The relevance of welfare politics for radical right voters

This paper aims at assessing the relation between welfare politics and the radical right by providing a theoretical framework and extending the empirical evidence of this relation across Western Europe vote are the goals of this research. It takes a resolutely quantitative large-N approach to give a renewed account of the determinants of the vote for radical right parties in Western Europe. The analysis is based on two hypotheses, which are considered more complementary than competing. The protection hypothesis entails that increasing economic insecurity is positively associated to the radical right vote, as these parties reject the globalization process that increases economic insecurity; they also represent parties of the status quo and are even promoting welfare protective preferences to match these voters. I have thus defined three individual level characteristics that are expected to be associated to the radical right vote: high-risk occupational positions, retrospective and prospective economic insecurity. Relying on the perception of the violation of the core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state, the differentiation hypothesis posits that four welfare attitudes are positively associated to the radical right vote: Welfare Populism, Welfare Chauvinism, Welfare Constriction and Egalitarianism. Section 1 gives a brief theoretical overview of the two hypotheses; section 2 presents the research design (data, operationalization of variables); section 3 presents the results.

1. Welfare politics and the radical right: research hypotheses

In this section I will provide the theoretical framework and the hypotheses linking welfare politics and the radical right vote, in an attempt to bridge the political sociology of the welfare state to a particular voting behaviour. This approach is inspired by the works of Stefan Svallfors, who initiated a subfield: the comparative analysis of how welfare attitudes, values and class positions, but also contextual factors such as policies and institutions, interplay with opinions and political behaviour (Svallfors 2007). This paper is based on two general hypotheses, which are rooted in different conceptions of the welfare state. There seems to be a consensus among social sciences that two functionalist conceptions of the welfare state exist: the so-called “piggy bank” and “Robin Hood” functions (Barr 2012). To the first, the welfare state can be conceived as the institutional set-up for risk management. On the other hand, the welfare can be seen as the institutional set-up that reallocates wealth and reduces social inequalities (Mau & Veghte 2007). I will briefly present these theoretical approaches and build on them to elaborate the link between the radical right and welfare politics. For that matter, I consider welfare politics as broader field than just policies of the welfare state, but rather as the array of issues pertaining to the who, what, when, and how of economic redistribution. This includes the nature of welfare policies, their extent and principles, the deservingness and contributions of individuals.

1.1 The protection hypothesis

The first hypothesis relies on a self-interest conception of welfare arrangements, that is a conception of the welfare state as risk management. The welfare state’s primary goal can be
conceived as a social insurance for individuals. Individuals would comply with the welfare state arrangements (taxes, social contributions) to the extent that it guarantees them a safety net in case of loss of resources. Individuals’ self-interest is the founding principle of welfare state legitimacy; it justifies its existence. The self-interested citizen is the major assumption of a risk-based welfare state approach (Hall & Soskice 2001, Rehm 2009). The relationship between the individual and the welfare state is instrumental: welfare state institutions originate in the benefits individuals obtain from it (Mau & Veghte 2007). In terms of welfare attitudes, the economic perspective assumes that individuals express their preference for welfare arrangements (taxes, level of redistribution, insurance) in terms of the maximization of their economic utility (Alesina & Giuliano 2009). Individuals calculate the benefits of complying with welfare institutions in terms of its costs (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003). When individuals rationally maximize their welfare, they do not only favour policies that directly benefit them, but also those that reduce their individual risk. Individuals do not just favour welfare policies because they directly gain from it; they also think prospectively and have to assess their risks, their position in the society and compare themselves to others. Preferences are thus also defined by the exposure to risks, and the perception of this exposure.

Because of economic globalization, individuals face socio-economic change, and eventually downgrading, which affects their welfare preferences and indirectly their vote choice. Economic (in)security is a key factor determining welfare preferences. Economic insecurity comprises more than experiencing some form of economic distress (falling in unemployment, being ill, etc). Some authors consider economic insecurity mainly as perceived, closely associated to the fear of social decline. Others, have looked more precisely at occupational experiences and how one’s work position (sector, hierarchy..) affects his perception of economic (in)security. In their landmark study on the effects of structural changes on political conflicts, Kriesi et al. argue that globalization gave rise to a revived economic competition and this process has constituted groups of winners and losers (Kriesi et al. 2008, Kriesi et al. 2012). Considering the realm of the welfare state, this new competition has led to increasing economic risks, chiefly income instability, unemployment, and labour-market instability. In that sense, the losers of globalization, as the lower earners would be expected to show support to welfare redistribution. However, there is a “revisionist” school of explaining support for the welfare state (Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012). The basic argument is that support for the welfare state does not lie in concepts of redistribution, but as a demand for insurance that depends on an individual’s level of risk. In this view, low income is not the only determinant of support for social insurance; facing higher risks is equally important, (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2006).

Losers of globalization face increasing economic insecurity; theoretically, according to a self-interest driven model of welfare preferences, they should expresses preferences for more securing welfare policies. Moreover, they should express important opposition to the process of economic globalization. This is in line with the factor endowment model developed in economic theories. The more skilled have more to gain form globalization than the less skilled. Losers of globalization, and mainly blue-collar workers become less important in the economic arena as trade with countries that have abundant low-skilled workers increases. This opposition to globalization has to be understood in terms increasing economic insecurity, because economic globalization contributes to lo incomes and weak labour-market positions. In addition to the objective structural economic constraint they face (increased social

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1 The “revisionist” school of explaining welfare state support is a reaction to the traditional approach of welfare support: the power-resource school. 
mobility, higher unemployment risk), the losers of globalization also express feelings of social disintegration, and social decline, and they are ‘threatened to become superfluous and useless for society’ (Betz, 1994).

The relation between economic insecurity and the radical right vote relies on part of the convergence hypothesis. The parties that usually hold office, both on the right and on the left, tend to converge in terms of economic policies. This is the result of structural changes of capitalism in advanced democracies (Kitschelt 1999). This convergence proves to be particularly the case for domains where the EU’s involvement is high. The Single Market and the Maastricht Treaty fundamentally changed national parties’ policy arena and dampened important policy conflicts between left and right, especially regarding the management of the national economy (e.g. Mair 2007, 2000). According to Mair, EU law, policies and institutions have been increasingly limiting the policy space, the policy instruments and the policy repertoire at parties’ disposal. This, in turn, led to dampening the competition between mainstream parties on policy domains, where the European Union (EU) has increased competences. This is chiefly economic policy: monetary discipline, deregulation, and labour-market flexibility (Nanou & Dorussen 2013). Kitschelt argues that, as major parties converge in terms of economic policies, voters become indifferent to the economic dimension of politics, and focus on the cultural dimension (Kitschelt 2007). The alternative is that such convergence benefits the radical right. Building on the idea that the reduction of the difference in policy preferences (and output) of mainstream parties creates a favourable political space for the radical right (Hainsworth 1992, Kitschelt 1995), Carter empirically demonstrates how the convergence of mainstream parties is correlated to the radical right’s electoral success (Carter 2005). In short, individuals most negatively affected by economic globalization are attracted to parties that hold radical position on the globalization process, such as radical right parties.

In addition to the argument that the convergence of mainstream parties benefit electorally to the radical right, economic insecurity is expected to further positively drive the radical right vote. This mechanism has to be refined. I argue that radical right parties have successfully attracted losers of globalization because they are openly opposed to globalization and to denationalization. Not only have radical right parties opposed structural changes in society (economic and cultural), they are actively trying to reach to the losers of globalization by turning to interventionist-nationalist preferences. This position is a combination of the rejection of denationalizing processes, and economic interventionist stances that address the question of economic insecurity (Kriesi et al. 2012). Another take on this combination is to consider the ‘left-authoritarian voters’ which have left-wing preferences on economic issues, but traditional preferences on socio-cultural issues. Lefkofridi et al. have found that these voters generally tend to vote for left-wing parties (Lefkofridi et al. 2013). In this research, the protection hypothesis challenges this idea, and argues that they can also favour the radical right. Radical right parties in Western Europe have targeted the two aspects of economic insecurity that are likely perceived by the losers of globalization: rejection of economic globalization and increased risks that prompt demand for more welfare state intervention. They aim at defending those who were ‘left on the side of modernization’, those who lost more than they gained in economic and social changes.

Thus, the general expectation is that economic insecurity triggers a need protection against risks that are the consequences of economic globalization. The radical right, which was qualified in the 1990’s as a protest vote is here envisaged as a protective vote (Givens 2005). Individuals that face increased economical risk may support the radical right, because it appears as a status quo party (Geering 2013). A protective vote for a status quo party is one that refuses the changes that brought economic insecurity. The notion of a status quo party
gathers the two dimensions of economic insecurity: rejection of the causes of change, protection against its consequences.

Figure 1 summarizes the general hypothesis of the relation between economic insecurity and the radical right vote. The causal mechanism from individual economic insecurity and voting for the radical right is one of demand for protection.

![Figure 1 - Relation between economic insecurity and radical right vote](image)

Individuals can assess the causes of their increasing economic insecurity. Globalization is perceived as the responsible process for increasing economic risks. If radical right parties have for some time advocated Kitschelt’s winning formula, they have always criticized international openness and *mondialisme* (Betz 1994, Swank & Betz 2003). Indeed, the belief that the internationalization of the economy is significant in increasing economic risks is wide-ranging. This is particularly true for the less-skilled individuals, which are “much more likely to oppose freer trade and immigration than their more skilled counterparts” (Scheve & Slaughter 2001). This idea is consistent with the factor endowment model, the workers and low skilled, since they are the most threatened by economic globalization, are likely to support it the less. In a nutshell, the losers of globalization are expected to support the radical right because those parties remain nationalistic (not necessarily nationalist, but as opposed to the globalization process), and the radical right confronts the causes of their increasing economic insecurity.

Individuals that face increased economic risks, those in danger of becoming precarious are expected to support the radical right. Globalization has increased the economic risks of the losers of globalization (blue-collars worker but also the tertiary sector *précariat*). These risks are multiple, and of various nature. Since some social categories are more likely than others to be economically threatened, risk pertain firstly to labour-market position. The distinction between insiders and outsiders in the labour market mirrors that of winners and losers of globalization. Being at risk in terms of employment strongly influences both welfare preferences and electoral behavior (Schwander 2012). Individuals do not only perceive economic risks in possible in terms of loss of income or labour-market related. Economic insecurity can lead to social exclusion. The notion of *précarité* embodies this broad conception: being poor is not only having limited resources, it also means growing away from the rest of society and the feeling of being left out. The insecurity index EPICES (*Évaluation de la précarité et des inégalités de santé pour les Centres d’Examen de Santé*) integrates items on lifestyle, social and familial risks. It is positively associated to the radical right vote (Mayer 2012). Hans-Georg Betz showed how the radical right parties appeal to individuals who express social risks and fear of social downgrading on top of economic insecurity. These parties are very successful among these “forgotten” voters (Betz 2015) Increased competition on the labour market, higher

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2 In chapter 2, when introducing the empirical analysis, I make a more extensive discussion of economic insecurity, and how it can be conceptualized and measured.
unemployment, and difficult access to healthcare are all motives for the losers of globalization to support parties of the status quo. The radical right parties are such parties, those who refuse structural changes and strongly oppose it. These parties frame economic globalization in terms of “labour and social security” more than any other party family except for the radical left (Höglinger et al. 2012). Few other parties than the radical right can capture the economic insecurity of the losers of globalization. Increased economic risks trigger a demand for protection and state intervention that can be matched by the radical right. By defending the status quo, these parties tend to support economically interventionist policies and favour a protecting welfare state against structural changes of the economy. Therefore, individuals who face high economic risks are expected to be more likely to vote for the radical right.

**1.2 The differentiation hypothesis**

Yet, “the electorates of advanced industrial societies do not seem to be voting with their pocketbooks, but instead primarily motivated by ‘sociotropic’ concern” (Inglehart 1990). The same argument can be made about welfare attitudes. Normative and cultural factors explaining these attitudes are very important (Mau 2003; Van Oorschot 2006; Svallfors 2007, 2012). The concept of moral economy enables to widen the mechanisms of attitude formation, by adding a normative side to the narrow self-interest factor. It has been extensively referred to in recent literature on welfare attitudes (Mau 2004; Svallfors 1997, 2012). The moral economy is composed of the rights and obligations of citizens regarding welfare politics. Two strands of literature echo these three constitutive norms: the literature addressing the “foudations of welfare”, and more abstractly the political philosophy of welfare. Goodin finds six common moral justifications to the institutionalization of the welfare state, and they are encompassed in the norms of need, reciprocity, and self-reliance. The political philosophy of welfare has engaged in a similar exercise of identifying “principles of justice”. Three principles are defined as the bases from which decision about welfare entitlements are made: equality, merit, and need (Fives 2008). Defining the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state, I will build on these two stands of literature.

The norm of equality encloses three moral justifications of the welfare state: reducing poverty, promoting social equality, and promoting stability. Reducing poverty was always a primary concern of society, welfare institutions originated in “Poor Laws” (Goodin & Mitchell 2000). To define poverty, one needs to take distance with a minimalist approach (fulfilling basic needs necessary for physical existence) but consider relative deprivation. The welfare state is justified by trying to minimize the relative deprivation. The promotion of social equality has evolved guarantying an equality of status (equality under the law, equality of vote) to equality of opportunity. This equality of opportunity is very pertinent when considering the welfare state. For instance, egalitarians tend to promote the better distribution of social goods, such as jobs. “Full employment policies” become therefore crucial aspects of the promotion of social equality (Goodin et al. 1999). The last dimension of equality is to promote social stability. Not only do societies need to be stable to remain integrated, but individuals also want stability in their personal lives. This is the aim of “social security”: ensuring resources to individual when their regular sources are interrupted. These practical moral foundations of the welfare state are closely link to a rawlsian conception of equality, which calls for the distribution of “primary social goods”. One point of particular interest in this theory for the rest of this work is the “difference principle” which states that some inequalities can be justified, only if they serve to improve the expectations of the least

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3 Hypothesising that increased economic risks trigger radical right voting competes with the fact that usually the worst-off individuals and the precarious importantly abstain from voting (Kriesi & Bornshier 2012; Mayer 2012).
advantaged individuals (Rawls, 1971). Empirical evidence supports the idea that equality is a central norm defining the moral economy of the welfare state. Not only do those elements form coherent scale of what the government responsibilities should be in the eyes of the citizens (Svallfors 2012)⁴. Individuals also judge positively the effects of the welfare state, such as the prevention of poverty, of social unrest, and enhancing population well-being (Van Oorschot 2012). Merging these different – although very close – aspects, I consider equality to be one of the three core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state.

The norm of **reciprocity** is the second central norm of the moral economy of the welfare state. It is closely linked to what theorists of welfare state foundations label the promotion of social inclusion. The idea of distributive justice presupposes a political community that divides, exchanges and shares social goods. This cooperation is both the cause and the consequence of integrated communities, and it builds on social capital (Putnam 1993). One of the founding dimensions of the welfare state is therefore to promote inclusion, through the action of welfare institutions. Reciprocity is the main prerequisite for individuals to cooperate. This is extremely relevant for the groups that are expected to contribute the most. The idea of belonging to a community is a forceful justification for the welfare state, under the condition that relations among individuals are perceived to be reciprocal. ‘Contingent consent’ to an institution – here the welfare state – can by explained through reciprocity, as a norm requiring that individuals cooperate with government demands but only as long as others also do (Levi 1997). The definition of the population of those expected to contribute is of central importance: those who contribute are deserving of social benefits, those who do not (or not sufficiently) are not. The political philosophy of the welfare state argues that merit is one of the main principles of justice. The notion of merit is very close to reciprocity in the sense that it grounds redistribution in a scheme of valued participation and conditionality (Fives 2008).

Practically, the ‘deservingness debate’ demonstrates the central importance of the norm of reciprocity in the moral economy of the welfare state. When individuals evaluate who is entitled to welfare benefits, past and future contributions are of major importance. For instance, the elderly are always ranked as the most deserving, because they have contributed during their whole life. (Van Oorschot, 2008).

The last norm of the moral economy of the welfare state is **self-reliance**. It has always been the norm (meaning the convention) when individuals consider welfare (Goodin & Mitchell 2000). Self-reliance is at the centre of the welfare state narratives. Individuals who are perceived to be self-reliant, sufficient without state intervention, are positively viewed (Halvorsen 1998). In the philosophical debate on welfare, Dworkin partly introduces a related concept when answering to the rawlsian conception of equality. To him, the pivotal distinction in justice is between “chances and choices”; this implies that it a social justice should correct the hazards of chance, individuals should be held responsible for their choices above all (Dworkin 1981). Regarding the foundations of the welfare state literature, self-reliance is tightly linked to the dimensions of efficiency. In that sense, not only are individuals responsible for their own welfare; but poverty, need of assistance are viewed as a personal failure (Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989). Self-reliance is also very important at the macro-level, since dependence is envisaged as violating the rule of ‘Pareto efficiency’ (when no one can be better off, without some others being worse off). Too great dependency bears

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⁴ Defining “Government responsibility”, Svallfors constructs a scale very close to what the norms of equality is. It is constructed of the following items on the scope of action of the welfare state: “ensure a job for everyone”; “ensure adequate healthcare for the sick”; “ensure reasonable standards of living for the unemployed”; “ensure sufficient child services for working parents”; “provide paid leave from work to those who have to care for family members”. Even if cross-national and categorical variations are strong, support for this dimension of social justice is strong in industrialized countries.
greater cost on the general welfare of society (Goodin et al. 1999). For these reasons, self-reliance is the third central norm driving the moral economy of the welfare state.

The framework I propose for the assessment of the impact of norms on welfare attitudes and consequently on voting behaviour is an interactive one. It is an individual’s assessment of the compliance of others to the norms of the welfare state that mainly shape his welfare attitudes. More precisely, welfare attitudes and following electoral preferences are sharply influenced by the perception that others violate one (or more) of the three core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state. Differentiation is the mechanism that leads the perceptions of the violation of norms of the moral economy of the welfare state to polarized welfare attitudes. These extreme welfare attitudes underlie support for the radical right. Normative beliefs produce different representations for different social groups. Boundaries are set between those groups, and as a result, some are positively connoted (in-groups), others are negatively connoted (out-groups) (Tajfel 1978). The antagonisms produced between groups are the central feature of normative beliefs (Staerklé et al. 2012). As a result, the norm-violating individuals are differentiated, they are considered an out-group, and thus considered as negative elements of society (Kreindler 2005). For the moral economy of the welfare state, this implies that some individuals are perceived as violating the norm of social justice, reciprocity, or self-reliance. Each of these norms can be translated in more explicit and concrete welfare attitudes. The perception of a violation of one, or more, of the core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state results in polarized positions in terms of those welfare attitudes. As a result of this polarized attitude that is driven by group differentiation, blame is put on the out-group. The differentiation hypothesis expects that that this blame (polarized welfare attitude) can translate into a vote for the radical right (Figure 2).

This section presents the welfare attitudes associated to each of the three core norms of the moral economy of the welfare state. I argue that individuals who perceive that a welfare norm is violated will hold extreme position on the associated welfare attitude. This extreme attitude is the result of a differentiation process: a norm-violating out-group is defined, and its deviant behaviour antagonizes some individuals. The radical right parties are likely to capture this welfare antagonism because they are ideologically prone to such differentiation processes.

Defining bounded communities and exclusion are characteristics of radical right parties. (Sniderman et al. 2000, Mudde 2007). They are essentially movements of exclusion (Rydgren 2005). Moreover, they are populist. Even if populism is a “thin ideology”, it has a “chameleon character” (Betz 1994; Mény & Surel 2002; Mudde 2004); it displays an exclusionary trademark. Populism relies on an antagonism between “us” and “them”. Populism is founded on a vertical and a horizontal opposition. Whether directed at the “corrupted elite” (vertical) or another out-group (horizontal), the mechanism is one of differentiation between a heartland, an idealized community and a negatively perceived group (Taggert 2002). Because of these exclusionary features, radical right parties are expected to capture the antagonisms produced by the perceptions of norms violation. In other words, citizens who display extreme welfare attitudes because they feel some individuals are violating a core norm of the moral economy of the welfare state are more likely to vote for radical right parties. The next section details the attitudinal mechanisms that would influence such behaviour.

Welfare populism is the attitude derived from the norm of reciprocity. It emerges when individuals feel an out-group is not contributing its share of the welfare social contract.
Parallel to the two-dimensional opposition of populism, welfare populism can differentiate a vertical and a horizontal out-group. On the one hand, the “welfare scroungers” designate those that abuse the welfare system, the “welfare dependents” that violate the norm of reciprocity. On the other hand, the “corrupted elite” is an encompassing notion that gathers economic elites, but also the constitutive elements of the welfare system. In that sense, public servants can become the target of such welfare populism, as they are the elites of the welfare system, and are deemed usurpers of its benefits. Thus, the welfare populist opposes the “hard working citizens”, the “little guys” to citizens and elites who do not contribute their share to the welfare system while greatly benefiting from it. The “social parasites”\(^5\), those who do not participate in the industrious production, are a targeted out-group. Voters may support radical right parties to oppose such individuals. Welfare chauvinism is an attitude that supports a “system of social protection only for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it” (Kitschelt 1995). It has been presented as a central feature of populist right vote in Europe in recent years (De Koster et al. 2012). Welfare chauvinism fits very well with the idea of ‘violated reciprocity’ (Van Oroschot 2008, Van der Waal et al. 2010)\(^6\). Immigrants are considered an out-group less entitled to welfare, because they have contributed less (by nature they arrive in the welfare system later; in addition they are perceived as a structurally dependent group). They are viewed as a threat to the welfare state that is based on the norm of equal reciprocity. Parallel to welfare populist attitudes, immigrants also constitute an out-group at which welfare chauvinism is directed. Thus welfare chauvinism is conceptualized as a specification of welfare populism, as it relies on the same principle of violated reciprocity\(^7\). Some individuals believe the norm of reciprocity is violated, and they express extreme welfare populist or welfare chauvinist attitudes. They believe that undeserving groups – whether they are an elite or an out-group such as immigrants – unfairly monopolize welfare benefits. These welfare populist or welfare chauvinist are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

Welfare constricted is the welfare attitude associated to the norm of self-reliance. The norm of self-reliance insists that individuals should not rely on the welfare state to fulfill their needs. Those who are autonomous are positively viewed. On the other hand, individuals who are deemed “welfare dependent” are negatively viewed. The relation between the norm of self-reliance and the attitude of welfare constricted is complicated, because it plays both on the micro and the macro level. Much of the libertarian economic tradition, most prominently Hayek and Friedman, argues that the welfare state is not the ideal arrangement to maximize the well-being of a society. They argue the welfare state should be reduced to its minimal form, because its institutions foster dependency, corrupt citizens from a righteous conduct; and therefore does not allow for the maximization of welfare. In that sense, being a proponent of a retrenchment of the welfare state can be a modality of welfare constricted. As it is deemed by essence to corrupt individual’s self-reliance, the welfare state should be retrenched as a whole. But there can be finer grained preferences for constriction: some groups’

\(^5\) The term « social parasite » is inspired from Saint-Simon in “Sur la querelle des abeilles et des frelons ou Sur la consommation respective des producteurs et des consommateurs non producteurs” published in 1819.

\(^6\) Jens Rydgren defined welfare chauvinism in a rather similar way: “In such a conflict situation, immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate competitors pitted against natives who are entitled to keep the entire cake for themselves. Hence, in this view immigration is seen as a zero-sum game in which one side always loses what the other side gains. In addressing welfare chauvinist frames, the new radical right-wing parties have used the idea of ‘national preference’: giving to native priority in jobs, housing, health care and so on – a proposal that can be characterized as ‘reversed affirmative action’” (Rydgren 2003)

\(^7\) Parallel to this sociocultural approach of welfare chauvinism is a socioeconomic one. “Realistic conflict theory”, assumes that some groups are in competition for scarce or valued social resources. However, this approach has been empirically proven wrong (Mau & Mewes, 2012)
dependence is perceived a consequence of their deficient self-reliance. This is especially true for non-mechanical welfare dependence: unemployment being the most likely to be blamed on the individuals, whereas age, and thus pension schemes are unavoidable to most individuals. It is very unlikely that individuals think about the norm of self-reliance on a macro-level economic scale. However, citizens can perceive that some individuals violate the norm of self-reliance by becoming voluntarily welfare dependent. Then, individuals can assess that the welfare state institutions foster such behaviours, and thus feel they should be retrenched (Halvorsen 1998). According to Kitschelt’s famous “winning formula”, radical right parties hold (or held) preferences for the reduction of the welfare state’s scope and range (Kitschelt 1995). Therefore, because some individuals believe the welfare state foster of form of dependency that benefits an out-group that violates the norm of self-reliance, they are more likely prefer the reduction of the welfare state policies, and support the radical right.

Egalitarianism is the welfare attitude logically associated to the norm of equality. This welfare attitude often has been equated to support for the welfare state (Svallfors 1999). However, egalitarianism is not just support for welfare institutions. Expressing egalitarian views can even go along critical views pertaining the welfare state (Achterberg et al. 2011). Here, egalitarianism is considered as the attitude expressed when individuals feel the norm of social justice has been violated. In terms of differentiation, citizen perceive this violation because the can identify out-groups that are clearly in precarious conditions. Contrary to the out-groups defined when assessing the violations of reciprocity and self-reliance norms, the out-groups here are not necessarily judged negatively. In fact, referring to the framework of populism, individuals can feel that those less well-off citizens are part of the imagined “us”. This idea is particularly relevant for some categories of the population. For instance, the working class usually displays high levels of egalitarianism. Workers and the less well-off tend to express egalitarianism the most dramatically (Svallfors 2012). At the same time, the working class is considered as the core electorate of the radical right (Oesch 2008; Mau & Mewes 2012, Rydgren 2007, 2013). Therefore we can hypothesize that some individuals who feel they are part of a group that is suffers from the violations of social justice and thus are strongly egalitarian, are likely to vote for the radical right.

To sum up, economic insecurity can underlie the radical right vote in two manners: assessing one’s individual risks given his material situation and evaluating future economic risks. Certainly, these two mechanisms interact. I label these two mechanisms retrospective and prospective economic insecurity. I have shown how the perceived violations of the norms of the moral economy of the welfare state can lead to group differentiation and welfare attitudes that can translate into radical right vote. Table 1 presents the subhypotheses.

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<td>Aspects of Economic Insecurity</td>
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8 Note that under a strictly libertarian conception of the economy, individuals should be expected to forecast their future dependence (or eventual illness) and provide insurance systems for themselves instead of relying on state schemes.
In the first case, voting for the radical right is compared to all other vote options (including blank votes and spoilt votes). In the second case, voting for the radical is compared to each of the other possible vote choice. To classify the party families, I rely on an adaptation of the Eurobarometer ZEUS coding schema into seven party families. Voting possibilities been categorized into seven party families that encompass almost every party competing in Western Europe: Non-governmental Left, Socialist/Social-democrat, New Left (greens), Liberals, Christian-Democrats, Conservatives and the Radical Right\(^9\). Non-voting is the

\[\text{Table 1} \quad \text{The influence of welfare politics on the radical right vote: Protection and Differentiation hypotheses}\]

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\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{H2a} & \text{Reciprocity} & \text{Welfare populism/Chauvinism} & + \\
\text{H2b} & \text{Self-Reliance} & \text{Welfare Constriction} & + \\
\text{H2c} & \text{Equality} & \text{Egalitarianism} & + \\
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\]

\[\text{2.1. Data and operationalization}\]

The testing of the protection and differentiation hypotheses is set on the individual level and based on the European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS4) of 2008. The questionnaire has a specific rotating module on “welfare attitudes in changing Europe” which allows for finer grained analysis of welfare dispositions and attitudes in relation to political behaviour. The first section details the construction of voting behaviour dependent variables (2.1.1.), then of independent variables of both hypotheses (2.2.2.), and finally of control variables (2.2.3.).

\[\text{2.1.1. Dependent variables: voting for the radical right in West European countries}\]

This chapter focuses on the core radical right electorate. Therefore it analyses only countries that have an electorally relevant radical right party at the time of the survey. Electoral relevance is determined under two conditions: radical right voters represent more than 4% of our sample, and the considered party must have competed in more than one consecutive national election at the time of data collection (2007). Hence, the analysis is based on eight West European countries and their respective radical right parties: Austria (\textit{Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs}) Denmark (\textit{Dansk Folkeparti}, DF), Finland (\textit{Perussuomalaiset}, PS), Norway (\textit{Fremskrittspartiet}, FrP), France (\textit{Front National}, FN), the Netherlands (\textit{Partij voor de Vrijheid}, PVV), Belgium (\textit{Vlaams Belang}, VB; \textit{Front National}, FN) and Switzerland (\textit{Schweizerische Volkspartei}, SVP; \textit{Schweizer Demokraten}, SD; \textit{Lega dei Ticinesi}, LdT, \textit{Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union}, EDU)\(^9\). The elections taken into consideration occurred between 2003 and 2007. These eight countries make up for a sample of 15039 respondents.

Voting for the radical right is the dependent variable of this chapter; it is based on report of vote choice from the last legislative election (elections dates from 2003 to 2007). Voting behaviour is measured in two different ways: as binary variable, and as categorical variable. In the first case, voting for the radical right is compared to all other vote options (including blank votes and spoilt votes). In the second case, voting for the radical is compared to each of the other possible vote choice. To classify the party families, I rely on an adaptation of the Eurobarometer ZEUS coding schema into seven party families. Voting possibilities been categorized into seven party families that encompass almost every party competing in Western Europe: Non-governmental Left, Socialist/Social-democrat, New Left (greens), Liberals, Christian-Democrats, Conservatives and the Radical Right\(^10\). Non-voting is the

\[\text{9} \quad \text{The Swiss case is particular since there are four parties that can be classified as radical right parties. Only the SVP gathers the two conditions of electoral relevance, but four parties are kept in the analysis. Since the electorate is considered as a whole, it is acceptable to include the four parties to form the group of Swiss radical right voters. A similar approach is taken for Belgium, even if VB and FN do not compete in the same electoral arenas; their voters are the Belgian radical right electorates.}\]

\[\text{10} \quad \text{In order to code parties into party families, I choose to rely on the European party affiliation of each national party with an additional distinction for the right parties. The Liberals, Christian-Democrats and Conservatives have been distinguished even though they can belong to the same EP groups because, even though they can share common positions, they are expected to diverge precisely on the issues of redistribution. Regionalist} \]

10
eighth electoral option. (See Appendix A for the full classification of political parties). Electoral analysis of the radical right is often confronted to the issue of underrepresentation of the voters in surveys. Smaller parties already have small proportions of respondents in such surveys, but this is worsened by under-declaration of the radical right vote due to social desirability. In the pooled sample for these 8 countries, the 974 radical right voters constitute a satisfactory sample. However, there is quite a large variation within countries, in which radical right voters range from a low 31 in France to 204 in Austria. 

2.1.2. Independent variables: economic insecurity and welfare attitudes

As discussed in the first section, I put forward two hypotheses to explain the relation between welfare politics and the radical right. Hence, there are three chunks of independent variables: those relating to the protection hypothesis, those relating to the differentiation hypothesis, and the usual control variables in electoral analysis.

Variables of the protection hypothesis
The first aspect of the theory that links economic insecurity to radical right voting is the individuals’ own economic risks. There are two ways to assess economic insecurity: occupational experiences and individual perceived risks. Occupational experiences are mostly captured by belonging to a specific occupational class. To account for these occupational experiences I rely on Oesch’s (2006) class schema, which is derived from the conventional International Standard of Classification of Occupations (ISCO88). This recalibration accounts for labour-market positions and goes beyond the manual/non-manual divide. The 16 positions occupational classification is also very functional as it can be adapted in 8 larger yet coherent occupational statuses. Finally, these groupings can also be aggregated in 4 reliable social classes: employers, middle-class, working class and routine workers (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). Table 1 presents these three level of occupational classifications.
Yet mere membership to an occupational class – however coherently it is aggregated is not a sufficient measure of economic insecurity. The aggregation gums the individual-level differences among social classes. It is also a very static measure that cannot account for the possible variations of an individual’s employment history. An alternative possibility would be to measure objective economic insecurity through a combination of occupational level rates of unemployment, skill specificity or employment types (for instance Rehm 2009, Schwander and Häusermann 2013) and these employment characteristics at the individual level (Rueda 2005). There are again shortcomings to using objective labour-market risks to account for economic insecurity: first, it is restricted to employment characteristics (economic insecurity relates to broader concerns about finances, health and situation at the household level); second, it does not account for the past experiences. Because both mere occupational class and objective labour-market risks are insufficient to fully capture economic insecurity, I opt for measures of prospective and retrospective subjective of economic insecurity, which allow for correcting (or completing) these shortcomings.

Prospective subjective economic insecurity is measured by a Likert-scale. It aggregates three items in the perceived likelihood to become unemployed, lack money to cover the household’s expenses, and to lack healthcare coverage over the next 12 months. To account for the possible influence of past events on preferences formation, retrospective economic insecurity is measured by a binary variable capturing whether an individual once experienced an unemployment period of more than 3 months (that is without a job and looking for one). 25% of the sample reports having been unemployed in the past. The combination of occupational status (and thus derived labour-market experience) with retrospective and prospective economic insecurity fully captures the concept of economic insecurity as defined in chapter 1; it brings together structural factors with individual’s assessments of the causes and consequences of their economic insecurity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16 Positions Occupational Classification</th>
<th>8 Positions Occupational Classification</th>
<th>4 Social Classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Large employers (10 or more employees)</td>
<td>• Self-employed professionals and large employers</td>
<td>• Employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-employed professionals</td>
<td>• Small business owners</td>
<td>• Middle-Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Small business owners with 1-9 employees</td>
<td>• (Associate) managers and administrators</td>
<td>• Working Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Small business owners without employees</td>
<td>• Office clerks</td>
<td>• Routine Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managers and administrators</td>
<td>• Technical professionals and technicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Associate managers and administrators</td>
<td>• Production workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skilled clerks</td>
<td>• Socio-cultural (semi)-professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Routine clerks</td>
<td>• Service workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technical experts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Technicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skilled craft workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Routine operatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Socio-cultural professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Socio-cultural semi-professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Skilled service workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Routine service workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - Occupational Classifications
Variables of the differentiation hypothesis

The differentiation hypothesis identified four welfare attitudes resulting from perceived norm violation: welfare populism, welfare chauvinism, welfare constriction, and egalitarianism. These four attitudes are measured by 5 points Likert-scales. The specific module on welfare attitudes of the ESS4 (2008) is the only dataset that to create comprehensive scales that account for normative beliefs about welfare politics. In addition to their theoretical definition, the welfare attitudes resulting from the differentiation hypothesis need to be empirically justified. I ran a factor analysis with a set of variables of this specific module pertaining to beliefs about the welfare state, which confirmed the four hypothesised welfare attitudes. Figure 1 is a scree plot that presents of eigenvalues of that analysis. There are four reliable factors, which correspond respectively to welfare constriction, egalitarianism, welfare populism, and welfare chauvinism. Each of the hypothesised welfare attitudes is a Likert-scale formed of three or four Likert-items (table 2 summarizes these items). Each scale ranges from 1 to 5, higher scores expressing higher agreement. Welfare constriction is the attitude that derives from the violation of the norm of self-reliance and it explains the highest share of variance is the factor analysis. In order to capture the breadth of this norm, it is composed of two items related to the general consequences of welfare benefits (making people more lazy, and less caring for themselves and their families) and two items on concrete violations of the norm of self-reliance (unemployed individuals not looking for jobs, employees pretending to be sick). Egalitarianism is the welfare attitude derived from the norm of equality, which dimensions are reducing poverty, promoting social equality and avoiding inclusion. Since these are statements about the role of the welfare state, I chose not measure egalitarianism with general statements on equality, but rather with specific expectation about the role and span of the welfare state. Therefore egalitarianism is composed of a scale of agreement with the position

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12 The presented results come from an orthogonal rotation of a principal component factor analysis. See Appendix B for factor loadings.
that the state should guarantee the “standards of living” of different groups at risks (the old, the unemployed, the sick) and ensure jobs for every individual. *Welfare Populism* and *Welfare Chauvinism* both derive from the violation of the norm of reciprocity, the latter being a specification of the former that targets specifically the immigrants. *Welfare Populism* expresses the violation of the norm of reciprocity by identifying an out-group that is deemed undeserving of the welfare benefits it enjoys; or, on the contrary, that does not receive the benefits it should be entitled to for its level of contribution. To capture these two directions, following the characteristics of populism, “many” are considered to receive more than they contribute, whereas the “low incomes” and thoses “in real need” are perceived not to receive all the benefits to which they should be entitled. The scale of welfare chauvinism focuses on reciprocity in giving welfare benefits to immigrants: after how long in the country should they receive welfare benefits, do they receive more than they contribute, are immigrants settling in the country because of social benefits?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-5 Scales</th>
<th>Items forming the scales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Constriction</td>
<td>Social benefits/services make people lazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social benefits make people less willing to look after themselves or their familie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employees often pretend thy are sick to stay home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Populism</td>
<td>Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insufficient benefits in country to help people in real need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many with low incomes get less benefits than legally entitled to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Chauvinism</td>
<td>Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When should immigrants obtain rights to social benefits/services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrants are encouraged to come to the country because of social benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>Government responsibility: standard of living of the old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government responsibility: healthcare for the sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government responsibility: standard of living for the unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government responsibility: job for everyone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - Likert-type items included in welfare attitude scales

*Control variables*

The models include the conventional control variables of electoral behaviour analyses. Socio-demographic characteristics are traditional control variables of the vote. Moreover, they are especially relevant when dealing with the radical right vote in Wester Europe, since they account for a – minor but real – portion of the variance in support for the radical right parties (Fennema et al. 2003). Hence, in the following analysis variables of age, gender, education (years of education) and household income (in deciles) are included.

Attitudes relating to the cultural issues are prominent in explaining the radical right vote, and more specifically the workers’ support for the radical right (Mudde 2007, Oesch 2008). One cannot assess the influence of welfare politics (holding specific welfare attitudes, or being economically insecure) without controlling for the cultural explanation of radical right support. To include this dimension – or control for it, I use an authoritarianism scale, inspired by Adorno’s F-scale, which is widely used in political sociology (Adorno 1950, Koster et al. 2007). This scale was computed in a similar fashion as the welfare attitudes independent variables: it is a 5-point Likert scale, with higher scores corresponding to higher levels of
authoritarianism\textsuperscript{13}. Table 3 give a statistical summary of the variables constructed in order to test the two hypotheses\textsuperscript{14}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Populism</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Chauvinism</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Constriction</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Social classes</td>
<td>13806</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective economic insecurity</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective economic insecurity</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>15309</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - Description of independent variables

2.2 Results

This part of the analysis provides a thorough but general testing of both hypotheses on influence of welfare politics on the radical right in eight countries in Western Europe. In order to demonstrate – or invalidate – the protection and differentiation hypotheses; I proceed in four steps. First, I test the significance of economic insecurity and welfare attitude determinants for voting for radical right parties with a logistic regression explaining vote choice. Second, I look more precisely in the effects of the seven variables of interests (three for the protection hypothesis, four for the differentiation hypothesis) through a comprehensive presentation of predicted probabilities of the radical right vote for each covariate. Third, multinomial logistic regression allows expanding on vote choice by overcoming a strictly binary logic. Indeed, vote choice cannot be simply reduced to voting for the radical right or not, but it has to be compared to other voting (or non voting) possible outcomes. We can expect welfare politics to have significant contrasting effects on different vote choices, on the left or on the right votes between the left and the right. The question remains if welfare politics significantly distinguishes radical right voters from other party families and in which direction. Finally, I hint at cross-country variance and contextual factors of this relation, as both electorates and parties themselves show a great deal of variation.

2.2.1 Voting for the radical right in Western Europe

This section presents the general model resulting from my two hypotheses for all selected cases. The logistic regression is run on a sample of voters (who have expressed a party preferences) comprising between 9133 and 9620 individuals. Cross-country variation can pose a double problem for this methodology: there may be some country specific effect that such model would obliterate, and there is a rather large variation of radical right voters among the different countries. To correct for these issues, the models are run with country fixed-effects. Table 4 presents odds-ratios for the three models of the analysis, including the protection hypothesis variables (I), the differentiation hypothesis variables (II) and a combined model (III).

\textsuperscript{13} Items composing the authoritarianism scale are: 1. School should teach children to obey. 2. Gays and lesbians are free to live as they wish. 3. People who break the law should have harsher sentences.

\textsuperscript{14} In order not to lose information and maintain the sample size, missing values of the independent variables were replaced by the mean value.
To begin with, the control variables give results in line with existing knowledge among the three models (Lubbers and Scheppers 2000, Givens 2004, Norris 2005). Age although statistically significant is not a predictor of the vote for the radical right. The same absence of effect goes for income, which is a little more surprising. However, the fact that this measure is controlled for education, and occupational class in model I or welfare attitudes in model II certainly explains this neutral effect. The effect of education can appear to be rather small considering the effect already established in the literature (Kriesi and Bornschier 2012); however there are several reasons for this. First, this model integrates years of education, the effect presented here is thus the effect of one additional year of education, which would not be as strong as taking different aggregate level of education. Second, the table presents odds-ratios; the odds ratio of .98 indicates that with each additional year of education, individuals are 2% less likely to vote for the radical right. Gender is a strong determinant of voting for the radical right. More precisely, in 2008 in Western Europe, females are much less likely to vote for the radical right, which is consistent with previous findings. Finally, as expected, authoritarianism is strongly and consistently associated with voting for the radical right. Model I presents clear results for the protection hypothesis. Both prospective and retrospective economic insecurity are strong and positive determinants of voting for the radical right. It is noteworthy that these effects are stronger or equal to that of the authoritarianism scale. The model predicts that an individual who has experienced a period of at least three months of unemployment in his life is 40% more likely to vote for the radical right than an individual that was continuously employed. With an odds-ratio of 1.27, the effect of prospective economic insecurity is almost equally strong. These results confirm that economic insecurity is a strong determinant of voting for the radical right. The effects of occupational class confirm existing knowledge of the sociological composition of the radical right electorate. Compared to working class voters, belonging to the middle class or being an employer make it very less likely to be a radical right voter. There is however no significant difference between the working class and routine service workers. Overall, the link between economic insecurity and voting for radical right parties, be it occupational class belonging or prospective and retrospective economic insecurity, is clearly demonstrated.

Model II presents the effects of the four constructed welfare attitudes. Previous research had already established that welfare chauvinism was a typical attitude of radical right voters, and the model forcefully confirms it. No other variable has a comparable effect to that of holding welfare chauvinist preferences. Additionally, the hypothesis on violated reciprocity is confirmed by the positive effect of holding welfare populist attitudes on the radical right vote. These two attitudes spur from the same logic – or perception or norm violation – and thus have similarly positive effects on this vote (although of different strength). The perception of violation of the norm of self-reliance, and the associated attitude of welfare constringtion also has positive effect on this vote. Egalitarianism on the contrary is not positively associated to voting for the radical right, yet being egalitarian is neither negatively associated to this vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.98*** (0.01)</td>
<td>.98*** (0.01)</td>
<td>.99** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.72*** (0.06)</td>
<td>.67*** (0.05)**</td>
<td>.72*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>1.00** (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00*** (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>1.33*** (0.04)</td>
<td>1.13*** (0.00)</td>
<td>1.12*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class (Working Class reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employers</td>
<td>.65*** (0.08)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.58*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Middle Class</td>
<td>.58*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.62*** (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Routine worker</td>
<td>.81 (0.11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.84 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Model III presents the aggregated model establishing the relation between welfare politics and the radical right. On the whole, previous results hold. One minor difference is that economic insecurity appears to have slightly more explanatory power when controlled for welfare attitude (whose effect are moderately lower). On the other hand, the scale of egalitarianism has a small but negative effect on the radical right vote in the aggregated model. These models however do not fully account for the effects of economic insecurity, and even for welfare attitudes. Attitudinal scales cannot be expected to have fully linear relations to voting behaviour; the next section goes further in explaining the effects of these variables by presenting detailed predicted probabilities of the vote.

### 2.2.2 Individual effects of the variables of interest

Looking at the predicted probabilities of each modality of the variables of interest allows for a much finer-grained analysis of their effect. Predicted probabilities are also easily interpretable, as they give a predicted share of the vote for the radical right for given levels of economic insecurity or welfare attitudes. However, they are not giving an explicit account of the sample that is analyzed, as they are calculated for each variable of interest with all other parameters set at means. Hence they do not exactly describe the entire population, but rather the specific individual effects of the modalities of each variable.

Regarding occupational status and economic insecurity, the computed predicted probabilities confirm the effects presented in the previous section (figure 2). The working class, as well as individuals who experienced unemployment are much more likely to vote for the radical right than others. Among the four broad occupational classes, the working class really stands out for its level of support for the radical right. While belonging to any occupational class, all other variables held constant, gives a predicted probability of voting for the radical right lower than 8%; being a working class voter increases this probability to 11%. This does not mean that 11% of the working class votes for the radical right. It is the differences between the two predicted probabilities, which is the interesting result. This analysis also specifies the relation between (prospective) economic insecurity and the radical right vote. I have showed they were rather strongly associated, but the predicted probabilities indicate that this effect is concentrated among the individuals who express the highest level of economic insecurity. Financial hardship, the fear of unemployment and the fear of lacking healthcare are influencing the vote for the radical right for the individuals that feel the greater risks.

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15 For this part of the analysis, the attitudinal scales have been reorganized into quintiles.
16 Indeed, this is the effect of being a working class voter, all else equal (at mean). The radical right vote of the working class is also determined by other factors. In the sample, 15.3% of working class individuals reported voting for radical right parties.
The predicted probabilities associated to different level of adhesion to the four welfare attitudes also enrich the previous analysis. Welfare chauvinism and welfare constriction are confirmed as strong predictors of the radical right vote. It is noteworthy that for individuals expressing the higher level of welfare chauvinism the expected share of vote for the radical right is close to 20%, which is twice the size of actual radical right voters in the sample. The relation between welfare populism and vote choice appears to be less clear. Note however that individuals that express the higher level of this attitudes are expected to vote less for radical right parties than the others. Similarly, the relation between egalitarianism and voting for the radical right does not hold a linear relation along attitudinal levels. This imperfect U-shaped curved is an important result however, as it shows that radical right voters are more likely to be found among either very egalitarian or very anti-egalitarian voters. To put it differently, individuals that are the most egalitarians are proportionally more likely to vote for the radical right than individuals that express rather average levels of egalitarianism. Contrary to what the simple multivariate analysis showed, egalitarianism is not necessarily negatively associated to the radical right vote.
Another step to look more closely to the extent in which welfare politics underlies support for the radical right is to compare this vote choice with others. Multinomial logistic regression allows for such specification of radical right support.

2.3.2. Voting for the radical compared to other vote choices

As the previous section showed, the protection and differentiation hypothesis are – more or less strongly – associated to the radical right vote. Yet a further question is to understand how these factors play in comparison to their influence for other party choices. For instance, is economic insecurity linked to radical right and radical left votes? Is egalitarianism more relevant to voters of the radical right than to those of mainstream parties? Which of these factors makes a difference between voting (for the radical right or other party families) and not voting? I performed two different multinomial logistic regressions, to grasp vote choice entirely and in a more dynamic manner. (A similar approach, which allows for the comparison of vote choices is to be found in Koster et al. 2012 and Zhirkov 2014).

Table 5 present the log odds of voting for the seven different party families found in Western Europe; not voting is the reference category. The literature indicates that non-voters and radical right electors have a somewhat similar sociological profile. This model therefore allows seeing what elements of economic insecurity or welfare attitudes distinguish these two groups (results of this comparison are concentrated in the right-hand column). Economic insecurity has already proven to be a determinant of the radical right vote in previous analysis, but it is negatively associated to voting for the radical right compared to not voting in this model. This means that the more insecure are more likely not to vote. Indeed, prospective economic insecurity is negatively associated to all vote choices (except the radical left) compared to non-voting: this negative effect is however the lowest for the radical right and
the social-democratic parties. Welfare attitudes resulting from the perception of violated reciprocity give notable results in this model (and different from the previous sections). When compared to non-voting, welfare populism and welfare chauvinism have opposite effects. These attitudes may proceed from the same normative reasoning but, as the targeted out-group varies, so does the influence on vote choice. Thus, logically, individuals targeting immigrants as receiving more than they contribute are more likely to vote for the radical right than no to vote. The individuals that express such an attitude but for another out-group, and those that are more egalitarian are more likely not to vote than to vote for the radical right. Overall, the four welfare attitudes have opposite influences on the decision to vote choice following a traditional left/right divide. Assessing the relation of these attitudes to voting behaviour for all types of parties constitutes a research agenda that is wider than this paper. Nonetheless, when compared to non-voters, the radical right voters attitudinally side with the other right-wing voters. The following section investigates further the determinants of the votes compared to that of the radical right.

Table 6 presents the log odds of voting for any party family or not voting, but using voting for the radical right as a reference category. Logically, the right-hand column is the inverse as the one from table 5, as it compares non-voting to voting for the radical right. The previous analysis showed a certain attitudinal proximity between radical right voters and those of other right-wing parties; yet, they diverge in terms of economic insecurity. Being economically insecure (prospective and retrospective) marks a strong difference between radical right voters and those of the liberal, Christian-democratic and conservative parties. In this regard, there is no statistically significant difference between radical right voters and those from the voters of left-wing parties. Welfare populism, the perception of the violation of the norm of reciprocity, also distinguishes from the left and the right. If the left-wing voters express this attitude more strongly than radical right voters, the latter are more welfare populist than the right-wing voters. A similar pattern is to be found for egalitarianism: radical right voters are less egalitarian than the left-wing voters, but not than right-wing voters. Finally, it is again confirmed that welfare chauvinism, believing that immigrants violate the welfare norm of reciprocity, is a essential characteristics of the radical right, distinguishing its voters from all others.

At a more general level, there is an opposition between the electorate of the radical right and those of the left parties, which contradicts previous works that considered them similar (Koster et al. 2012). This result calls for further research, and to look more closely at cross-sectional differences in the radical right electorate. It may be that the working-class supporters of the radical right are akin to those of the left, whereas the self-employed constituency of the radical right resembles the traditional right voters in terms of welfare attributes.

2.3.3. Internal differences of radical right voters

These analyses partially validated the hypotheses of the relation between welfare politics and radical right parties among Western European countries that have electorally significant radical right parties. Yet these parties are not all similar, and certainly their electorates are not either. Instead of introducing country level variables in this analysis, I choose to break down the explanation of voting behaviour between countries. Table 6 shows the effects of welfare attitudes and economic insecurity variables on the radical right vote for each country of the sample. It is to be noted that these models are not statistically completely fit, as countries samples are somewhat limited, and the proportion of radical right voters is rather small in some cases.

The strong impact of Welfare chauvinism on the radical right vote holds in every considered country. The violation of the welfare norm of reciprocity by immigrants is even more relevant
in continental welfare state, where the effect of welfare chauvinism on the vote is particularly strong. The literature had already proven the capital influence of welfare chauvinism for specific countries (Andersen & Björklund 1990, Mau & Mewes 2012, Rydgren 2013), yet results are extended to significant West European radical right parties. In five of the eight countries selected, welfare constriction, and thus the violation of the norm of self-reliance are determinants of the vote. On the other hand, egalitarianism is not a positive determinant of this vote, and even has a negative effect in Denmark and Switzerland (two countries where the radical right parties tend to express rather limiting conception of welfare redistribution). However, this also implies that holding an egalitarian attitude is not contradictory to a radical right vote (except for these two cases). This is in line with previous work that showed how welfare chauvinism and critical views pertaining the welfare state institutions can be combined to egalitarianism as determinants of the radical right votes (Achterberg et al. 2011). Only in Finland is welfare populism positively associated to voting for the radical right, and thus it is the only where the entire hypothesis on violated reciprocity is proved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare Regime type</th>
<th>Retrospective economic insecurity</th>
<th>Prospective economic insecurity</th>
<th>Welfare Populism</th>
<th>Welfare Chauvinism</th>
<th>Welfare Constriction</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
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</table>

Table 5 - Breakdown by countries off the effects of economic insecurity and welfare attitudes on the radical right vote

Economic insecurity has a fluctuating effect on the vote across cases. However, whether prospective or retrospective, economic insecurity is positively associated to the vote for radical right parties in all the Scandinavian countries and in five of the eight cases.

This final step introducing cross-country variation allows concluding on the validity of the protection and differentiation hypotheses. The protection hypothesis introduced three dimensions of economic insecurity that were expected to be positively associated to the radical right vote: occupational class, retrospective and prospective economic insecurity. The analysis confirmed previous results: belonging to the working class, and thus in a sector that faces higher structural risks, is strongly positively associated to voting for the radical right. Additional findings are that retrospective and prospective economic insecurity are also determinants of this vote. This has proven to be particularly true for individuals that express the highest level of economic insecurity; this characteristic also clearly distinguishes the radical right voters from those of the conventional right, as they are closer to those of the left on this dimension. Overall, this first empirical analysis of the protection hypothesis tends to confirm it. The effect of the four welfare attitudes on the radical right vote is not as clear-cut. Regarding the violation of the norm of reciprocity, welfare chauvinism, which targets immigrants as receiving more than they contribute is a very strong predictor of the radical right vote, across all cases. Yet the generalization of violated reciprocity (welfare populism) is not that clearly linked to the vote. It is indeed more associated to a left-wing vote, although radical right voters seem to be more welfare populist than any other right-wing parties. Conversely, welfare constriction also determines this vote, but distinguishes radical right
voters from those of the left-wing parties. Hence, we could argue that radical right voters give more relevance to the norm of reciprocity than right-wing voters, and on the other hand consider the norm of self-reliance more important than left-wing voters. In most cases, egalitarianism does not have a direct effect on the vote for the radical right. However, absence of significant influence also proves to be a result: radical right voters do not reject egalitarianism and the role of the state in redistributing wealth. Overall, the differentiation hypothesis can only be partially confirmed at this stage.

**Conclusion**

This paper has shown that welfare politics does matter when studying the determinants of the radical right vote. The account of this vote cannot be limited to the already deeply scrutinized cultural aspect of the radical right support. In order to demonstrate this, I put forward two hypotheses on the relation between welfare politics and the radical right: protection and differentiation. The first one stated that because some individual feel economically insecure they may be inclined to support radical right parties that single themselves out regarding other parties and yet represent a status quo (against the process of globalization that increases economic risks and against further change of the welfare arrangements). The second hypothesis stated that because individuals feel some core norms of the welfare state are being violated, they identify a responsible and norm-violating out-group, which can be also singled out by radical right parties, and thus they may be more inclined to support these parties.

This paper presents preliminary findings, which partly confirm these hypotheses. The most remarkable results are the high significance welfare chauvinism and individual prospective and retrospective economic insecurity as determinants of the radical right vote in Western Europe. H1b, H1c and H2a are therefore confirmed. If the former was already demonstrated, it is now generalized. Another interesting finding relates to the attitudes of welfare constriction and egalitarianism. Radical right voters seem to be more sensible to the norms of reciprocity and equality than those of the right: they are more welfare populist and more and less in favour of welfare conscription. H2b and H2c cannot be fully confirmed, but the results make an interesting contribution with regards to the singularity of radical right voters and their distance or proximity to mainstream left and right-wing voters. Working class support for the radical right was well-documented phenomenon. However, even controlled for cultural and welfare attitudes, being a blue-collar worker remains a significant determinant of the vote. This effect may capture the perception of labour-market instability, which would then translate into support for parties that oppose globalization, H1a is therefore considered proven.

This analysis also raises a number of questions to be addressed in future research. For instance, do radical right parties compete specifically in the electoral arena on welfare attributes? Do they adapt to the welfare preferences of their national constituencies? A review of the welfare agendas of radical right parties would complete this analysis on the supply side. When considering the working class support for the radical right, the protection hypothesis could also very well function for radical left parties. It is necessary to look more closely into sectional support of the radical right constituencies by adopting an interactive approach. This means considering the welfare attitudes of different classes of voters (blue-collar, self-employed). Finally, the last step of the analysis revealed cross-country differences in the link between welfare politics and the radical right. Yet these differences also seem to somehow go along welfare regime types. If it is known that radical right support varies across welfare regimes, patterns of variation the link between welfare politics and the radical right across welfare regimes need further investigation.
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