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**ST21 - Adoption, organisation et diffusion des primaires ouvertes. Une
approche comparée**

**Adhérents de partis et votants aux primaires: différents profils, différents
comportements de vote? Le cas Italien**

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Résumé:

Le degré d'inclusivité des modes de sélection des candidats aux élections (présidentielles, locales, législatives) et des modes de désignation du leader du parti est en train d'augmenter non seulement aux Etats-Unis, mais aussi dans plusieurs pays Européens. Les adhérents, les militants et parfois les électeurs ou les sympathisants sont aujourd'hui intégrés dans ces procédures de sélection et ont la possibilité, sinon de décider, du moins d'influencer la procédure en faisant entendre leur voix (Treille et Faucher-King, 2003 ; Cross et Katz, 2013). Dans le cas des primaires dites ouvertes, tant les adhérents que les sympathisants sont intégrés au processus de sélection, sans que l'adhésion partisane soit un prérequis. Certains auteurs soulignent que, dans les partis qui ont adopté ces procédures très inclusives de désignation des leaders et des candidats, ces changements organisationnels semblent affecter les structures partisans en réduisant les marges pour différencier clairement entre le rôle et le profil des adhérents et ceux des sympathisants (Katz, 2001 ; Bolleyer, 2009).

Notre papier se propose donc de se pencher de façon tant empirique que théorique sur cette question et d'explorer en particulier les profils, attitudes et motivations des deux groupes de participants aux primaires ouvertes, les adhérents et les votants/sympathisants. Cette réflexion nous amène aux questionnements suivants: qui sont les participants aux primaires? Est-ce que la sociologie électorale des votants diffère de celle des adhérents de partis ? De plus, la littérature américaine a montré l'existence d'un lien entre le caractère inclusif des procédures de sélection des candidats et le positionnement idéologique des votants (Norrande, 1989 ; Kaufmann et al., 2005). Les votants aux primaires semblent être idéologiquement plus polarisés que l'électorat général mais moins que les adhérents de parti.

Toutefois, la nature de cette relation est plutôt controversée. D'ailleurs, les différences entre adhérents et votants/sympathisants seront explorées non seulement en termes de profil sociodémographique et politique, mais aussi en termes de comportement et de motivations de vote. Afin d'explorer empiriquement ces questionnements et les hypothèses formulées par la littérature américaine nous nous focalisons sur un cas d'étude spécifique, c'est-à-dire les partis de gauche en Italie et le Parti Démocrate plus spécifiquement. Ce parti a utilisé des primaires ouvertes pour désigner son leader et sélectionner les candidats aux élections depuis sa fondation en 2007. Nous développerons nos analyses à partir d'une base de données empirique originale élaborée sur base de données d'enquête 'sortie des urnes' lors des élections primaires de 2012 pour désigner le candidat premier ministre de la coalition de centre-gauche guidée par le PD et lors des élections primaires de 2013 pour sélectionner le leader du PD.

1. Introduction and theoretical framework

Parties in established democracies have recently faced three significant trends that have altered their relationships with the grassroots: declining voter loyalty, declining party membership and the declining importance of cleavage politics. The three constitutive organisational elements of party politics, namely the 'party in central office', the 'party in public office' and 'the party on the ground' are developing in very different directions and coping with general declining political trust and participation and growing political discontent in different ways. Several authors have pointed out that the 'party on the ground' dimension is facing a real crisis (Cross and Katz, 2013: 65). The most significant aspect of 'party decline' could be interpreted as a crisis of participation within parties.

The two main organisational responses that parties have recently adopted to cope with such new challenges (anti-party attitudes, eroding electorates, etc.) include: the expansion of intra-party democracy and the introduction of new forms of party membership. On the one hand, parties have been prompted to develop new strategies to broaden their boundaries and reach out to non-member supporters. On the other hand, parties have adopted a wide range of internal organisational reforms that, at least formally, give members more say over outcomes. Direct democracy is now used in a diverse range of intra-party decision-making procedures, such as candidate selection, leadership selection and policy positions formulation. These two responses - and party organisational change in general - have triggered significant modifications in the role and behaviour of grassroots activists, namely party members. The case of the Italian centre-left parties, and particularly the Democratic Party (PD, Partito Democratico), is in this sense particularly relevant, as for over a decade, they have been reaching out to supporters in order to integrate them into decision-making processes, such as selecting the party leader or candidates for elections or chief executive candidate. Primary elections seem to be an adaptive reaction used by Italian parties of the left in order to re-activate the link with their members and to outline new relationships with their supporters.

Primary elections are a recurrent theme in the debate about parties and their organisational change (Watterberg and Dalton, 2000; Farrell and Webb, 2000) and the personalization of politics (Calise, 2007; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Blondel and Thiebault, 2010). Literature on party politics generally argues that open primaries for selecting party candidates or leaders, i.e. direct elections open to all party voters, represent a further step in the organisational evolution of political parties. In fact, in open primaries, both enrolled members and simple party supporters can vote and mobilise internally, either for selecting the party leader or candidates for elections.

Katz and Mair (1994; 1995; 2009) argue that parties have progressively and strategically reduced the size of the 'party on the ground'. The party in public office has taken over the organisational role of mass membership. Political parties find new

legitimacy in the participation in government rather than in social integration and encapsulation; the result is a shift in the mobilising dynamics of intra-party politics. From this perspective, the model of parties as instruments of social integration has been transformed through the adoption of new mobilising strategies that go beyond the traditional ideological boundaries and that increase parties' organisational permeability (Sandri and Pauwels 2010).

Western European parties are nowadays more electorally oriented than in the past. This has led to parties adopting innovative tools for mobilising new voters and supporters. These new supporters are not as sensitive to the traditional party discourse as loyal, formally enrolled and ideologically identified members. The growing professionalization of political communication, influenced by political marketing, allows political parties to use mobilising strategies for bypassing the traditional but costly resource represented by enrolled members. They are hardly needed to convey the party's political discourse and party manifesto; they are less needed for campaigning and mobilising voters. Members end up playing a marginal role. IT and new media resources allow parties to contact a wider public, providing a more general message, which is less focused on belonging and ideological rhetoric, and aims at attracting new electoral support rather than new members (Katz and Mair, 1995).

Parties have replaced their old mass-party structures, which were rooted in grassroots membership and were ideologically distinctive, by greater organisational permeability and by the mobilisation of party supporters through new instruments of internal democracy, such as open primaries. While this new tool for mobilising voters may attract new quotas of the electoral market, it does not guarantee loyal and consistent electoral support (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Cross and Katz, 2013), thus affecting negatively the transformation of voters into affiliated members (Raniolo, 2004; 2006). Looking at declining membership figures and election turnout, it seems that this new approach to electoral and internal party mobilisation is less effective in terms of consistency in the long-term (Scarrow, 2000; van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2011).

A closer look reveals that the high degree of inclusiveness of open primaries is aimed at mobilising supporters rather than regularly affiliated members. In fact, primary elections promote a new image of political parties, namely that they are more democratic and transparent and open to all members who are finally admitted into smoke-filled rooms (Hopkin, 2001: 344). Yet the real targets of this mobilising strategy are voters (Cross and Katz, 2013: 10). Inclusiveness of open primaries means that both members and supporters without any formal affiliation take part in core decision-making processes, such as the selection of candidates and party leaders. This is bound to affect party organisation. However, this also means that these two categories of selectors are very different from a political standpoint. While enrolled members might be easily considered to be strongly involved and interested in internal party life, this is not necessarily true for supporters, who remain external to party structures. Incentives for intra-party mobilisation are very different and could lead to different outcomes from

the viewpoint of the internal organisational relationship (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015; Sandri and Seddone, 2012; Seddone and Venturino, 2013b).

Over the past decades, the diversity in possible types of party membership has increased with the introduction of new participatory opportunities that challenge the very notion of formal party membership; this has widened the possibility for individuals to interact and participate in very different ways with the party (Young, 2013; Gauja, 2014; Scarrow, 2014). One of the most prominent new categories is the so-called 'supporter' category, which allows the participation of non-members in electoral campaigns, policy development, leadership and candidate selection. Other parties have opened up their organisational boundaries in order to allow direct interaction with 'supporters' during primary elections or online, for example, through Twitter, Facebook and party websites (Gibson et al., 2012). Italian parties have been quite innovative with regards to new types of internal involvement, since Italian parties have used primaries for more than a decade, and they involve both party supporters and enrolled members in internal decision-making processes. Also, several Italian parties have restructured their organisational setting so that new typologies of members, supporters, volunteers or on-line members could be integrated into party activities.

Internally, democratic political organisations provide crucial instruments for political integration by giving opportunities to members and ordinary citizens to influence the choices voters are offered (Scarrow, et al., 2000: 130). When using direct internal elections for selecting party elites or candidates open to all members, parties do not distinguish anymore between active and passive members (Katz and Mair, 1995: 20; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Kenig 2009). In addition, open primaries only require prior registration or registration at the moment of the vote within a 'supporters' register'. Therefore, the unmediated nature of these participatory instruments is thought to be associated with the enhanced individualism of new types of party members' role and profiles (Bolleyer, 2009: 563; Russell, 2005: 267). This atomistic conception of party membership is also considered to be related to a weakened distinction between the functions, identity and role of party affiliates and supporters.

As a consequence, the introduction and diffusion of open primaries weakens the distinction between members, supporters and 'external voters' in terms of activities and power. Parties adopting new intra-party democracy instruments and primary elections in particular have increasingly blurred the member/non-member distinction by inviting supporters and primary voters to join in their activities, such as campaign actions for instance, whether formally enrolled or not. However, the distinction is not (yet) blurred to the point of rendering the different categories of partisan affiliation identical in terms of role, activities and power. The traditional difference in terms of socio-demographic, ideological profile and party identification among the three groups needs thus to be empirically documented. Also, parties that involve non-members in their internal activities claim organisational openness to be an expression of their democratic values. While openness is unproblematic for the working of internal processes as long as members have little say over party decisions, the involvement of non-members within

the party can create tensions, especially if a parallel process of membership empowerment has taken place and/or access to decision-making power does not require any indication of organisational commitment (Bolleyer, 2009; Sandri, 2011). Thus, the research questions explored in this paper address the relationship between parties, members and new forms of party involvement.

First, in order to explore this relationship, the paper assesses the differences between the three groups of primary voters, namely party members, supporters and external voters in terms political and ideological profiles. Secondly, the paper explores the potential consequences of the variations in partisan affiliation by focusing on voting behaviour and party attachment of three different groups of primary voters. The paper assesses the overall degree of differentiation between the various internal mobilisation strata. We explore the main reasons that have shaped the selectors' voting choices. Thus, we address the following research questions:

- 1) *To what extent do members, supporters and external voters differ with regard to political attitudes?*
- 2) *To what extent do members, supporters and external voters differ in terms of voting behaviour? More specifically, to what extent do the different profiles of the three groups contribute in explaining their voting motivations in primary elections?*

We explore these issues using an original dataset on the profiles, political attitudes and behaviours of party members, voters and supporters of the main Italian centre-left party, the PD. In the first part of this paper, we examine the political profiles of PD's enrolled party members and non-enrolled supporters and voters. This exploratory analysis, which aims to identify the main variations among the three groups, will be developed on the basis of survey data collected through the exit polls realised in November-December 2012 during the centre-left coalition's primary elections for selecting the chief executive candidate. In the second part of this paper, we explore the consequences of the differences in the political profiles of the three groups in terms of voting behaviour. This second step in the examination of the different types of partisan affiliation within the PD aims to analyse the variations in the relationship that each group develops with the party.

2. New forms of mobilisation, members, supporters and internal elections in Italy

Among Italian parties, the PD is the only political organisation that has adopted primaries not only as an instrument to enhance intra-party democracy but also as its own main distinctive feature, transforming internal elections into a symbolic and political identity factor. In fact, primary elections have been organised to select the first leader and to celebrate the foundation of the new party, which was created in 2007 with the merger of the leftist, post-communist party DS (Democrats of the left) and the centre-left party 'La Margherita' (The Daisy). The adoption of such an inclusive

procedure of leadership and candidate selection as open primaries intended to symbolise a break with the past so that the traditional mass party structures could be improved by offering new participatory instruments to both members (thus strengthening the party-membership relations) and to unaffiliated supporters (namely loyal voters).

The PD¹ provides a relevant case study because it has been reaching out to supporters since 2005 in order to integrate them into various types of internal elections including: choosing the party leader, candidates for national, regional and local elections and the chief executive candidate at the national level. Since 2005, centre-left parties and the PD in particular have organised open primaries for selecting party candidates for mayoral and regional elections (and regional chief executives) in several cities. More than 900 primaries have been organised since 2005 at the local level to choose the party candidate as mayor in more than 70 cities (Seddone and Venturino, 2013a). Moreover, the PD has also organised open primary elections to select: the party leader in 2007, 2009 and 2013, the chief executive candidate in 2005 and 2012 and candidates at national elections in 2012.

Other political organisations such as SEL ('Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà /Left Ecology and Freedom', a small leftist party) also use open primaries to select candidates (in fact, SEL has organised several open primaries together with PD to select the common candidates for their electoral coalitions at the local, regional or national level); thus, they formally recognise different forms of partisan affiliation. However, for the PD, primary elections do not constitute merely a new instrument for mobilising electoral support during electoral campaigns. The adoption of primaries for selecting leaders and candidates has significantly affected the party's organisational features. The peculiar relationship between enrolled members and non-enrolled supporters constitutes the main organisational specificity of the PD. As is the case for many other Western European parties, the enrolled members' figures of the PD have been consistently declining over time. Already the two founders parties of the PD, the DS and the Margherita, experienced a significant decline of their membership figures in the years that led to the creation of the new party; also, recent data confirms the PD has experienced a similar decline. The broadening of the PD's organisational boundaries was thus thought to provide a significant boost to partisan engagement.

In fact, the number of PD's enrolled members have been declining subsequent to the mobilisation 'momentum' created by the party founding and the first primary elections held in 2007. Still, the overall membership is well beyond half a million affiliates (at least until the last recruitment campaign organized in mid-2014). In 2008, the PD counted

¹ In October 2007, the two most relevant (both electorally and in terms of coalitions potential) parties of the centre-left coalition merged into a new party. The "*Democratici di Sinistra*" (Democrats of the Left, DS, heir of the Communist party) and "*La Margherita/Democrazia e' Libertà*" (The Daisy/Democracy is Freedom, DL, heir of the leftist faction of the Christian-democratic party) merged into a new party, the "*Partito Democratico*" (Democratic Party, PD). The founding moment of the new party corresponded to the organisation of open primary elections for selecting its first leader and its congress delegates.

820,000 officially enrolled members, while the official data released by party central organs declared only 618,768 members in 2010. While membership figures briefly increased to a total of 763,783 in 2011, they dropped back to 500,163 in 2013 and - apparently- to 120.000 in 2014 (but the latest recruitment data are yet to be officially confirmed). This means that the PD 'party on the ground' represents (until 2014) around 6% of the party's voters, which corresponds with the European average in terms of encapsulation ratio (Scarrows and Gezgor, 2010; van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2011). The party members mobilize locally through the 7200 local sections of the party. However, the rapid decline of aggregate membership figures from the foundation year (2007) to the following one (2008) is rather striking, even if we take into account that in 2009 and 2013 new open primary elections were to select a leader. It seems that several members joined because they were attracted by this type of event ('instant members') and then left shortly after (Rahat and Hazan, 2007). Furthermore, this downward trend was already characterizing the membership structures of the two parties that merged in 2007 in order to create the PD, namely the DS and the Margherita party (see Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix).

Since its creation, the PD has introduced a new typology of involvement within the party, namely the supporter: a voter who is not formally enrolled in the party but who can participate in some internal activities, such as canvassing, campaigning and selecting candidates for elections through primaries. The PD is thus characterised by a relatively broad variety of partisan affiliation. The distinction between formally enrolled members and non-enrolled party supporters is enshrined in the PD's statutes and internal rules. The first article of the party constitution states that the internal life is based around two different units: members and (registered) supporters. Italian citizens² and citizens of an EU country residing in Italy as well as those from a third country with a valid working visa who accept to be integrated in the 'public register of PD's supporters' (article 2 and 3 of the party statutes) have the right to participate in the internal life of the party, including decision-making processes. They shall be older than 16, they shall formally declare to accept the PD's ideological stance and programme and pledge to support it.

The PD is not the only Italian party entailing different types of partisan affiliation. The organisational permeability of Italian parties seems relatively high. Three other parties (LN, PDL and IDV (*Italia dei Valori*)) also recognise the category of 'party supporter/sympathizer' in their internal statutes. However, in the case of LN, this category simply represents the first step in the complex procedure of becoming a member, while in the cases of IDV and PDL, this formal category does not actually correspond to a specific role or function within the party (Sandri, Seddone and Bulli, 2015). Conversely, in the case of the PD, party supporters are integrated within the internal life of the party.

² Since 2009, the selectorate enlargement went as far as to include Italian citizens who are living abroad, namely all Italian citizens registered within the AIRE, the public registrar of Italians temporarily residing abroad.

PD's 'registered supporters' are in fact primary voters that accept to be listed in the party register when casting their vote for the party leader or candidates. They have a wide array of formal rights: not only can they participate in primary elections, either for the leader, the chief executive, the gubernatorial candidate or the mayoral candidate, but they can also participate in internal policy forums and referenda and can be informed about every aspect of the party's internal life (article 1.3 of the statute)³. They can also participate in local branch meetings (but without voting rights). Nonetheless, they have limited obligations and crucial membership rights; for example, selecting delegates to party congress is still reserved to formally enrolled members. The turnout at nationwide primary elections varies: between 4,300,000 voters registered in 2005 (selection of chief executive candidate, centre-left coalition) and around 3,100,000 voters registered in 2012 at the first round of the elections for the chief executive candidate of the centre-left coalition (around 2,800,000 voters participated to the second round). The number of voters that participated in the primary elections for selecting the national party leader was 3,550,000 in 2007, 3,102,000 in 2009 and 2,815,000 in 2013. The introduction of 'party supporter' category represents a crucial step in the process of internal democratization and affects the working of PD's internal processes.

However, there are substantial differences in costs and benefits regarding access to membership compared to primary election eligibility.⁴ In terms of costs, the difference is both monetary and procedural. Supporters only pay 2 euros when they register (usually on the primary election day), while members must pay fees varying from 15 to 50 euros, depending on age and income, in order to obtain their membership card. PD allows on-line recruitment of members; however, at some point even the online recruits need to enrol to the local party branch. When joining, members need not only to support the PD's manifesto and to pledge to vote for the party in the same manner as registered supporters, but they also have an obligation to respect the statutes and to become involved in the party. Also, the distinction between the two categories is at the same time formal and behavioural. Primaries represent the main venue in which both members and supporters are involved at the same time and share the same rights and obligations. During primary elections procedures, members and supporters thus share the same collective and selective incentives even though their respective overall involvement in party activities differ. Registered supporters enjoy similar rights as party members. Yet, only members can elect their delegates to party congress and vote in local sections meetings.

Given significant differences still exist in terms of the benefits and costs of obtaining each of the statuses, we expect members of the two groups to be different in demography, political profile, voting behaviour and motivations. More specifically, in section 5, we explore the differences in terms of political profiles and attitudes and in section 6, we explore the differences in terms of voting behaviour and linkage with the

³ Statute adopted on 14/12/2014.

⁴ Article 2 of the statute adopted on 14/12/2014.

party of the different categories of partisan affiliation. Also, we assess whether and to what extent these differences in voting behaviour and motivations could be explained by the specific profiles of each group. In this study, the differences in profiles and attitudes of the different categories of partisan affiliation constitute the main independent variable, while members, voters and supporters' voting behaviour and motivations represent our dependent variables.

3. The PD's primary elections (2012-2013): the two case studies.

In order to understand the participatory and electoral dynamics of the national primary elections organized between 2012 and 2013 we need to briefly summarize the political context in which they took place and the main details concerning the two case studies. The 2012-13 phase represents a key moment in recent Italian political history. During this tumultuous period, the Italian political system underwent a crucial stage of rapid transition that significantly affected the party change process within the PD. In November 2011, Berlusconi's resignation and the subsequent appointment of Mario Monti as PM of a technocratic cabinet gave the PD an opportunity to redefine its role within the Italian Parliament. The PD's support to Monti's government provided a new political centrality to the party, and substantially helped in launching the long electoral campaign leading up to the 2013 general election.

Thanks both to the PD's new political role in parliament and the fact that its main electoral competitor, Berlusconi, was elsewhere occupied (he was facing criminal charges for corruption and tax evasion at that moment), the overall political context was extremely favourable for the PD. The party moved into a clear lead early in the electoral campaign for the 2013 general election in a set of national polls conducted both locally and nationwide. However, in September 2012 the party entered a critical phase of its internal functioning that strongly affected the primary elections process. The primary contest, as often happens (Cross and Pilet, 2013) became the main arena for settling new and long-standing internal disputes and weighting the respective power of the party factions. One of the party heavyweights, Matteo Renzi, was considered since his election as mayor of Florence in 2009 as the leader of an internal faction highly critical of the party traditional élite and trying to renew the party from its grassroots. In September 2012, Renzi announced that he would seek to lead the centre-left coalition in the 2013 general election. His political discourse rapidly gathered consensus among the younger members of the national and regional middle-level elites and he managed to build a momentum in internal party dynamics leading to the decision of the PD's national the Executive Committee to change the party statutes concerning the rules for nominating the chief executive candidate.

In fact, the statutes previously stated that the incumbent party leader was automatically nominated as the PM candidate for the party or the sole nominee for running in coalition primaries (when the party would run through an electoral cartel or a coalition, as in fact

happened in 2013 general elections). Renzi challenged this internal rule and managed to obtain the modification of the candidacy rules. He was therefore allowed to run against Pier Luigi Bersani, the incumbent leader of the Democratic Party in the primaries for selecting the chief executive candidate for the centre left coalition for the 2013 general elections. The other three candidates for that position were: Nichi Vendola, leader of the Left Ecology Freedom party (SEL), Laura Puppato, a PD's MP from Veneto and Bruno Tabacci, leader of the (very small) party Democratic Centre.

As a consequence, the fall 2012 primary election campaign was quite conflictual. Other internal rules concerning primaries were also changed at that time, modifying both the selectorate (primary voters needed to enrol previously and not simply on Election Day) and the voting system, by introducing 2-rounds, run-off system. These changes in primary elections rules were perceived by both party members, sympathizers and Renzi's faction as an attempt to weaken the young challenger, exacerbating the already very difficult relationship between the various party factions. The PD's organizational persistence was as stake as well as the nomination. After the first round of the December internal election, Renzi gained 35.5% of the vote, finishing second behind Bersani and qualifying for the second ballot. Bersani eventually gained a total of 61% of the vote, against Renzi's 39%, and became the PM candidate for the center-left coalition. However, the conflict within the party was far from being appeased. Renzi only waited a year before launching his candidacy for the leadership selection scheduled for the fall 2013.

The strength of his candidacy was increased by the narrow and disappointing victory achieved by PD in 2013 general election. In April 2013, the divisive election of the President of the Republic, when a large part of Democrat MPs deserted the vote for the PD's main candidate, Romano Prodi, showed the depth of the internal crisis of the party. The following appointment of Enrico Letta, a young member of the national leadership of the party, as the PM of a Grand coalition government entailed the forced resignation of the incumbent leader Pier Luigi Bersani. He was shortly replaced by Guglielmo Epifani, who was given the task of leading temporarily the party and organizing a new leadership election in the fall of 2013. Matteo Renzi won the open primary competition in December 2013. His anti-party establishment, anti-elites rhetoric advocating internal renewal won over most of the internal factions and changed the dominant coalition within the party.

When Renzi won the leadership contest in December 2013, he completely changed the composition of the PD's Executive Committee and the national Bureau by appointing young backbenchers and regional and local middle-level elites. In a few months, Renzi forced Enrico Letta towards his resignation as PM, obtaining a confidence vote by the congress of his own party and later by the Parliament, in February 2014. For the first time in history, the centre-left was led by a party leader who was also head of the government, entailing a decisive overlapping between party in central office and party in public office (Seddone and Venturino, 2015). The subsequent success in European

parliamentary elections in May 2014, when the PD gained 41.8% of the votes, significantly strengthened Renzi's position within the party. This process triggered a substantial organizational change within the party, strengthening its catch-all features and the internal personalization dynamics (Bordignon, 2014, 2013; Pasquino, 2014a; 2014b).

This is the context in which the primary elections that constitute our two case studies took place. The main goal of this paper is to assess the differences in terms of political attitudes and behaviours between party members and supporters during the 2012 and 2013 PD's internal elections. The first case study consists in the 2012 primaries for selecting the chief executive candidate of the centre-left coalition, while the second one is represented by the 2013 primaries for selecting the party leader. Even though the nature and consequences of primaries for selecting candidates and leaders are different (Kenig, Rahat and Hazan, 2015), we decided to compare the individual level survey data for the two elections because the participatory dynamics were quite similar and several candidates were the same. Even if the issue at stake was different – in 2012 it was the nomination for the chief executive candidate for general elections, while in 2013 it was the party leadership – the two primaries share several crucial features. They both took place in the very specific phase of Italian recent political events that we outlined above. They took place at national level, in the same party, over less than 12 months.

We explore the variation in our dependent variable (voting motivations in primaries) on the basis of an original dataset on the attitudes, profiles and behaviours of primary voters of 2012 and 2013 internal ballots. The data presented in this paper have been collected by the Candidate & Leader Selection research group of the Italian Association of Political Science on the basis of two exit poll survey conducted respectively during the 2012 centre-left coalition's primary elections and the 2013 primaries selecting the PD's party leader. In order to better understand the data presented here, we provide a few details on the rules managing the two primaries which constitute our case studies.

The electoral coalition called 'Italia Bene Comune' (Italy. Common Good) was formed by PD, SEL, CD-Democratic Centre (a small centre party) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Primaries were organised in November and December 2012 (first and second round) to select the leader of the coalition who would stand as common candidate for the office of Prime Minister in the subsequent general election, which took place on 24–25 February 2013. Five candidates ran in the primaries: Pier Luigi Bersani, Matteo Renzi, Nichi Vendola, Laura Puppato and Bruno Tabacci. Bersani won 61% of the votes, defeating Matteo Renzi in the run-off.

While the results of the internal election were not surprising, this ballot was quite innovative from an organisational point of view with regard to the voting system rules and the potential candidates. Due to relevant power shifts in the dominant coalition within the main party of the electoral cartel, namely the PD, the rules concerning the voting system and the registration of voters were changed a few months prior to the

election. The party leadership adopted a two-round, run-off voting system for the 2012 PM candidate selection as well as the new rule of previous (or election day) compulsory registration of primary voters for both rounds. Prior to 2012, the two rounds system has been used only in a handful of local primaries for selecting the mayoral candidate.

More importantly, historically, primary voters were not required to pre-register in the register of PD primary selectors (and to formally pledge to vote for the centre-left coalition in the 2013 general elections) in order to be allowed to vote. This new rule has been specifically designed to monitor internal participation and avoid cross-over voting, namely the participation of voters in centre-left primaries who are affiliated or loyal to other parties (Fracchiolla and Venturino, 2013). The fear of cross-over voting was related to the exceptional candidacy of Matteo Renzi, the main competitor to the front runner and party leader, Pier Luigi Bersani.⁵ In fact, Renzi focused his primary election campaign on party renewal and broadening the party's societal reach, by trying to win the electoral support of centrist (or traditionally non-PD) voters.

For a better understanding of the 2013 contest we need to point out that that beside the open competition allowing members and supporters - without any formal link to the party- to vote in the internal ballot, the selection of the party leader is organized as is a multistage process involving three different consecutive selectorates: enrolled members first, then electors, and finally the National Assembly (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, pp. 36-37). In the 2013 selection, local party conventions open only to formally enrolled party members were held to select the prospective nominees for subsequent primary. Party rules – article 9 of the party statute – gave the possibility to run in an open primary only to the three most voted candidates in a selection restricted to party members. This phase of the process consisted in the selection of four prospective nominees for the open primary, but one of the candidates, Gianni Pittella – a former vice president of the European Parliament – did not gained enough votes in the internal election by the membership.

Therefore, the party presented three prospective nominees for the position of party leader: Matteo Renzi, Mayor of Florence, Gianni Cuperlo, the candidate supported by the traditional establishment of the party, and the outsider, Pippo Civati, a young national MP and former regional MP from Lombardy. The power of the previous dominant coalition, represented by Cuperlo, appeared significantly reduced at that moment and the political discourse and narrative of the campaign was mainly shaped by Renzi and focused on the conflict between the 'old' and 'new' party leadership. Renzi has rapidly become to be well known in the public sphere as the 'scrapper' of the party establishment. Thus, Renzi was perceived as the candidate able to change the strategic direction and priorities of the party as a whole. The restriction of the selectorate to party

⁵ In fact, the candidacy of Matteo Renzi was quite exceptional: the PD statute previously stated that the party leader would be automatically held as the PD's chief executive candidate in the case of coalition primaries. Renzi managed to obtain a modification of the internal rules in order to run in the 2012 primaries.

members makes this stage similar to closed primaries – also called One-Member-One-Vote (OMOV) or Full Member Vote – which have already been adopted by several parties in a number of parliamentary democracies (Pilet and Cross, 2014).

According to the party statutes, this first-stage OMOV selection aimed at reducing the number of candidates allowed to run in the open primary contest⁶. By using this procedure, the party recognizes in fact a crucial role to party members. In 2013, for instance, the membership vote was decisive in reducing the number of candidates from four to three. Both in 2009 and 2013 leadership primaries, voting rights granted to all members, without any distinction on the basis of membership duration or degree of activism. In fact, full enrolment could be finalized directly at the polling station on the same day of the closed primaries/local conventions.

On the one hand, this rule has enhanced the role of formally enrolled party members in internal decision-making, by giving different powers (and thus different status) to members and supporters at the different stages of the selection process. This constitutes the main procedural difference with 2012 primaries (and all other internal ballots) for selecting (chief executive) candidates. In the 2012 primary, party internal rules did not leave any room for allocating a distinctive role for members in candidate selection, and put them on an equal foot with supporters and external voters in the selection process. This clearly exerted a significant impact on the intra-party democracy dynamics within the PD.

On the other hand, the two-stage rule used in 2013 has triggered one of the main unintended side-effects or pathologies affecting closed primaries, namely “instant membership”, i.e. the last minute enrolment of significant amounts of members than then leave the party shortly after the internal ballot. This implies that these “instant members” joined to the party or were recruited for the sole of supporting a candidate or for more instrumental reasons (Carty and Blake, 1999; Kenig, 2006). This drive for enrolment just before or at the time of leadership selection in 2013 has led to substantial conflict among candidates (Anastasi and De Luca, 2014). If we look at the differences in the results obtained by the candidates in open and closed elections, we can see that the three candidates allowed to run in the open, second-stage primary performed quite differently in the first-stage membership ballot (Tab. A in the appendix). Even if Renzi obtained a large consensus in both the internal elections, when he ran for party leadership in 2013 he gained higher shares of votes from external voters. His leadership is thus built outside the party where he gained the large majority of votes (Venturino, 2015)

⁶ «Candidates have to exceed the threshold of 5 percent of the votes. Furthermore, these votes must be distributed in such a way as to obtain a minimum of 15 percent in at least five regions. Additional candidates may be admitted if they obtain at least 15 percent of members’ votes» (Venturino, 2015).

4. Data and methods

The data collection process at the individual level through exit poll surveys presents some major methodological challenges, especially in the case of primary elections. The main difficulty concerns the elaboration of a probability sample that could be considered representative of the target population. In the case of open primaries, it is rather complex to define the sampling frame in order to elaborate a simple or stratified random sample, given that the frame population corresponds to the whole coalition electorate (and more generally the population residing in the country aged 16 and over). Even the formal requirement of pre-registration that was introduced in 2012 could not prevent the participation to the ballot of voters or members of parties not belonging to the centre-left coalition. Thus, using the party's electorate in the previous election as the sampling frame was not the best option, given that voters of other parties could also take part in the ballot (at least theoretically).

For all these reasons, the "Candidate & Leader Selection research group has chosen to use the whole resident population aged 16 and over as the frame population. This was applied in the two data collections by elaborating non-probability samples, taking into account population size (at regional and then municipal level) and past voting history, of 102 voting precincts nationwide.⁷ The samples of 3500 interviews have thus been elaborated by allocating a fixed number of interviews per polling station on the basis of PD's results in previous elections in the given constituency, including both stations where the party achieved high scores and others in which it suffered a defeat⁸ (see Tables A3a & A3b in the appendix). Primary voters were interviewed as they exited the voting station. At each sampling location, an interviewer approached voters as he or she exited the polling place.⁹ Participation was voluntary and anonymous.¹⁰ The high number of interviews carried out, the quality of the data collected (in terms of prediction of the actual results of the primaries) and the constancy with the socio-demographic characteristics of previous exit polls samples allows us to use probabilistic statistics in the analysis.

⁷ Given that our questionnaire was anonymous, it is not possible to identify non-respondents within our sample and frame; therefore, properly estimating the sampling error is unfeasible. We can only compare the main characteristics of the population frame and the responding sample. Generally, scholars present estimates of the response rates on key subgroups (defined mainly by age, gender, geographical origin, occupation) and check whether these relevant subgroups are overrepresented in the survey responses in comparison to the target population (Groves, 2006; Rüdig, 2010). Nevertheless, given that the group of non-respondents cannot be distinguished from the respondents in the frame used in this study, this comparison is not feasible in our database. As we have no information on the refusal rate, it is impossible to explore the demography of those who refused.

⁸ For further details on sampling and data collection please visit the C&LS website: www.cals.it.

⁹ We carried out the sampling after both rounds of the election. The two samples combined are reported here. The data collected during the second round of voting is presented separately in the appendix. The data collected during the first round of voting is presented separately in the text (N=3227). The potential participant pool is the same for both rounds of the elections, and same sampling rules apply.

¹⁰ The interviewing starts when the polls open and continue throughout the day until about an hour before polls close.

To analyse the variations in the forms of partisan affiliation and their consequences, we have classified primary voters into three different categories (Table 1). The following coding has been used to place respondents into three categories of participants:

- 1) The ‘external voters’: they are primary voters not formally enrolled in the party and they did not vote for the party in previous general elections. They are citizens with varying degrees of party identification, who are willing to mobilise politically due to the low costs of participation of primary elections. Presumably, there are some loyal voters for whom this primary represents the first time they have participated in a party activity.
- 2) The ‘supporters’: they are primary voters not formally enrolled in the party but are loyal party voters, in the sense that they declare to have voted for the party in previous general elections. Supporters include those who have consistently voted for the party and occasionally participate in other intra-party activities.
- 3) The ‘members’: they are primary voters who are also formally enrolled members and loyal voters (in the sense that they declare to have voted for the party in previous general elections). They represent the category of partisan affiliation most involved in intra-party activities. There are some members who are not active in intra-party activities since the distinction is based on formal criteria (formal membership, previously voting for the party) rather than behavioural criteria (intensity of participation in internal activities).

The three categories are thus ordered on the basis of their respective level of party attachment. The fourth category is that of ‘disloyal members’: while they are formally affiliated to the party, they voted for other parties during previous elections. Due to the limited numbers of cases that fall into the last category, they are not taken into account in our analysis.

Table 1. The relationship between primary voters and the party.

Typology	2013	2012
Members	26.1	19.5
Supporters	52.2	53.6
External voters	21.7	26.9
Total	3,227	3,227

On the basis of the three categories of participation, we explored our two research questions through: a) descriptive analyses for assessing the differences in the profiles and political attitudes of the three groups and b) inferential analyses for assessing the extent to which voting motivations in primary elections can be explained by the specific profiles of each group. Section 4 presents the descriptive analyses on the political profiles and attitudes of the three groups by exploring their level of reported political interest and ideological self-positioning over a left-right scale (Table 2). To further study the differences in primary voters’ profiles (and particularly their relationship with the

party), we also provide in Tables 3a and 3b a descriptive account of the reported main voting motivations.

These preliminary analyses contribute to clarifying the nature of the relationship between the three groups of primary voters and their party, and provide useful elements for interpreting the results of the multivariate analysis. Given that literature on new types of membership still remains at an embryonic stage (Fisher et al., 2014; Scarrow, 2014; Gauja, 2014), it is rather challenging to formulate theoretically grounded and deductive hypotheses. We provide more limited and empirically grounded hypotheses based on the results of the descriptive analyses. The main argument guiding our analyses is that voting motivations in primary elections are explained by the different relationship that the three groups have with the party:

H1: The voting motivations of enrolled members are based on the 'feeling of belonging' to the party because of their higher degree of attachment to the party.

H2: The voting motivations of supporters and voters are more 'strategic', following a rational logic and related to specific issues, due to their lower degree of attachment to the party.

In order to explore the impact of the type of relationship with the party on voting motivations, we recoded the dependent variable into a dichotomous one. The variable measuring the reported motivations for the voting choice in the primary is presented in Tables 3a and 3b. We recoded the 12 response categories for explaining the choice for a given candidate in primary elections by collapsing them into two categories: the first one merges all the response categories dealing with 'strategic' motivations for choosing a candidate and the second one merges all the response categories dealing with voting motivations based on the 'feeling of belonging' to the party. The recoded dichotomous variables distinguishes thus between 'strategic motivations' (= 0) and 'feeling of belonging motivations' (= 1).

In the data collected during the 2012 primary election, the category assessing the voters' 'strategic motivations' is constructed on the basis of the following items: a) She/he represents the renewal of party elites; b) She/he is the most fit to lead Italy; c) I like her/his political programme; d) She/he is the most fit to win against the centre-right coalition; e) She/he is the least bad choice; f) I like the candidate's personal profile; g) She/he has been recommended to me by friends/family. The 'feeling of belonging motivations' category contains the following response categories: a) She/he represents my ideological values; b) She/he is formally supported by my party; c) I like the outcomes of hers/his past political activities; d) I like primaries and participation in general. Conversely, in the data collected during the 2013 primaries, the strategic motivations' category includes the following items: a) I like his/her personal features; b) I am looking for someone able to win next general elections. While the category related to 'belonging motivation' is composed by the following modalities: a) he/she better fits

my political values; b) he/she better fits PD's values; c) I share his/her vision for the future of my party.

Moreover, beside the main independent variable (= type of partisan affiliation as summarised by the three groups presented in Table 1), we also considered the degree of political interest,¹¹ the ideological self-placement on the right-left spectrum,¹² the voting intentions in general elections (recoded as a dummy: intention to vote or not for the PD) and the perception of the electability of each candidate (measured here though a proxy, namely which candidate the respondent thinks would win the primary ballot). Results are presented in Tables 4a and 4b.

5. Different types of membership and profiles

In this section, we explore empirically whether significant differences exist between members, voters and supporters with regard to their political profile and their political behaviour in primary elections. Primary elections trigger the development of new forms of political mobilisation within parties by opening up internal decision-making to those citizens that are not interested in making a strong commitment through formal party enrolment, but are willing to mobilise politically (Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2015).

Tables 2a and 2b present data on political profiles of the three different groups, namely, party members, supporters and external voters.¹³ Not surprisingly, looking at 2012

¹¹ The variable has been measured on a scale of political interest ranging from 1 to 10 and then recoded into a four-points scale: the respondents that positioned themselves on the positions 1 to 2 on the scale are merged into the 'none' category; the respondents that positioned themselves on points 3 to 5 are merged into the 'low' category; the respondents that positioned themselves on points 6 to 8 are merged into the 'average' category and those positioning themselves on points 9 and 10 of the scale are computed into the 'high' category.

¹² The variable has been measured on an ideological scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) and then recoded into a five-points scale: the respondents that positioned themselves on points 1 to 2 of the scale are merged into the 'left' category; the respondents that positioned themselves on points 3 to 4 are merged into the 'centre-left' category; the respondents that positioned themselves on points 5 to 6 are merged into the 'centre' category; those positioning themselves on points 7 and 8 are merged into the 'centre-right' category and those positioning themselves on points 9 and 10 of the scale are computed into the 'right' category.

¹³ Data on socio-demographic profiles, on the contrary, show a stronger differentiation among our typologies of primary voters. The socio-demographic profile of the primary voters reported in Tables A4a and A4b in the appendix shows that male citizens are usually overrepresented among primary voters; however, substantial gender differences exist between the three groups. The variation between the three categories in terms of age and professional status is even stronger. Clearly the two dimensions are related. This confirms the idea that primary elections are indeed capable of mobilising different generational cohorts. The party membership of the PD is traditionally older than the general electorate. Among the group of 'external voters' we can find the highest proportion of young primary voters, which seems to support the idea that low cost political mobilisation provided by primary elections attracts younger citizens. Political socialization patterns in Italy usually involve older primary voters who are more familiar with traditional instruments for political participation, and more than likely, have been previously involved in mass parties, such as the communist party and its heirs (Raniolo, 2006). On the contrary, primary elections could mobilize younger voters which are less familiar with traditional forms of political participation but are willing to occasionally get involved in the internal life of the party. Our data support this assumption.

selectors, the level of interest in politics is higher among members 91.9% are interested or strongly interested in politics) than supporters (85.3%), and a similar pattern emerges also among the 2013 selectors. Moreover, the test of significance shows that the differences between the two groups are highly significant.¹⁴

Table 2a. The political profiles of primary voters (percentages).

2012				
Political interest*				
	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
None	1.0	2.3	4.8	2.7
Low	7.1	12.4	17.2	12.7
Average	41.1	58.9	57.3	55.0
High	50.8	26.4	20.7	29.6
N	620	1,699	854	3,173
Ideological profile (self-placement on the left-right scale)*				
	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
Left	52.1	41.3	32.9	41.2
Centre-left	37.2	46.8	29.9	40.4
Centre	9.7	10.5	28.7	15.2
Centre-right	0.6	1.4	6.8	2.7
Right	0.3	-	1.7	0.5
N	616	1,684	833	3,133

Note. * Chi-square test= p <0.01.

Table 2b. The political profiles of primary voters (percentages).

2013				
Political interest*				
	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
None	1.5	3	6.3	3.3
Low	8.8	15.9	19.8	14.9
Average	43.2	55.7	51.3	51.5
High	46.5	25.4	22.5	30.3
N	895	1782	742	3419
Ideological profile (self-placement on the left-right scale)*				
	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
Left	39.8	36.5	33.6	36.8
Centre-left	48.9	51.2	32.8	46.6
Centre	10.9	11.2	24.6	14
Centre-right	0.2	0.8	6.7	1.9
Right	0.2	0.2	2.4	0.7
N	890	1769	720	3379

Note. * Chi-square test= p <0.01.

¹⁴ The Chi-square test statistic is used to investigate whether distributions of categorical variables differ from one another. It can be used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from each other. The statistical significance of the tests that we perform is given by reporting the p-values of each test in the cross-tabulations. Since the P-value (<0.01) is less than the significance level (0.05), we conclude that the two groups are significantly different from each other, and that a relationship between type of partisan affiliation and political interest exists.

We also explored the self-placement of the respondents on the right-left spectrum. The Chi-square tests have also substantive implications concerning the differences in terms of ideological positioning. They show that the three groups are significantly different from each other with regard to political attitudes. Given the declining levels of party identification in Italy and the fact that voting choices are nowadays less based on ideological orientations and cultural belonging, it is not surprising to see that in terms of ideological positioning there are significant differences between the three categories. External voters are more ideologically moderate than members and supporters. Primary elections attract selectors from different ideological traditions and do not always share the same political orientations of the party organizing the ballot. In terms of internal mobilisation, the involvement of citizens less rooted in the centre-left subculture could represent an electoral added value because this means that the party reaches out to new voters. Nevertheless, the question of the relationship with the party of these 'external voters' once primaries are over remains empirically unexplored. The data reported in Tables 3 (a and b) contribute to answering this question.

Tables 3a and 3b summarize the reported motivations for the respondents' voting choice in primary elections. Concerning the 2012 primary election, in terms of self-reported reasons for choosing a chief executive candidate, members are more interested in their capacity of leading the country if elected (26.7% of members reported this as the main reason for their voting choice), while for external voters, it is more important that the chosen candidate represents political and party renewal (23.3% of the 'external voters' reported this as the main reason for their voting choice). Considering that only 7.5% of members declared that they took into account political and party renewal when elaborating their voting choice, this seems to empirically support the expected organisational distance between external voters and the party. External voters more often select their candidate based on their own ideological values (19.7% said so) and of the candidates' political programs rather than because she/he is supported by party elites. In this case too, the Chi-square tests show that the three groups are significantly different from each other with regard to voting motivations.

Interestingly, the 2013 data show that nearly 1/3 of the sample declares to have chosen their candidate because of his/her vision for the future of the party, while slightly less than 1/4 of the respondents choose their candidate because of his/her political values and only 1/5 because of his/her capability to win the general election. Looking at the attitudes and behaviours of the three categories of selectors, we can see significant differences between the three categories and over time. Among party members, in 2013 the main determinant of their voting choice concerns the party and in particular the candidates' vision for the future of their political organization, while only 1/4 of the respondents declares that their voting choice in 2013 leadership primaries was mainly motivated by the fact that the chosen candidate shares the same political values. A similar pattern can be found also among 2013 supporters, but for this category the perceived electability in general election constitutes the second most relevant reason for voting a candidate (23.5%).

Remarkably, the 2013 external voters – those who are neither enrolled nor PD’s voters- are way more affected in their voting choice by motivations related to party identification and feelings of belonging than 2012 external voters: 29.8% of them casted their vote for the candidate who better fitted their political values (which is more than 6 percentage points higher than the average). Has something changed over a little less than a year? We would need a dedicate study to properly answer the question, but it seems clear that the disappointing performance of the PD at the general election in April 2013 has affected the behaviour of primary voters. To develop further the descriptive analyses provided in this section, we present in the next section (6) the findings of preliminary multivariate analyses for assessing the main determinants of voting choices of primary voters.

Table 3a. The reported motivations for voting choices in primary elections, 2012.

Reported motivations of the vote choice* (%)				
	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
She/he represents the renewal of party elites	7.5	17.6	23.3	17.1
She/he is the most fit to lead Italy	26.7	16.1	10.0	16.6
She/he represents my ideological values	12.2	13.7	19.7	15.0
I like her/his political programme	8.0	11.9	16.5	12.4
I like the candidate’s personal profile	12.0	12.9	9.7	11.9
She/he is the most fit to win against the center-right coalition	11.4	11.2	7.0	10.1
She/he is formally supported by my party	15.1	7.7	3.1	7.9
I like the outcomes of hers/his past political activities	7.0	6.2	5.2	6.1
She/he has been recommended to me by friends/family	0.2	1.4	3.9	1.8
She/he is the least bad choice	-	1.1	1.4	1.0
I like primaries and participation in general	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Other	-	0.1	-	0.1
N	615	1,675	831	3,121

Note. * Chi-square test = $p < 0.01$.

Table 3b. The reported motivations for voting choices in primary elections, 2013.

	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
He/she better fits my political values	24.20	20.70	29.80	23.60
He/she better fits PD's values	15.50	7.40	5.50	9.10
I like his/her personal features	9.10	13.20	19.30	13.40
I share his/her vision for the future of my party	34.80	35.20	27.90	33.50
I am looking for someone able to win next general elections	16.40	23.50	17.50	20.30
N	890	1768	731	3389

Note. * Chi-square test = $p < 0.01$.

Primary voters' political profiles vary significantly on the basis of their relationship with the party. Members are ideologically closer to the social-democratic party organizing the ballot, and their profiles correspond to a traditional pattern of partisan mobilisation based on the sense of belonging and party internal discipline. Supporters are less involved in intra-party ordinary activities but are highly interested in politics and in primary elections as an instrument of electoral mobilisation. The most interesting category is represented by external voters, which remain outside the party's societal reach and organisational boundaries. They are quite distinctive both in terms of ideological positioning and voting motivations.

The original data presented in the paper (and the results of the Chi-square tests performed on the data reported in Tables 3a and 3b) show that the political profiles of the three categories of primary voters differ significantly: the first two categories are more similar, while the third is clearly distinct. This could lead to the identification of three different attitudes towards political mobilisation within parties: members correspond to traditional forms of party membership, while supporters' attitudes and profiles seem to suggest the emergence of new forms of internal mobilisation closely linked to the electoral dimension of political organisations. In terms of socio-demographic¹⁵ and political profiles, they are closer to members than to external voters, however, their occasional and less intensive involvement in intra-party life highlights a pattern of cognitive political mobilisation. Highly interested in politics, supporters mobilise in low cost activities, such as participating in internal elections (and in some cases campaigning), as they are able to contribute to crucial party decisions without having to make any formal commitments. The last type of internal mobilisation is represented by external voters. Their profiles and political attitudes are rather distinctive; they only marginally engage in intra-party activities. They are interested in primary elections as an opportunity to participate in politics, but they do not develop any links with the organizing party. This is clearly shown by the reported rationales of the voting choices for this category of respondents.

Exploration of the survey data concerning the second round of voting leads to similar results than those presented above.¹⁶ Given that the political profiles of party members and supporters are relatively similar, and primary elections offer rights and power to voters and supporters, other than to affiliated members, it is relevant to explore how the latter would or plan to behave in such inclusive decision-making procedures as primaries, which distributes collective and selective incentives to this distinctive mobilisation group regardless of their real involvement in party life or general elections.

¹⁵ See Table A4a and A4b in the appendix section.

¹⁶ Data are available in the appendix section.

6. Voting motivations and the relationship with the party

In this section we explore the consequences of the differences in political profiles and political attitudes of the three groups in terms of voting behaviour (voting motivations). We have assessed that there are significant difference between the three groups not only in terms of political profiles and attitudes, but also in terms of voting motivations. This second step in the examination of the different types of party membership of the PD aims to analyse the variations in the relationship that each group develops with the party. In particular, we develop multivariate analyses for assessing the extent to which voting motivations in primary elections can be explained by the specific profiles of each group. Following the two hypotheses formulated in section 3, we examine the extent to which their respective voting motivations in primary elections are related to feelings of party belonging or party identification, or to other factors, such as the electability of the candidate.

More specifically, we perform here a logistic regression on the impact of a set of independent variables (the main independent variable is represented by the type of partisan affiliation, plus a set of control variables) on the type of motivations that determine the voting choices in primary elections; consequently, this is taken as the main dependent variable for measuring the political consequences of the different profiles of members and supporters.¹⁷

The results of the logistic regression are reported in Tables 4a and 4b. On the basis of the Chi² associated to the log-likelihood, we can see that the model is significant and provides a satisfactory fit to the data. In this analysis, the key dependent variable is constituted by the reported motivation for the respondents' voting choices in the primary election. The variable distinguishes between 'strategic motivations', mainly related to the electability of each candidate or to their political programme (= 0) and 'feeling of belonging motivations', linked to party or candidate identification (= 1). The key independent variable is a categorical variable measuring the type of partisan affiliation, broken down into the three categories discussed in section 4: enrolled member, supporter, external voter; they are ordered according to the intensity of attachment to the party (ranging from the lower category: 'external voter', to the higher: 'member').

The other control variables included in the model are those describing their political profile, namely the degree of political interest (1 = none; 2 = low interest in politics; 3 = average interest in politics; 4 = high interest in politics) and the ideological self-positioning (1 = left; 2 = centre-left; 3 = centre; 4 = centre-right; 5 = right). We also included a control variable in the model, which measures the perceived electability of the candidates. This is assessed by using a proxy variable ('predicted winner'): in the questionnaire, we included an item asking the respondents to state which candidate

¹⁷ The detailed presentation of the variables included in our model (and their coding) is reported in section 3.

they thought would win the primary ballot (regarding 2012 primary elections: 1 = Bersani; 2 = Tabacci; 3 = Puppato; 4 = Vendola; 5 = Renzi; regarding 2013 primary elections: 1=Cuperlo, 2=Civati; 3= Renzi). Finally, the model also included the variable measuring the voting intentions in the following general elections (1 = will vote for PD; 0 = will not vote for PD).

An overview of the results suggests that the different degree of attachment with the party of the respondents determines their voting motivations in primary elections. We can see that the logit coefficients associated with the type of membership are significant and that, taking 'members' as a reference category, a change in our independent variable considerably affects our dependent variable. Considering results reported in table 4a, being a supporter decreases the odds of voting following 'feeling of belonging' motivations by a factor of 0.7, while external voters are 0.8 times less likely to vote according to party identification. A similar pattern is also found in Table 4b, summarizing data on 2013 primary elections: being a supporter as well as being an external selector decrease the odds to choose the candidate by a belonging logic by a factor of 0.5. This means that members are more likely to be motivated by feelings of belonging to the party than supporters and external voters. While this is unsurprising, what is rather interesting is that the difference in the odds ratios associated with supporter and external voters is quite small.

Table 4a. Explaining voting motivations (2012)

	Exp(B)
Relationship with the party (ref.cat: Members)	
External	.838 (.158)
Supporters	.760 (.121) **
Political interest (ref.cat: high)	
None	.844 (.349)
Low	.846 (.169)
Average	.981 (.105)
Ideological profile (ref.cat: right)	
Left	1.704 (.753)
Centre-left	1.128 (.755)
Centre	1.087 (.759)
Centre-right	1.524 (.798)
Predicted Winner (ref.cat: Renzi)	
Bersani	1.827 (.147) ***
Tabacci	5.461 (.584) **
Puppato	1.908 (.914)
Vendola	3.050 (.281) ***
Voting intentions for PD 2013 (ref.cat: yes)	1.295 (.119)**
Constant	.148 (.762)
Observations	2,702
Log-likelihood	2871.505

Note: Logistic regression. Dependent variable: voting motivation (0=strategic motivation; 1= feeling of belonging motivation; standard errors in brackets). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05

Table 4b. Explaining voting motivations (2013)

	Exp(B)
Relationship with the party (ref.cat: Members)	
External	0,592 (.096)***
Supporters	0,563 (.130)***
Political interest (ref.cat: high)	
None	0,670 (.224)
Low	0,995 (.124)
Average	1,026 (.090)
Ideological profile (ref.cat: right)	
Left	3,664 (.522)**
Centre-left	3,398 (.521)**
Centre	3,877 (.527)**
Centre-right	3,021 (.579)
Predicted Winner (ref.cat: Renzi)	
Cuperlo	2,021 (.222)**
Civati	5,662 (.457)***
Voting intentions for PD in general (ref.cat: yes)	1,217 (.089)*
Constant	0,735 (.527)
Observations	3181
Log-likelihood	3.988.438

Note: Logistic regression. Dependent variable: voting motivation (0=strategic motivation; 1= feeling of belonging motivation; standard errors in brackets). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05

However, if the size of the effect of our other independent variables on voting motivations is remarkable, the exponentiations of regression estimates for political interest and ideological positioning are not significant. Even so, the coefficients are quite high and show, in particular, that ideology positioning matters: leftist and centre-left selectors are 1.7 and 1.2 times, respectively, more likely to be motivated by feelings of belonging to the party than strategic considerations. Regression coefficients are even higher if we look at data on 2013 primary elections. Those who are more likely to adopt party identification as main voting motivation are those selectors ideologically positioned on the center-left and center of the political spectrum. On the contrary, the impact of the degree of interest in politics on voting motivations varies significantly between 2012 and 2013. If in 2012, a variation of one unit in the degree of interest in politics (from 'high' to 'average') decreases the odds of being motivated by feelings of belonging to the party by a factor of 0.98, in 2013 this variable seems not relevant in affecting the motivations of vote.

The size of the effect on our dependent variable of the last control variable, namely the perceived electability of the candidates, is also quite important. Selectors that believe that the more ideologically or party labelled candidates will win the primary ballot (such as Vendola or Bersani in 2012 or Cuperlo and Civati in 2013) are more likely to be motivated by feelings of belonging to their party than by strategic incentives. Looking at table 4a, we can see that the odds of scoring 1 (= feeling of belonging motivations) increase by a factor of 1.8 when the respondents believe that Bersani, the party leader

(and former communist), will win the election, compared to those that predict the victory of the centrist newcomer, Renzi. Predicting the victory of the SEL leader, Vendola, increases the odds of voting following 'feeling of belonging' motivations by a factor of 3.0. As reported in table 4b, selectors declaring that Cuperlo or Civati (the most leftist or newcomer candidates) will win the party leadership contest are, respectively, 2 times and 5.6 times more likely to choose the candidate by adopting a belonging logic.

The perception of the electability of the candidate has a significant impact on respondents' voting motivations. This result may be related to the high level of competitiveness of the 2012 primary elections, which counted a relatively high number of candidates and small differences in the shares of votes of the first two candidates especially in the first round. Moreover, the primary electoral campaign has been quite divisive and the competition among the candidates has been based on intergenerational issues and party elites renewal rather than ideological conflict (albeit Renzi openly tried to mobilise support from centre and even centre-right voters). Finally, and unsurprisingly, the multivariate analysis shows that a change in one unit in the voting intentions for the PD in general elections increases the odds of voting following 'feeling of belonging' motivations by a factor of 1.3 in 2012 and by a factor of 1.2 during the 2013 leadership selection.

All in all, based on the results reported in Tables 4a and 4b, we can see that the three types of partisan attachment, namely members, supporters and voters, are significantly differentiated with regard to the type of motivations for voting choices in primary elections. This is particularly relevant from our perspective, and - not surprisingly - members are more likely to be motivated by their tighter relationship with the party when choosing their candidate, while less involved categories, such as supporters and external voters, are mainly driven by strategic considerations. This seems to suggest that our data support the first hypothesis (H1) formulated in section 3. We also argued (H2) that the voting motivations of supporters and voters are more 'strategic', and this too appears to be supported by empirical evidence (with a slight but significant increase in the strength of the effect of partisan affiliation on the likelihood of following strategic motivations when the independent variable changes from supporters to external voters).

7. Conclusions

A recent article by the New York Times¹⁷ argued that several parties in different countries are nowadays inspired by one 'unique creation of the American 20th century', and are introducing party primaries for choosing their leaders or candidates for office, strengthening the quality of party internal democracy. Direct democracy is now used in a wide range of intra-party decision-making procedures. However, except for the case of the American primaries, only few studies have empirically explored what happens when parties broaden their boundaries and reach out to supporters, particularly through the

use of open primary elections. This article thus evaluates the political consequences of open primaries in a country case study, Italy, where such procedures are becoming quite common despite being relatively new. Given that primaries (open and closed) are gaining newfound favour with parties in many parliamentary democracies, this subject is of interest beyond our case study.

The members-party relationship is evolving within Italian parties, with the progressive broadening of their organisational boundaries and the introduction of various forms of partisan engagement: on the one hand, parties still formally enrol members, who take part in party activities on a regular and consistent basis and to which are assigned specific obligations and privileges; on the other hand, some parties, such as the PD, now also recruit supporters, who are not organisationally affiliated to the party. They have stronger partisan ties than mere voters and they may occasionally help their party by voting in primary elections or making a donation or helping with canvassing and other voluntary activities; however, they do not take up full party membership and do not participate in a regular way in internal activities (Scarrow, 2014).

The introduction and diffusion of open primaries weakens the distinction between members, supporters and 'external voters' in terms of activities and power. However, the costs and benefits associated with full membership, on the one hand, and with registration within a supporters' register, on the other, still differ significantly. Thus, we expect members of the three groups to be different in demography, political attitudes and voting motivations. We also argued that voting motivations in primary elections are best explained by the different relationship that the three groups have with the party.

The original data presented in the paper show that the political profiles of the three categories of primary voters differ significantly, in both case studies (2012 and 2013 PD's internal ballots), in terms of political interest, ideological positioning and perceived influence of the primary electoral campaign. The three groups are clearly distinctive also with regard to their voting behaviour in the primary ballot. We have also assessed that enrolled members are more motivated in their voting choices by their feelings of belonging to the party. Supporters and external voters were more inclined to take into account strategic considerations, such as the electability of the candidates in their voting choices. Also, the data show that the differences in political profiles between members, supporters and voters have a significant impact on their voting behaviour.

The analyses developed in this article contribute to the literature on primaries and party membership on two different accounts. First, the original individual level data reported in the study can shed light on who is participating in important democratic decisions, such as the selection of the chief executive candidate for a coalition of parties, and why they are partaking in this activity. The exit poll results reported here represent a major effort to go beyond anecdotal accounts of what is happening in primary elections. Secondly, the originality of the empirical findings could contribute to the debate on party organisational transformations and their consequences. This is particularly relevant for understanding parties' ability to mobilise, given the heated debate on party

decline or adaptation and the generalised belief that party membership figures are pertinent indicators of party change or party decline (van Biezen et al., 2011). In fact, scholarly attention on the consequences of primaries (outside the US) has focused on their influence on the overall levels of participation in the internal ballots and less on who the voters are and the characteristics of their voting behaviour (Rahat and Sher-Hadar, 1999; Wauters, 2014). We show that primary voters are not a homogenous entity and as such, they need to be studied according to their different degree of attachment to the party.

Also, the effects of the adoption of primary elections on parties' electoral dynamics are highly contested within the US literature and empirical findings are quite mixed (for an overview, see Cohen et al., 2008). This study shows that the different degree of party attachment of the three groups of primary voters - members, supporters and external voters - impacts on their voting motivations in the primary ballot. These empirical findings not only provide a better understanding of the recent evolutions of party membership and political participation, but also show that – at least in Italy - primary voters (and especially those with weaker partisan ties) select electable candidates on the basis of strategic motivations rather than ideologically extreme ones. Also, primary voters come from different ideological traditions and do not always share the same political orientations of the party organizing the ballot.

In conclusion, we can observe an increasing role for party supporters in intra-party politics. The attachment of members to a party, which selects its candidates in a more democratic, inclusive way, is clearly evolving. The PD now relies on wider internal mobilisation thanks to its greater organisational permeability.

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Appendix

Regions	<i>Direct membership vote (OMOV)</i>				Open selection		
	Renzi	Cuperlo	Civati	Pittella	Renzi	Cuperlo	Civati
Aosta Valley	24.3	38.3	37.4	0	64.2	15.2	20.6
Piedmont	47.9	37.4	13.7	1.2	70.2	14.1	15.7
Lombardy	45.9	37.1	16.1	0.9	67.8	14.9	17.3
Liguria	44.7	41.5	13.3	0.6	62.8	19.5	17.7
<i>North-west regions</i>	<i>45.2</i>	<i>37.9</i>	<i>16.0</i>	<i>0.9</i>	<i>67.6</i>	<i>15.3</i>	<i>17.1</i>
Trentino-Alto Adige	48.8	31.5	19.0	0.7	67.5	13.8	18.7
Veneto	48.4	35.2	15.8	0.6	68.8	14.9	16.3
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	51.5	33.2	14.9	0.4	66.2	17.9	15.9
Emilia-Romagna	44.1	41.2	13.3	1.5	71.6	14.9	13.5
<i>North-east regions</i>	<i>47.0</i>	<i>37.1</i>	<i>14.9</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>69.5</i>	<i>15.2</i>	<i>15.3</i>
Tuscany	51.4	37.7	10.7	0.6	77.4	12.3	10.3
Marche	53.4	28.9	16.1	1.4	76.2	10.7	13.1
Umbria	44.9	45.2	8.3	1.6	73.6	16.1	10.3
Latium	52.1	38.5	6.1	3.4	65.5	21.2	13.3
Abruzzo	51.3	33.9	8.6	6.2	67.4	20.1	12.5
<i>Central regions</i>	<i>51.4</i>	<i>36.7</i>	<i>10.4</i>	<i>1.5</i>	<i>74.0</i>	<i>14.5</i>	<i>11.5</i>
Molise	35.1	60.4	3.4	1.2	62.1	29.6	8.3
Puglia	46.5	31.5	10.7	11.2	60.3	24.5	15.2
Basilicata	18.8	36.4	2.1	42.7	58.3	33.7	8.0
Campania	46.6	39.4	4.9	9.1	60.7	30.8	8.5
Calabria	43.8	39.5	2.3	14.0	58.4	33.3	8.3
<i>Southern regions</i>	<i>45.1</i>	<i>36.7</i>	<i>6.9</i>	<i>11.3</i>	<i>61.6</i>	<i>27.2</i>	<i>11.2</i>
Sicily	46.9	43.1	6.4	3.6	61.3	27.4	11.3
Sardinia	45.8	42.7	10.3	1.2	55.6	25.4	19.0
<i>Islands</i>	<i>46.6</i>	<i>42.9</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>59.4</i>	<i>26.7</i>	<i>13.9</i>

Table A1. Party Membership of PD founding parties: the PCI-PDS-DS (1946-2006).

	Absolute data	M/V
1946	2,068,272	47.7
1948	2,115,232	26.00
1953	2,134,285	34.6
1958	1,818,606	27.12
1963	1,615,571	20.80
1968	1,502,862	17.56
1972	1,584,659	17.47
1976	1,814,262	14.37
1979	1,761,297	15.81
1983	1,635,264	14.82
1987	1,508,140	14.71
1992	769,944	12.59
1994	698,287	8.89
1996	686,713	8.85
2001	598,085	10.69
2006	561,193	-*

Sources: Istituto Cattaneo (http://www.cattaneo.org/index.asp?l1=archivi&l2=iscritti_ai_partiti).

Note: * The data concerning the M/V (members/voters or encapsulation ratio) for 2006 are not available because the party competed in elections within the 'Ulivo' cartel.

Table A2. Party Membership of PD founding parties: the PPI-DI-Margherita (1994-2006).

	Absolute data	M/V
1994	233,377	5.47
1996	172,701	6.76
2001	188,303	3.49
2006	260,000	_*

Note: * The data concerning the M/V for 2006 are not available because the party competed in elections within the 'Ulivo' cartel.

Table A3a. Territorial coverage of the sample of the 2012 exit poll survey.

Regions		Population¹	Sample
Piemonte	Total	3,847,110	261
	Provincial capital	1,185,966	81
	Other cities	2,661,144	181
Valle d'Aosta	total	109,268	7
	Provincial capital	30,344	2
	Other cities	78,924	5
Lombardia	total	8,421,490	572
	Provincial capital	1,931,084	131
	Other cities	6,490,406	441
Trentino-Alto Adige	total	861,282	58
	Provincial capital	186,734	13
	Other cities	674,548	46
Veneto	total	4,191,523	285
	Provincial capital	899,811	61
	Other cities	3,291,712	223
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	total	1,070,647	73
	Provincial capital	343,959	23
	Other cities	726,688	49
Liguria	total	1,418,389	96
	Provincial capital	709,210	48
	Other cities	709,179	48
Emilia Romagna	total	3,807,456	259
	Provincial capital	1,371,047	93
	Other cities	2,436,409	165
Toscana	total	3,243,069	220
	Provincial capital	1,121,376	76
	Other cities	2,121,693	144
Umbria	total	782,087	53
	Provincial capital	243,157	17
	Other cities	538,930	37
Marche	total	1,343,137	91
	Provincial capital	299,285	20
	Other cities	1,043,852	71
Lazio	total	4,876,974	331
	Provincial capital	2,597,998	176
	Other cities	2,278,976	155
Abruzzo	total	1,155,637	78
	Provincial capital	264,264	18
	Other cities	891,373	61
Molise	total	276,905	19
	Provincial capital	63,174	4
	Other cities	213,731	15
Campania	total	4,811,214	327
	Provincial capital	1,085,408	74
	Other cities	3,725,806	253
Puglia	total	3,442,772	234

	Provincial capital	927,572	63
	Other cities	2,515,200	171
Basilicata	total	502,975	34
	Provincial capital	110,225	7
	Other cities	392,750	27
Calabria	total	1,704,269	116
	Provincial capital	377,821	26
	Other cities	1,326,448	90
Sicilia	total	4,229,494	287
	Provincial capital	1,353,043	92
	Other cities	2,876,451	195
Sardegna	total	1,455,120	99
	Provincial capital	312,468	21
	Other cities	1,142,652	78
Italy	total	51,550,818	3,500
	Provincial capital	15,413,946	1,047
	Other cities	36,136,872	2,453

Note: ¹ Population residing in the region >16 years old. Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics, ISTAT, updated at 01.01.2011.

Table A3b. Territorial coverage of the sample of the 2013 exit poll survey.

Regions	Population*	PD voters**	Provincial capital	Other cities	Total
Piemonte	4374052	158208	53	129	182
Lombardia	9794525	358269	91	319	410
Trentino Alto Adige	1039934	26477	0	24	24
Veneto	4881756	176476	41	160	201
Friuli Venezia Giulia	1221860	52246	21	42	63
Liguria	1565127	88234	48	47	95
Emilia Romagna	4377487	391204	160	276	436
Toscana	3692828	285391	117	225	342
Umbria	886239	75074	45	40	85
Marche	1545155	85227	32	65	97
Lazio	5557276	316745	189	167	356
Abruzzo	1312507	60688	17	54	71
Molise	313341	18878	0	19	19
Campania	5769750	300989	76	262	338
Puglia	4050803	173305	52	144	196
Basilicata	576194	66176	16	61	77
Calabria	1958238	143877	33	133	166
Sicilia	4999932	201453	76	155	231
Sardegna	1640379	105840	36	78	114
Totale	59557383	3084757	1103	2400	3503

* Population residing in the region >16 years old. Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics, ISTAT, updated at 01.01.2011.; ** *Partito Democratico*

Table A4.a. The socio-demographic profiles of primary voters (percentages), 2012.

%				
Gender*	Members	Supporters	External Voters	total
Female	31.3	45.9	43.2	42.3
Male	68.7	54.1	56.8	57.7
N	611	1680	845	3,136
%				
Age**	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
18-24 years	3.40	4.3	21.6	8.8
25-34 years	12.8	10.5	15.4	12.3
35-44 years	15.3	11.6	14.7	13.1
45-54 years	19.6	20.2	20.0	20.1
55-64 years	25.8	28.2	15.4	24.2
Over 65 years	23.1	25.2	13.0	21.5
N	616	1,690	853	3,159
%				
Education*	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
Primary education	5.3	4.7	2.7	4.3
Compulsory education	15.9	13.1	10.5	13
Secondary education	37.1	38.3	50.2	41.2
University/Higher education	41.7	43.8	36.6	41.5
N	618	1,690	847	3,155
%				
Professional status*	Members	Supporters	External Voters	Total
Retired	27.6	30.0	15.1	25.
Employee (private and public)	22.4	19.3	20.8	20.3
Student	6.8	5.5	22.4	10.3
Professional (doctor, lawyer, etc.)	13.5	9.4	9.4	10.2
Teacher	5.5	8.5	6.9	7.5
Manager, judge, professor	4.2	8.3	2.9	6.0
Housewife	3.2	4.6	4.3	4.3
Laborer/Blue collar worker	4.7	3.5	5.2	4.2
Unemployed	4.1	3.8	5.0	4.2
Self-employed/Business owner	3.7	4.2	3.6	3.9
Entrepreneur	2.9	2.8	3.8	3.1
Other	1.3	0.1	0.6	0.5
N	616	1,696	853	3,165

Note. * Chi-square test = $p < 0.01$.

Table A4.b. The socio-demographic profiles of primary voters (percentages), 2013.

Gender*	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Female	30.1	45.9	41.4	40.8
Male	69.9	54.1	58.6	59.2
N	893	1783	741	3417
Age*	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
18-24 years	5.8	4.6	18.0	7.8
25-34 years	13.6	7.5	14.2	10.6
35-44 years	14.6	10.6	12.0	12.0
45-54 years	18.0	15.0	18.0	16.4
55-64 years	22.5	26.4	20.4	24.1
Over 65 years	25.5	35.8	17.4	29.1
N	895	1786	740	3421
Education*	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Primary education	7.3	7.3	3.4	6.4
Compulsory education	15.9	16.8	16.4	16.5
Secondary education	41.7	41.1	44.6	42.0
University/Higher education	35.1	34.8	35.5	35.0
N	892	1787	737	3416
	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Professional & Self-employed/Business owner	16.1	12.0	18.1	14.4
Employee private	19.8	17.2	17.9	18.0
Employee public	17.4	15.2	13.4	15.4
Retired	31.8	42.1	22.3	35.1
Housewife	2.1	4.8	4.6	4.1
Student	7.6	4.9	17.7	8.4
Unemployed	4.9	3.6	5.8	4.4
Other	.2	.2	.1	.2
N	893	1782	739	3414

Table A5. Profiles and voting intentions of primary voters, 2nd round, 12/2012 (percentages).

Gender	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Female	33.9	48.0	41.9	43.8
Male	66.1	52.0	58.1	56.2
N	540	1,676	869	3,085
Age	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
18-24 years	5.0	3.5	18.2	7.9
25-34 years	12.8	9.4	13.2	11.1
35-44 years	11.5	11.1	15.5	12.4
45-54 years	17.0	19.2	19.0	18.8
55-64 years	26.9	28.7	17.3	25.2
Over 65 years	26.9	28.2	16.7	24.7
N	540	1,670	862	3,072
Education	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Primary education	5.7	5.0	4.7	5.0
Compulsory education	14.2	13.2	14.9	13.9
Secondary education	37.3	38.9	45.0	40.4
University/Higher education	42.7	42.9	35.4	40.7
N	541	1,677	872	3,090
Professional Status	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Retired	31.7	33.6	20.0	29.4
Employee (private and public)	21.0	20.4	18.6	20.0
Student	13.3	10.8	9.2	10.8
Professional (doctor, lawyer, etc.)	6.4	4.0	17.9	8.4
Teacher	5.5	7.4	4.6	6.3
Manager, judge, professor	4.8	5.4	3.6	4.8
Housewife	2.6	4.8	6.3	4.8
Laborer/Blue collar worker	4.8	4.0	5.7	4.6
Unemployed	3.5	4.0	5.7	4.4
Self-employed/Business owner	3.7	2.7	4.8	3.5
Entrepreneur	1.8	2.4	3.1	2.5
Other	0.9	0.4	0.5	0.5
N	543	1,683	871	3,097
Ideological profile (self-placement on L-R scale, 1-5)	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
Left	41.1	38.1	32.4	37.1
Centre-left	50.2	49.5	32.4	44.9
Centre	8.4	11.0	24.3	14.2
Centre-right	0.4	1.3	9.4	3.4
Right	0.0	0.1	1.4	0.4
N	538	1,680	842	3,060
Voting intentions	Members	Supporters	External voters	Total
PD	3.9	21.2	55.4	27.6
I do not know (yet)	94.5	74.9	27.7	65.2
Other left parties	0.6	1.8	7.8	3.2

SEL	1.1	1.7	5.8	2.8
M5S	0.0	0.5	2.0	0.8
Other	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.4
N	544	1,683	859	3,086