round represent the effective threshold. The following hypotheses can be thus derived on the patterns of party competition:

H1. The number of coalitions is determined by the majoritarian component of the system, the number of parties by the proportional component; hence,

H1a: The number of coalitions should be lower in Italy compared to France because the electoral system encompasses only one tier in France, two in Italy.

H1b: The fragmentation of coalitions should be higher in Italy compared to France because the effective threshold is lower in Italy compared to France.

Considering now disproportionality, we expect levels between those expected in proportional and majoritarian systems. This hypothesis is the result of two contradicting logics. The bonus, in itself, is huge force towards disproportionality because of its very nature. Yet, this is compensated by the fact that, in most cases, the bonus is given to a coalition and not to a party. Within coalitions, we expect seats to be distributed on a proportional basis, as shown in the study of various electoral coalition settings (Golder 2006, Le Breton and van der Straeten 2013). The “Gamson law” (Carroll and Cox 2007) indeed appears to hold for electoral agreements as well.

³ ‘Almost’ because the bonus linked to this election can be compensatory if the winner gets more than fifty per cent of the votes.

⁴ Several reasons can explain this preference, as, for instance, the electoral cost of entering a coalition for next elections. Most arguments applied to minority government formation can be applied here as well. See Strom (1990).

The bonus should therefore benefit to a number of parties, thus limiting its effect on disproportionality at the coalition level. At the level of coalitions, disproportionality should differ in accordance with the type of bonus involved in the process. With a fixed bonus of twenty five per cent of the seats, disproportionality is expected to be significant in France. The Italian case is more nuanced as the bonus is of diverse nature: it is at the same time compensatory (because it depends on the electoral outcome and is lower for large victories) and majority assuring. Because of the existence of two thresholds (fifty per cent for the regional presidency race and forty per cent in the provincial race), significant discontinuities in disproportionality are expected. However, disproportionality is generally smaller when the score of the winner trespasses these thresholds. If H1a is true and competition in Italy tends to oppose two blocks, disproportionality should tend to be rather small, the maximum bonus a coalition can secure being inferior to twenty per cent. Hence the following set of hypotheses on disproportionality:

H2. Disproportionality due to the bonus system is located at the coalition level; hence,

H2a: Disproportionality should be higher in France compared to Italy because the bonus is significant and parallel, holding H1a as true.

H2b: Disproportionality within coalitions should be close to zero in both cases, thus decreasing the overall level of disproportionality.

These various hypotheses are tested on two series of regional elections in France and Italy, between 2004 and 2010. The main indicators are the degree of bipolarization (computed as the proportion of votes secured by the two main coalitions), the effective number of parties (Neff, see Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) computed either at the provincial list level or for the first round of election, and the Least square index of disproportionality (Lsq, see Gallagher 1991). Lsq is computed based on party votes at the provincial level or the first round. We provide Lsq both for all parties and considering only the winning coalition.

Regional elections in Italy under a mixed system with majority bonus, 2005-2010

The context of the Italian regional elections of 2005 and 2010 can be summarized in few words: as it is now traditionally the case of regional contests in Italy, the electoral outcomes were strongly influenced by the national political environment and the “electoral cycles” (Chiaramonte and Barbieri 2007, Baldi and Tronconi 2010). As a result, the elections of 2005 witnessed a very clear victory of the center-left coalition that won 11 out of the 13 regions,⁵ following the European elections of 2004, and their future victory in the national elections of 2006. The outcomes of 2010 were more balanced, as the center-right coalition won in 6 regions (regaining 4 of the regions lost in 2005), and the center-left in 7 regions.

⁵ In this paper, only the regional contests in Ordinary regions are analyzed. Abruzzo is excluded from the comparison, since elections were held in 2008 because of the demission of the president of the region before the end of the term.

The regional Italian electoral law provides strong incentives for bipolarization: the direct election of the head executive through a majoritarian, FPTP system, the existence of a majority bonus encouraging the formation of coalitions as large as deemed necessary to secure the bonus, and thresholds of representation that are lower for parties belonging to a coalition than for those competing on their own (Plescia, 2010). We expect that the number of coalition is determined by the majoritarian part of the electoral system, here, by the FPTP system. Indeed, competition appears to take an almost pure bipolar form in Italy: ninety seven per cent of the votes in 2005, and ninety three per cent in 2010 were cast in favour of the two leading coalitions (see Table 1 for summary statistics; detailed results are provided in the appendix). This result suffers almost no regional exception. The ‘least’ bipolarized regions are Basilicata and Emilia-Romagna in 2010, with almost eighty nine per cent of the votes in favour of the leading coalitions. It is difficult to disentangle what stems from the regional electoral system from what results from the format of the national competition. Indeed, the national Italian party system is also characterized by an almost perfect bipolarism in 2006, slightly tempered in 2008 (ninety four per cent of votes for the two leading coalitions, D’Alimonte, Chiaramonte, 2006, 2008). As electoral systems for regional and legislative elections, their impact can thus be viewed as reinforcing.

Table 1. *Bipolarization, fragmentation, and disproportionality in Italian regional elections, 2005-2010*

	Elections 2005				Elections 2010			
	<i>Bipolarization^a</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lsq</i>	<i>Within-coalition Lsq</i>	<i>Bipolarization</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lsq</i>	<i>Within-coalition Lsq</i>
Mean	96.6	6.3	3.8	3.4	93.1	5.3	5.3	4.3
Standard Deviation	2.5	2.3	0.7	1.3	3.8	1.3	1.7	2.4
Minimum	90.2	3.4	2.6	1.3	88.8	3.7	3.0	1.3
Maximum	99.1	10.3	4.9	6.0	100.0	7.9	9.3	8.7

Source: Our elaboration of the electoral results of the Archivio Storico delle Elezioni of the Ministero dell’Interno.


a. The indicator on bipolarization indicates the percentage of votes in favour of the two leading candidates for presidency leading the regional lists

Still, the bipolarism of competition in the regional elections in Italy is fundamentally fragmented, as evidenced by the effective number of parties getting votes. This is not a surprising result given the strong incentives to expand the coalitions and provide a large menu of choice to the voters, in addition with the low electoral threshold, enabling small parties to secure more easily representation when belonging to a coalition. The number of effective parties reaches an impressive 6.3 in 2005, (“only” 5.3 in 2010). What is more puzzling than the level of fragmentation is the fact that the coalitions formed in Italian regions have been almost always

surplus coalitions, including more parties than needed to win the election.⁶ The only notable exceptions were actually the regions in which the electoral contest has been the more fiercely disputed, the most prominent example being Lazio, 2005. In many regions, competition has taken the form of vast, fragmented coalitions despite the fact the leading coalition has won quite easily: Veneto, Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, and Basilicata. This might be the sign of a deliberate strategy to involve more parties in the coalition than what would be reasonably needed to secure the majority bonus. This is probably again, partly the result of the national logics of the party systems, and the necessity to preserve potential coalition partners. It can also be viewed as a kind of insurance mechanism in an environment characterized by volatility.

Finally, the disproportionality between votes and seats remains very limited both overall and within winning coalitions: 3.8% in 2005, and 5.3% overall, 3.4% in 2005 and 4.3% in 2010 within the winning coalitions. Therefore, the regional Italian electoral system does not “distort” greatly the results insofar as the actual distribution of seats does not over-represent greatly the winning coalition (Figure 1). In 2005, the winning coalition has obtained on average 6 percentage points of seats more than its share of votes (5.6 in 2010). In any case, disproportionality within the winning coalition remain lower than the overall level of disproportionality.

Figure 1. *Distortion between vote share and seat distribution in the Italian regional elections, 2005-2010*



Regional elections in Italy generally meet our expectations in terms of patterns of party competition: it is strongly bipolarized, highly fragmented and weakly disproportional. France offers a contrasted picture.

⁶ See Appendix, tables 2-3, Patterns of coalitions in the regional Italian elections, 2005-2010.

Regional elections in France under a two round proportional system with majority bonus, 2004-2010

The majority bonus system has been introduced in France as a remedy to the major crisis of 1998, when several regional right-wing leaders made coalitions with the National Front to keep their offices (Perrineau and Reynié 1999). The reform introduced a majority bonus into a formerly pure proportional system. The overall goal of the reform was achieved as regions have had stable majorities since 2004 and the *cordon sanitaire* around the National Front was shortly re-established (Dolez and Laurent 2005). This should not however be attributed to the sole effect of the electoral system as electoral coalition with the National Front might have emerged if the expected electoral effect of such a kind of alliance would not have been viewed as so negative.

The bipolarization of the competition in the regional elections appears as much more limited than in Italy, as expected given the threshold of access in the second round. In the first round, the leading coalitions get, on average, less than sixty percent of the votes (see Table 2 and appendix for detailed results). Even in the second round after the list mergers, the concentration of votes in favour of the two leading coalitions is, on average, eighty seven per cent in 2005 and eighty eight per cent in 2010. Bipolarization is therefore strong, but not absolute. In the vast majority of cases, three lists compete in the second round of the election.⁷ There is a basic constraint on coalition building in the French regional elections: no crossing of the national coalition lines. This means that the National Front is systematically excluded from coalitions, and that no centrist coalition has been possible from 2007 (Sauger 2010). The competition takes place between two main blocks, one on the left led by the Socialist Party, and one on the right led by the UMP. Coalition tends to always prevail within blocks, and when it is not the case, this is the result of failed negotiations, with few examples between within the right in 2004 and within the left in 2010. Therefore, in the second round, there are usually more than two coalitions competing, and these coalitions tend to be widely inclusive.

Table 2. *Bipolarization, fragmentation, and disproportionality in French regional elections, 2004-2010*

	Elections 2004					Elections 2010				
	<i>bipolarization^a</i>	<i>Bipolarization 2nd round</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lsq</i>	<i>within- coalition Lsq</i>	<i>bipolarization</i>	<i>Bipolarization 2nd round</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lsq</i>	<i>within- coalition Lsq</i>
Mean	59,9	87,5	4,4	11,5	2,3	58,5	87,8	4,7	11,3	2,9
S.D	6,6	6,9	0,6	0,8	1,8	5,3	8,1	0,5	1,2	2,2
Minimum	47,8	78	2,9	9,4	0,1	48,1	77,1	3,8	8,1	0,3
Maximum	79,2	100	5,7	13,3	4,9	68,4	100	5,5	13,6	9,2

Source: Our elaboration of the results found in the French ministry of Interior

⁷ See appendix, Table 6-7. Patterns of coalition in France in 2004 and 2010.

a. The indicator of bipolarization refers to the concentration of votes obtained by the two leading coalition, respectively in the second and in the first round.

As in Italy, competition is very fragmented as illustrated by the effective number of parties in the first round: 4.4 in 2004, and 4.7 in 2010. The average number of lists is 7.9 in 2004, and 8.9 in 2010.⁸ Most of these lists never achieve to pass the threshold for the run-off, although most of them qualify for the 5 per cent merging threshold except for the lists of the extreme left. Again, the format of competition can be qualified of “fragmented bipolarism”.

Our final perspective on the French regional elections is disproportionality. The overall level of disproportionality is quite high: eleven percent in 2004 and 2010 but far less than what the mechanical effect of a twenty five per cent bonus should have led to. This is explained by the low level of disproportionality within the coalition. Even if the coalition partner may not have been able to run for the second round, it gets on average what it would have got without coalition if the electoral system was purely proportional. In other terms, the Socialist party chooses not only to have coalition agreement whenever possible but also rewarded its partner along a constant rule, whatever the actual bargaining situation. This explains, in turn, why the disproportionality of the system is not even higher despite a bonus of 25% of seats. The distribution of seats within the winning coalition appears to follow quite strictly the Gamson’s law.

Conclusion: Electoral systems with majority bonus in the world of electoral systems

This article has presented investigations about a rather understudied and complex electoral system, the mixed member system with majority bonus. We have argued that this system should be classified in the larger class of mixed electoral systems. It should be noticed that this type of system encompass significant variations as well, from a rather parallel system in France to a compensatory system in Italy. Some hypotheses about the consequences of this type of system have been proposed, mainly based on the idea that these mixed-systems produce incentives for a bipolar and fragmented competition, or, in other words, of two main inclusive coalitions. The main hypothesis has stated that the number of coalitions is determined by the majoritarian component of the electoral system, whereas the number of parties is determined by the proportional component of the system.

This hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence. There tends to be more than two coalitions in France, and only two in Italy. In Italy, the majoritarian component works as a FPTP system, therefore giving strong incentives for a battle between two coalitions. In France, both national politics and the existence of only one tier contribute to fuel challengers to the two main blocks. As a result, competition has proved to be more strictly bipolar in Italy than in France (H1a). These results, are partly influenced by the national party systems: perfect bipolarization in two poles in Italy in the mid-2000s, systematic exclusion of the National Front of the coalition

⁸ See appendix, Table 8-9. Fragmentation and competitiveness of French regional elections in 2004 and 2010.

game in France. However, regional exceptions to these patterns of coalition exist in both countries showing that the logics of coalition building were also influenced by the electoral incentives provided by the electoral rules and the likelihood of victory. For example, in France in Brittany and Limousin in 2010, the socialists have deliberately excluded either the Greens or the Communists from the coalition in the second round, because of the difficulties to coordinate between the first and the second round. Therefore, the coalescing tendency as well as bipolarization is clearly much stronger in Italy than in France partly because of the *cordon sanitaire* excluding the National Front, partly because the majority bonus in Italy is compensatory, pushing therefore even more towards bipolarization. Moreover, overall, parties do not conform very well to the expectations of bargaining theories of coalitions. Coalitions have in general included more parties than needed to secure the bonus; both in regions where the electoral contests are heavily disputed and where the electoral outcomes were a foregone conclusion, in both countries.

The second sub-hypothesis resulting from the main assumption stated above was the existence of more fragmentation in Italy than in France. Indeed, the threshold of representation is lower in Italy than in France. The number of effective parties competing is, as a result, quite significantly higher in Italy (H2b), in 2005 in particular. This provides evidence that the proportional component of electoral systems with majority bonus is the key in determining the level of fragmentation.

Finally, the level of overall disproportionality is around three times as high in France as in Italy, thus confirming the second hypothesis, despite the fact that the Italian electoral system is majority assuring and the French is not. In France, the bonus is fixed, leading to a much higher level of distortion seat-votes than the level witnessed in Italy, where the bonus depends on the score of the winning coalition. Hence, one can talk of a partly compensatory bonus in the Italian system: despite the fact it is meant to assure the majority to the leading coalition, its actual effect on disproportionality is relatively limited, leading to a limited vote-seat distortion because of the strong bipolarization of party competition. In Italy, the overall disproportionality of the system is relatively similar to the level of disproportionality between votes and seats within the winning coalitions. In France, on the contrary, the overall level of disproportionality is significantly higher than in Italy, while the level of disproportionality within the winning coalition is low and quite comparable to the Italian one, if not slightly lower. This finding confirms the prevalence of the Gamson's law in electoral coalitions.

As a conclusion, these electoral systems are truly mixed, not only in terms of the typology of electoral rules, but also in their effects. Their impact on competition is highly dependent on the precise electoral provisions, as it is well illustrated by the different levels of disproportionality resulting from the different Italian and French provisions regarding the format and the allocation of the bonus. Interestingly, in both countries, the proportionality of the distribution of seats within the winning coalition clearly limits the impact of the disproportionality of the bonus. Keeping this aspect in mind, the composition and inclusiveness of the electoral coalitions competing are paramount in explaining the actual effects of the majority bonus.

Expanding the conclusions beyond the electoral systems with majority bonus, the interest of such systems is the fact they articulate two types of thresholds. Contrary to most “simple” electoral systems which provide only one main threshold in the transformation of votes into seats (Lijphart 1994), mixed systems provide with two thresholds: a threshold for representation (what is the minimum of votes I should get to have at least one seat?) and a threshold of “majority building” (what is the number of votes I should get to have a majority of the seats in the assembly?). The literature on electoral systems has generally focused on the threshold of representation. Majority bonus systems emphasize the role of the most important threshold, to build a majority, or, to put it more generally, to maximize bargaining power in the assembly. Building indicators and even laws about this type of threshold might represent a significant improvement for the future developments of the literature on electoral systems.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. *Main deviations to the 1995 Italian regional electoral law*

Region	Regional list	Bonus	Threshold	Other main modifications
Lazio	-	Number of councilors is not fixed to 71 members, 56 elected at the provincial level and 14 at the regional level	-	-
Calabria	-	-	4% for each party competing, regardless of being part of a coalition or not	-
Puglia	Abolished. Bonus seats attributed proportionally to the winning coalition.	-	4% for each party competing, regardless of being part of a coalition or not	Lists must have candidates in at least half of the provinces
Toscana	Abolished. Distribution of the seats between seats over the required thresholds at the regional level.	If the president gets less than 45% of the votes, his coalition gets 55% of the seats. Otherwise, 60% of the seats. The winning coalition cannot have more than 65% of the seats of the council.	4% for parties standing alone, 1.5% of votes for parties linked to a candidate getting at least 5% of the votes	Lists must have candidates in at least half of the provinces
Marche (from 2010)	Abolished. Determination of the seats of each coalition, with eventual extra seats to reach 60% of the seats for winning coalition	If the leading coalition has less than 60% of the seats, it is given extra seats subtracted to the total of losing coalitions.	Coalitions must get at least 5% of the votes, except for lists below this threshold reaching 3% of the votes	Coalitions must have candidates in at least half of the provinces

Tables 2-3. Patterns of coalitions in the regional Italian elections, 2005-2010

Regions	Elections 2005		Parties with seats in winning coalition	Parties with seats if coalition was minimum-winning	% of votes of surplus parties
	Winner	Coalition type			
Piemonte (b)	center-left	Surplus	8	8	0,8
Lombardia	center-right	Surplus	4	2	12,8
Veneto	center-right	Surplus	5	3	7,8
Liguria	center-left	Surplus	6	4	5,3
Emilia-Romagna	center-left	Surplus	5	1	13,9
Toscana	center-left	Surplus	3	1	8
Umbria	center-left	Surplus	4	1	16,9
Marche	center-left	Surplus	5	1	18,8
Lazio (a)	center-left	minimum-winning	6	6	-
Campania	center-left	Surplus	9	3	21,9
Puglia	center-left	minimum-winning	10	10	-
Basilicata	center-left	Surplus	6	1	29,9
Calabria	center-left	Surplus	6	3	21,8

Regions	Elections 2010		Parties with seats in winning coalition	Parties with seats if coalition was minimum-winning	% of votes of surplus parties
	Winner	Coalition type			
Piemonte (b)	center-right	minimum-winning	4	4	-
Lombardia	center-right	Surplus	2	2	0,2
Veneto	center-right	Surplus	2	1	24,7
Liguria	center-left	Surplus	6	5	3,2
Emilia-Romagna	center-left	Surplus	4	1	11,3
Toscana	center-left	Surplus	3	1	18,5
Umbria	center-left	Surplus	4	2	14,4
Marche	center-left	Surplus	6	2	13,1
Lazio (a)	center-right	Surplus	4	4	3
Campania	center-right	Surplus	8	2	17,5
Puglia	center-left	Surplus	4	4	0,3
Basilicata	center-left	Surplus	7	2	23,1
Calabria	center-right	Surplus	3	2	16,4

Source: our elaboration of the electoral results found in the Archivio storico delle Elezioni of the ministero dell'interno and on the regions websites when necessary.

Notes: a) The center left coalition obtained less votes than the center-right coalition in the list part in 2005, but still won in the majoritarian part, so it was considered as a minimum-winning coalition.

b) The center right coalition obtained less votes than the center-left coalition in 2010 in the list part, but still won most votes in the majoritarian part, so it was considered as a minimum-winning coalition.

Tables 4-5. Indexes of competitiveness, fragmentation and disproportionality of the Italian regional elections, 2005-2010.

Regions	Elections 2005						
	Gap coalitions	Lists>1%	NeffV	NeffS	% bigger party*	Ls q	Lsq winning coalition
Piemonte	3,7	14	7,8	7,2	20,1	2,8	3,8
Lombardia	10,7	11	5,5	4,7	26	3,6	3,2
Veneto	8,2	13	6,6	5,5	22,7	3,8	2
Liguria	6,1	11	5,5	4,7	34,3	4,1	4,1
Emilia- Romagna	27,6	9	3,6	3,2	48	3,3	3,6
Toscana	24,5	9	3,4	3	48,8	3,3	1,3
Umbria	29,4	8	3,8	3,5	45,4	3,6	3,3
Marche	19,2	12	4,5	3,8	40,1	4,8	5,8
Lazio	3,3	13	6,8	6	27,1	2,6	2,5
Campania	27,3	16	10,1	8,7	16	3,8	3
Puglia	0,6	15	9,4	8,9	16,6	4,9	2,1
Basilicata	38,2	11	5	4,8	38,9	4,3	3,5
Calabria	19,2	13	10,3	8,6	15,5	4,6	6
<i>Total Italy</i>	<i>16,8</i>	<i>11,9</i>	<i>6,3</i>	<i>5,6</i>	<i>30,7</i>	<i>3,8</i>	<i>3,4</i>

Regions	Elections 2010						
	Gap coalitions	Lists>1%	NeffV	NeffS	% bigger party*	Lsq	Lsq winning coalition
Piemonte	0,4	13	6,4	5,3	25,1	3,8	2,2
Lombardia	22,8	8	4,4	3,8	31,8	5,1	1,3
Veneto	31,1	9	4,3	4	35,2	4,9	1,3
Liguria	4,3	9	5,2	4,3	28,3	4,3	3,7
Emilia- Romagna	15,3	8	3,9	3,4	40,7	4,9	3,6
Toscana	25,3	7	3,7	3,2	42,2	4,2	5,9
Umbria	19,5	8	4	3,2	36,2	6,7	8,7
Marche	13,5	12	4,7	4,2	31,1	3,9	2,2
Lazio	2,8	11	5,9	5,4	26,3	3	5,2
Campania	11,2	16	5,9	4,8	31,7	4,4	1,7
Puglia	6,44	10	5,9	5	20,8	9,3	6,5
Basilicata	32,9	13	7,1	5,8	27,1	6,2	5,4
Calabria	24,5	13	7,9	5,4	26,4	7,6	8
<i>Total Italy</i>	<i>16,2</i>	<i>10,5</i>	<i>5,3</i>	<i>4,4</i>	<i>31,0</i>	<i>5,3</i>	<i>4,3</i>

Source: our elaboration of the electoral results found in the Archivio storico delle Elezioni of the ministero dell'interno and on the regions websites when necessary.

Note: * The bigger party refers to the bigger party of the winning coalition.

Tables 6-7. Patterns of coalitions in France in 2004 and 2010

Elections 2004	<i>Winner</i>	<i>Lists >10%,</i>	<i>Lists >5%,</i>	<i>Lists, 2nd</i>	<i>Left coalition</i>	<i>Right coalition</i>
		<i>1st round</i>	<i>1st round</i>	<i>round</i>		
Alsace	Right	3	5	3	-	-
Aquitaine	Left	4	5	3	-	UMP-UDF
Auvergne	Left	2	5	2	PS-PC-Verts	-
Basse Normandie	Left	3	6	3	PS-Verts	No
Bourgogne	Left	4	5	3	-	No
Bretagne	Left	3	5	2	PS-Verts	UMP-Right
Centre	Left	4	5	3	-	UMP-UDF
Champagne-Ardenne	Left	4	6	3	No	UMP-UDF
Franche Comté	Left	3	5	3	-	No
Haute Normandie	Left	4	5	3	-	UMP-UDF
Ile de France	Left	4	5	3	PS-PC	UMP-UDF
Languedoc Roussillon	Left	3	5	3	-	No
Limousin	Left	2	7	2	PS-Verts	UMP-Right
Lorraine	Left	3	5	3	-	UMP-UDF-Right
Midi-Pyrénées	Left	4	5	3	-	UMP-UDF
Nord Pas de Calais	Left	4	7	3	PS-PC-Verts	UMP-UDF
Pays de Loire	Left	3	5	2	-	UMP-UDF
Picardie	Left	4	5	3	PS-PC	-
Poitou-Charentes	Left	3	4	3	-	-
Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur	Left	3	3	3	-	-
Rhône-Alpes	Left	4	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Elections 2010	<i>Winner</i>	<i>Lists >10%,</i>	<i>List >5%,</i>	<i>Lists, 2nd</i>	<i>Left coalition</i>	<i>Right coalition</i>
		<i>1st round</i>	<i>1st round</i>	<i>round</i>		
Alsace	Right	4	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Aquitaine	Left	3	6	3	PS-PC-Verts	-
Auvergne	Left	4	5	2	PS-PC-Verts	-
Basse Normandie	Left	3	5	2	PS-Verts	-
Bourgogne	Left	3	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Bretagne	Left	3	5	3	No	-
Centre	Left	4	6	3	PS-PC-Verts	-
Champagne-Ardenne	Left	3	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Franche Comté	Left	3	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Haute Normandie	Left	3	5	3	PS-PC-Verts	-
Ile de France	Left	3	5	2	PS-PC-Verts	-
Languedoc Roussillon	Left	3	6	3	No	-
Limousin	Left	3	5	3	PS-Verts (not PC)	-
Lorraine	Left	3	4	3	PS-Verts	-
Midi-Pyrénées	Left	3	5	2	PS-PC-Verts	-
Nord Pas de Calais	Left	5	5	3	PS-PC-Verts	-
Pays de Loire	Left	3	4	2	PS-Verts	-
Picardie	Left	3	6	3	PS-Verts (not PC, other left)	-
Poitou-Charentes	Left	3	4	2	PS-Verts	-
Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur	Left	4	5	3	PS-PC-Verts	-
Rhône-Alpes	Left	4	5	3	PS-PC-Verts	-

Source: French Ministry of interior

Note: - means: no opportunity to coalesce with "possible partners"

Tables 8-9. *Fragmentation and competitiveness of French regional elections in 2004 and 2010*

**Elections
2004**

	1 st round				2 nd round	
	<i>Lists</i>	<i>Lists >5%</i>	<i>Lists >10%</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lists</i>	<i>Competitiveness</i>
Alsace	9	5	3	4,8	3	9,1
Aquitaine	7	5	4	4,4	3	21,4
Auvergne	9	5	2	4,2	2	5,3
Basse Normandie	9	6	3	5,5	3	6,2
Bourgogne	9	5	4	4,5	3	20,3
Bretagne	7	5	3	4,1	2	17,6
Centre	6	5	4	4,1	3	14,8
Champagne-Ardenne	7	6	4	4,8	3	2,1
Franche-Comté	10	5	3	4,8	3	10,7
Haute Normandie	7	5	4	4,1	3	20,0
Ile de France	8	5	4	4,7	3	8,4
Languedoc-Roussillon	9	5	3	4,3	3	18,1
Limousin	7	7	2	4,0	2	24,0
Lorraine	9	5	3	5,4	3	14,2
Midi-Pyrénées	7	5	4	4,1	3	27,1
Nord-Pas de Calais	11	7	4	5,7	3	23,4
Pays de Loire	6	5	3	3,7	2	7,1
Picardie	5	5	4	4,0	3	9,8
Poitou-Charentes	5	4	3	2,9	3	18,9
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	13	3	3	4,0	3	11,3
Rhône-Alpes	7	4	4	4,0	3	8,3

**Elections
2010**

	1st round				2nd round	
	<i>Lists</i>	<i>Lists >5%</i>	<i>Lists >10%</i>	<i>Neff</i>	<i>Lists</i>	<i>Competitiveness</i>
Alsace	11	4	4	4,8	3	6,9
Aquitaine	11	6	3	4,5	3	28,3
Auvergne	8	5	4	4,9	2	19,4
Basse Normandie	8	5	3	4,6	2	14,3
Bourgogne	9	4	3	4,1	3	19,1
Bretagne	11	5	3	4,5	3	17,9
Centre	9	6	3	5,0	3	13,5
Champagne-Ardenne	8	4	3	4,3	3	5,8
Franche-Comté	10	4	3	4,5	3	9,1
Haute Normandie	11	5	3	4,6	3	24,4
Ile de France	12	5	3	5,4	2	13,4
Languedoc-Roussillon	9	5	3	5,1	3	27,7
Limousin	7	7	2	4,2	2	15,0
Lorraine	9	5	3	4,8	3	18,4
Midi-Pyrénées	7	5	4	4,0	3	35,5
Nord-Pas de Calais	11	7	4	5,5	3	26,0
Pays de Loire	6	5	3	3,9	2	12,8
Picardie	5	5	4	5,5	3	15,8
Poitou-Charentes	5	4	3	3,8	3	21,2
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	13	3	3	5,1	3	11,1
Rhône-Alpes	7	4	4	5,2	3	16,7

Source: Our elaboration of the results found in the French Ministry of interior

Table 10. Overall and within coalition disproportionality in French regional elections, 2004 and 2010

	2004		2010	
	<i>Overall disproportionality</i>	<i>Within coalition disproportionality</i>	<i>Overall disproportionality</i>	<i>Within coalition disproportionality</i>
Alsace	12,2	-	11,9	-
Aquitaine	10,9	-	10,5	6,6
Augergne	11,2	4,9	10,5	2,9
Basse Normandie	12,1	0,9	10,9	1,9
Bourgogne	10,9	-	11,0	5,1
Bretagne	11,1	1,2	10,9	-
Centre	11,6	-	12,0	2,0
Champagne-Ardenne	13,3	-	13,1	4,2
Franche-Compté	11,9	-	13,6	1,6
Haute Normandie	11,4	-	10,9	1,1
Ile de France	11,8	0,1	11,3	1,2
Languedoc-Roussillon	11,6	-	10,0	-
Limousin	10,1	3,0	13,1	9,2
Lorraine	11,6	-	11,4	1,4
Midi-Pyrénées	9,4	-	8,1	2,7
Nord-Pas de Calais	11,1	2,9	11,0	0,5
Pays de Loire	11,0	-	11,4	1,4
Picardie	12,4	4,8	11,4	4,3
Poitou-Charentes	10,9	-	10,3	0,3
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	12,4	-	12,6	3,2
Rhones-Alpes	11,9	0,4	11,4	2,4

Source: Our elaboration of the results found in the French Ministry of interior

Table 11. Results of the 2005 and 2010 regional elections in Italy per region

	Piemonte		Lombardia		Veneto		Liguria		Emilia-Romagna		Toscana		Umbria		Marche		Lazio		Campania		Puglia		Basilicata		Calabria		
	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	2005	2010	
Pd (a)	30,4	23,2	27,1	22,9	24,3	20,3	34,4	28,3	48	40,6	46,8	42,2	45,2	36,2	40,1	31,1	27,1	26,3	29,2	21,4	26,3	20,8	35,7	27,1	29,9	15,7	
Idv	1,5	6,9	1,4	6,3	1,3	5,3	1,3	8,4	1,4	6,4	0,9	9,4		8,3	1,4	9,1	1	8,6	2,4	6,5	1,8	6,5	2,7	9,9	-	3,4	
Re-PdL	9	2,5	8,1	2	5	1,6	9,2	3,9	9,2	2,3	15,3	5,3	14,5	6,9	10,2	3,9	8,2	2,7	5,4	1,6	9	3,3	8,8	2,1	5,1	4	
Veneti	2,8	0,8	2,9	0,8	3	0,7	2	1,2	3,1	-	-	-	2,3	-	3,3	1,7	2,6	1,2	3,4	1,1	-	-	5,7	2,1	-	-	
Sel	-	1,4	-	1,4	-	1,2	-	2,5	-	1,8	-	3,8	-	3,4	-	2,6	-	3,2	-	3,5	-	9,7	-	4	-	-	
Other CL (b)	5,6	8,7	2,6	1,9	6,8	0,2	1,1	4,5	0,3	0,2	-	-	-	4,2	2,7	5,6	9,6	6,3	-	6	12,7	5,8	12,7	14,8	25,5	14,9	
Udc	1,6	3,9	3,8	3,8	6,1	1,9	3,3	3,9	3,9	3,3	3,7	1,8	1,9	1,1	7,2	5,8	7,8	6,1	6,7	9,1	7,8	6,5	7,9	7,1	10,1	9,1	
PdL (c)	31,9	24,9	34,6	31,8	30,8	24,7	26,8	29,3	27,1	24,6	28	27,1	29,3	32,4	31,1	31,2	32,3	11,9	21,1	31,7	29,9	31,1	19,2	19,4	19,9	26,4	
Ln	8,5	16,8	15,8	25,2	14,6	35,2	4,7	10,2	4,8	13,7	1,3	6,5	-	4,3	0,8	6,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other CR (d)	5,1	5,2	1,3	0,2	1,4	0,8	11,8	7,8	0,9	0,1	-	-	-	-	1,3	2,6	10,2	33,4	18,5	17,5	11,7	13,3	0,9	7,8	6,2	22,1	
Others (e)	0,5	3,5	2,3	2,6	6,3	5,1	5,5	-	1,2	6	2,1	1	3,6	-	1,8	-	1,3	0,3	12,3	1,3	0,7	2,9	3,3	5,3	0,8	2,2	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% votes	71,4	64,3	73	64,6	72,4	66,4	69,6	60,9	76,7	68,1	71,3	60,7	74,3	63,4	71,5	62,8	72,7	60,9	67,7	63	70,5	63,2	67,2	62,8	64,4	59,3	
% valid votes	66,5	60,6	68,2	62,6	67,8	64,1	66,7	58,6	73,2	64,8	66,4	58,7	70,3	63	67,2	59,8	69,8	56,3	63,1	56,9	66,5	59,9	63,7	58,6	60,7	56,1	
Valid votes	2428014	2204349	2285975	4819576	2700742	2540735	955281	913176	2527559	2300383	2066096	1767409	306437	449782	865503	770749	3213035	2755065	3078322	2924360	2128974	2338391	353464	333739	1124526	1064003	

Source: Electoral results found in the Archivio storico delle Elezioni of the ministero dell'interno and on the regions websites when necessary (for Marche, Calabria, Puglia, and Toscana in 2010).

Notes:

^a In 2005, competed under Uniti nell'Ulivo, Ds, and Margherita

^b Includes all minor lists competing within the center-left coalition

^c In 2005, competed under Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale

^d Includes all minor lists competing within the center-right coalition

^e Includes all minor lists not part of any of the two main coalitions

Table 12. Configuration of the two main coalitions in each region for the Italian regional elections, 2005-2010

Regions	Elections 2005	Elections 2010
Piemonte	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd-Udc Pdl-Ln
Lombardia	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl-Ln
Veneto	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl-Ln
Liguria	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd-Udc Pdl-Ln
Emilia-Romagna	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl-Ln
Toscana ^a	Pd-Verdi-Idv Rc Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl-Ln
Marche	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Ln-Udc	Fds-Sel Idv-Pd-Udc Pdl-Ln
Umbria	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl-Ln
Lazio	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc-Pdl
Campania	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds Sel-Idv-Pd Udc-Pdl
Puglia	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd Udc Pdl
Basilicata	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds-Sel-Idv-Pd-Udc Pdl
Calabria	Pd-Fds-Verdi-Idv Pdl-Udc	Fds-Sel-Pd Idv Udc-Pdl

Source: For the elections of 2005, our own elaboration of the results found in the archivio storico delle Elezioni of the ministero dell'interno. For 2010, see Baldi and Tronconi, p. 54.

Note: For matters of comparability, we used for both elections the labels of 2010. For example, Pdl refers in 2005 to FI (Forza Italia) and An (Alleanza Nazionale), Pd to the alliance between Ds (Democratici di sinistra) and the Margherita, and Fds to the federazione di sinistra, the label under which Rc (Rifondazione comunista) and the Pdc (Partito dei comunisti italiani) competed in 2010.

^aIn 2005 in Toscana, Pdc competed with the center-left coalition and Rifondazione Comunista on its own