

**ST 21 / Adoption, organisation et diffusion des primaires ouvertes. Une  
approche compare**

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**Résumé:**

**L'adoption de primaires en Allemagne, en France et en Grande-Bretagne: contagion, cartellisation et facteurs externes**

L'objet de ce texte est d'analyser l'adoption récente de primaires dans cinq partis politiques, présents dans trois démocraties d'Europe de l'Ouest : l'UMP et le PS en France, les Verts en Allemagne, et les partis conservateur et travailliste au Royaume-Uni. Cette recherche vise à mieux comprendre les facteurs amenant les partis politiques à modifier leur organisation interne (cf. Pannebianco 1988, Harmel et Janda 1994, Barnea et Rahat 2007), et à mesurer l'impact de changements extérieurs aux partis sur leurs dispositifs de sélection des dirigeants. Sur la base d'hypothèses similaires à celles de Cross et Blaise (2013), le texte étudie plusieurs facteurs explicatifs possibles à l'organisation des primaires, dont la défaite électorale, l'ancienneté du parti et les effets de contagion. Le dispositif d'enquête comparatif utilisé dans cette recherche mobilise à la fois les études existantes (Wauters 2013, Pielt et Cross 2014), les données quantitatives disponibles (notamment celles de la base *IDEA Political Finance* et des instituts YouGov et Dimap), la documentation officielle des partis, et une sélection de sources documentaires secondaires. La sélection des cas a été effectuée de manière à observer des formations partisanes diverses sur le plan idéologique, et à maximiser le contraste entre les systèmes politiques étudiés (*most different systems design*), tout en posant les mêmes questions d'un point de vue empirique : (1) quand et pourquoi les partis mettent-ils en place des primaires ? (2) Quelles règles procédurales les partis retiennent-ils pour organiser ces dispositifs ? (3) quelles sont les élites partisanes qui influencent ces décisions ? Les premiers résultats de cette recherche indiquent que tous les facteurs explicatifs retenus par Cross et Blais (2013) sont à l'œuvre dans la mise en place de primaires, à l'exception de l'ancienneté du parti, qui joue un rôle moindre dans l'échantillon étudié. De plus, nos résultats vont dans le sens d'un lien entre cartellisation et réforme des appareils dirigeants des partis, dans la mesure où les partis les plus cartellisés ouvrent leurs primaires à un plus large public mais renforcent dans le même temps les conditions nécessaires à la candidature au leadership du parti.

**Abstract:**

**Explaining Reforms of Party Leadership Selection: External Causes and Cartelisation**

The following paper aims to further expand our understanding of factors triggering party organisational change (see Pannebianco 1988, Harmel and Janda 1994, Barnea and Rahat 2007) by analysing what caused the recent reforms in the leadership selection method in three parties across two Western European countries: the UMP and PS in France and the Greens in Germany. All the selected cases are mainstream parties and recently allowed for a more inclusive selectorate in choosing their party leader (electoral and/or organisational). Hitherto these cases are relatively little studied, thus a detailed analysis of them further increases our knowledge of what factors trigger reforms in leadership selection methods. Replicating the study of Cross and Blaise (2013), the paper analyses how the impact of immediate changes in the external environment of parties that affect their competitive position lead to changes in leadership selection. The factors studied are: electoral defeat, being in opposition, party age and contagion effect. The methodology used in this paper is a mixture of document and secondary data analysis. It uses party constitutions, official party documents, newspapers, government reports and official online resources. Further it works with various data sets such as the IDEA Political Finance Data Base, Norwegian Social Data Services, opinion polls (YouGov and Infratest Dimap) and findings by other studies (Wauters 2013, Pielt and Cross 2014). The cases are selected based on a most different system design in order to determine whether the same factors explain party reforms in different institutional settings and across different party types. For the second part of the paper various proxy indicators, such as party membership level and level of state funding, are employed to analyse whether there is a link between cartelisation and reforms in party leadership selection method. The empirical analysis shows that electoral defeat, being in opposition and the contagion effect are external factors that seem to explain party leadership reforms, while the hypotheses based on party age is refuted. Further there seems to be a little connection between cartelisation and leadership reform, as all parties reformed at very different stages of cartelisation. But candidacy requirements and inclusiveness of the selectorate reflects the degree of party cartelisation: the more cartelised the more inclusive selectorate but restrictive candidacy criteria. Thus in these cases leadership reform seems more a product of external pressure rather than a strategic decision of the leadership to reduce middle-elite power. The cases analysed here confirm the importance of external factors but also the increasing link between party cartelisation, organisational reform and intra-party regulations. This latter aspect requires further research in order to fully evaluate the impact of reforms in leadership selection method and its effect on intra-party democracy.

**Explaining Reforms of Party Leadership Selection: External Causes and Cartelisation**

***Introduction***

The following paper aims to further expand our understanding of factors triggering party organisational change by analysing the causes of reform in party leadership selection method over the past in European parties. In contrast to the US, where such reforms have a long history and are often due to legal requirements (Katz and Kolodny, 1994 p. 262), in Europe this development is relatively new and voluntary. The party organisational literature points out that parties are traditionally very conservative organisations and thus dislike change. Consequently, the question emerges what causes and motivates these conservative organisations to voluntarily change their leadership selection methods?

This paper addresses this first by replicating Cross and Blaise's (2012a) study focusing on impact of changes in the external environment on party reform. The factors studied are: electoral defeat, being in opposition, party age and contagion effect. In a second step the paper looks at broader developments in the political system by examining whether there is a link between the ostensive systemic shift towards cartel party organisational structure and "democratisation" of leadership selection process (Katz 2001) using proxy indicators, such as party membership level and level of state funding. Using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach developed by Ragin and Rihoux (2009), the paper aims to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for reform in party leadership method. The cross-country comparison of five parties in three countries provides an insight into the combination of factors leading to reform in variety of institutional settings and party organisational models. The five cases are: the UMP and PS in France, the Greens in Germany and the Conservatives and Labour in the United Kingdom.

In essence, the paper will find that external factors are useful in explaining leadership reforms while the cartel party model seems to have little impact on democratising the leadership selection method. It confirms findings by Cross and Blais (2013) for triggers of leadership reforms in six Westminster democracies, with the exception that in their sample there seems to be a link between party age and leadership reform. More specifically in all the cases discussed, electoral defeat, being in opposition and contagion are collectively necessary and sufficient conditions for leadership reform, while party age seems to play little if any role. With regards to the cartel party argument, the paper finds that the parties reached various degrees of cartelisation when they decided to democratise their leadership selection

method. Thus there seems to be no direct link between cartelisation and taking the decision to democratise the leadership selection process.

### ***Explaining Reforms in Party leadership selections Method***

#### ***Party leadership selections and IPD***

Leadership selection methods are often reformed in line with increasing intra-party democracy (IPD). An increase in IPD is normally defined as giving more power to the party members and decentralisation of power (Berge, 2013p. 2). This can be done by giving members or lower levels more control over policy formation, candidate selection and/or leadership selection. The following paper will focus on the last aspect and only look at parties which can be placed on the most extreme end of the inclusiveness spectrum: parties which use either open or closed primaries (Kenig, 2009) to select their party leader. Despite this common feature, there are still some substantial differences in leadership selection methods, such as who can run or what electoral system is used, but in all cases discussed here the final say rests with a highly inclusive selectorate. It is also necessary to distinguish between two different kinds of leadership contests: one for the party leader in office, and the other for the party leader of the organisation, thus in central office. The paper will focus on the former, as the theory of presidentialisation suggests that the leader in public office gains more influence over decisions in areas previously under control of the organisational party leader (Poguntke and Webb, 2005). Further it increases comparability with other studies, which mainly focused on the selection of party leaders in public office. In some cases the selection of the party leader in central office is the selection of the leader in public office.

#### ***Cross and Blais Analytical Framework***

The theoretical framework developed by Cross and Blais (2013) enable this paper to derive four testable hypotheses linking the negative impact of the external factors in a party's comparative position to the reform leadership selection method:

- 1. Parties that experienced electoral setback are more likely to reform their leadership selection method*
- 2. Parties in opposition are more likely to democratise their candidate selection process*

3. New parties are more likely to democratise their candidate selection processes and empower their members

4. Parties are more likely to reform when other parties within the system have already democratised their selection process

They are based on the logic that parties will reform if their competitive position in the system changed. As Frantzich suggests “as a basic rule, winners seldom innovate”(1989 p. 91), thus it is a negative change in a party’s competitive position that will lead to change. The paper focuses only on external and direct factors affecting the party’s competitive position and organisation negatively ( for further factors see Lucardie and Rihoux, 2008 p. 10).

The first factor, “*electoral setback*”, described by Deschouwer as “the mother of all change“ (1992 p. 9), is here defined as disappointing electoral performances based on the expectations of the party itself in the most recent election(s) prior to the reform. Thus depending on the party’s aim and the electoral system “defeat” can take different forms. Further it enables the party, with little organisational effort, to effectively react to dissatisfied voters.

The second factor, *being in opposition*, is based on the argument that “in opposition, a party’s lines of authority are weakened and its degree of freedom to experiment with new forms of intra-party arrangements are increased” (Courtney, 1995 p. 262) as there is less at stake (Cross and Blais, 2012b p. 39). Reform while in opposition can be used for party renewal, improving the relation between leadership and members, or as a strategic electoral campaign tool.

The third factor, *party age*, is defined as a new party entry to the electoral market aiming to challenge the competitive position of the already existing parties. Adopting organisationally innovative ways, such as inclusive leadership selections, is an easy way to differentiate themselves (Gauja, 2009) and gain high media attention.

The last factor is the *contagion effect*. Harmel and Janda argue that parties are more likely to reform if other parties do so first (Harmel and Janda, 1994 p. 264). As they operate in a highly competitive environment, if one party reforms due to public expectations the pressure on other parties to also reform will increase in order to maintain their competitive position.

There is also the possibility of *internal contagion effect* when parties transfer inclusive selection methods previously successfully used on lower organisational levels to the national level. The limitation of this hypothesis is that it cannot attempt to explain why the

first party in a system would reform. Consequently, the hypothesis cannot be viewed as an independent explanation but only as part of the more comprehensive list of factors outlined above.

Before testing the four hypotheses the paper will turn to the link between leadership reform and the cartel party thesis.

### ***Cartel Party and Leadership Selection Method***

This section examines whether there is a link between the ostensive systemic shift towards cartel party organisational structure and “democratisation” of leadership selection process. Katz and Mair argue that cartel parties are typically characterised “by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion”(Katz and Mair, 1995 p. 17). At first sight this is clearly a systemic development as it requires the cooperation of various parties and relates to the party system as a whole. But these changes have important implications for the organisational profiles of the individual parties operating within the cartel system; thus it is possible to speak of a cartel party as an organisational type. Parties need to react to these changes in the environment by reforming their organisational structure in order to secure and strengthen their competitive position. It is these changes in organisational characteristics that the paper will focus on.

Cartel parties typically develop in countries with declining party membership and activism and with increasing dependency of parties of state for resources (Katz and Mair, 1995). Various scholars argue parties actively encourage this development in order to become independent of party activists and structure (Hopkin, 2001 p. 345). Nevertheless parties still see advantages in members as they provide legitimacy to their claims and just as for catch-all parties they are “cheerleaders” for the leadership. The democratisation of selection method can be an easy way to combine the two desires of independence and legitimacy. If so, such reforms can be seen as part and parcel of various measures to advance cartelisation of the party.

Katz and Mair point out that members of cartel parties might have more rights in comparison with catch-all parties but if members exercise their rights they are more likely to do so as individuals rather than through delegates (Katz and Mair, 1995 pp. 20-21). This is particularly true for the “one member, one vote” (OMOV) selection methods used in the empirical cases here. Thus, members are atomised and their role is reduced to legitimise leaders rather than take an active role in party life. Furthermore, the power of party activists

is reduced and their voice is covered out by a large selectorate of party members or primary voters. This makes the party internal selectorate more similar to the general electoral, increasing the party's electoral chances. (Katz and Mair, 1995 p. 289). In summary, the party democratizes its leader selection process in form, while centralising control in practice, as "an inclusive but unorganized selectorate may give the appearance of democracy without the substance". (Katz and Mair, 1995 p. 277).

If Katz and Mair are right, then highly cartelised parties should be more likely to adopt the inclusive selection method providing the presence of democracy in form but practically handing all control to the central leadership. Thus an ideal form would be a highly cartelised party which uses an open primary to select its leaders but where the central leadership controls the candidate list. The paper agrees with Koole's critique of the cartel party argument and the tendency to see it as the new ideal type of party as it is better to speak of the degree of cartelisation of the party's organisational structure (Koole, 1996). This leads to the fifth and last hypothesis: *Parties in overall more cartelised party systems and already partly cartelised organisational structures are more likely to democratise their leadership selection method (5)*.

Before moving to the empirical part, the paper will briefly discuss the methodology used and justify the case selection.

### ***3. Methodology and Case Selection***

The paper will be based mainly on document analysis. It will use documents such as party constitutions, official party documents, newspapers, government reports and internet publications. The diversity of the documents, such as newspapers with different ideological orientations (i.e. Le Monde on the left and Le Figaro on the right) helps to triangulate the findings and increase external and internal validity (Krippendorff, 1980). It will also help compare findings with other studies outlining the causes of leadership selection reforms. Furthermore, the paper will use secondary data analysis providing reliable and high quality data. The paper will mainly rely on official statistics and party self-information.

The paper will select data on the dependant variables so that all cases have the same outcome. The aim is to test whether this outcome came about under similar conditions and to trace the developments leading to the reform. A useful approach and method in this regard is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) originally developed by Ragin and Rihoux (2009). The paper will use a QCA approach but not the full method due to the low number of cases.

The paper does not aim to isolate one single factor that led to the selection method reform but rather aims to identify whether there is a clear pattern of factors that led to the reform. Given that parties operate in multi-layered environments and are highly complex organisations, it is highly unlikely that one single explanatory factor would even exist, but it is rather the combination of various factors that only when presented collectively will trigger the reform. Using the language of QCA the presence of an individual factor might be necessary for the reform but not sufficient and only the presence of a specific set of factors provides the necessary and sufficient conditions to lead to the outcome under study (Ragin and Rihoux, 2009).

All parties chosen here are or were in government and have high chances of being part of future ones. Thus all parties that reformed can be classified as mainstream parties. Furthermore, hitherto the cases chosen are relatively little studied, thus a detailed analysis of them further increases our knowledge of what factors trigger reforms in leadership selection methods. Despite their similarity the paper follows a most different system design as all cases portray substantial differences, except on the outcome as all reformed their selection method for the party leadership to be more inclusive. The most different comparative approach, in combination with QCA, allows us to analyse whether different institutional, organisational and systemic factors present across the cases lead to the same pattern of factors triggering the reform or not. This leads to the following case selection: UMP and PS in France, the Greens in Germany, the Conservatives and Labour in the UK

<b>Cases</b>	<b>Year of reform</b>	<b>Years with Inclusive Selections</b>
PS	1995 and 2006	1995, 2006, 2011
UMP	2002	2012*
Conservatives	1997	2001,2003,2005
Labour	2014	Not yet used new method
Greens	2012	2012

*\*The UMP held two previous leadership contests however they are excluded here as they were not competitive, a vital feature of democratic elections. In 2007 Sarkozy was the only candidate; in 2004 he ran against two unknown candidates and he was the only effective candidate.*



***Empirical Analysis***

The following section examines the four hypotheses outlined above for the five case studies. It also outlines the operationalization and measurement of the concepts and variables that emerged from the theoretical discussion above.


The first independent variable is *electoral setback*. The concept is defined as a “disappointing electoral performance based on the expectations of the party itself in the most recent election(s) prior to the reform”. Electoral setback is rather subjective and dependent on the goals of the party: office seeking, policy seeking or vote maximising (Harmel and Janda, 1994). For office-seeking party electoral setback is the failure to secure a specific office while vote maximising or policy driven party the high vote share might be an electoral success without securing a specific office. The two French and UK parties are office seeking and thus disappointing electoral performance is the loss of the highest office - presidency and prime minister respectively. In the case of the Greens it means a decline in vote share, losing the possibility of coalition partner and to effectively push for their policies.

The above leads to two variables to measure electoral defeat: (1) change in percentage of vote share and (2) loss of office or coalition stature. Both are dichotomous variables and can be recodes as either “yes” or “no”. The table below summarises the findings for the five cases discussed here:

	Change in percentage of vote share	Loss of Office or coalition status	Disappointing electoral Performance from Perspective of Party
The Greens	No	Yes	Yes
The Conservatives	Yes	Yes	Yes
Labour	Yes	Yes	Yes
The PS	No	Yes	Yes
The UMP	Yes	Yes	Yes

Overall it can be seen that all parties experienced one or the other or both types of electoral; defeat before reforming their leadership selection method. The next section takes a closer look at both indicators.

The electoral results of the five parties are summarized in the graph below. The black circles indicate the last election before the reform:



Note: In the cases of France the results in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of presidential elections are used. The PS failed to qualify in 2001 this is recoded as 0. Source: (Norwegian Social Data Services)

It can be seen that Labour, the Conservative and the UMP all experienced substantive electoral defeat before the reforms. In the cases of the PS there are two circles as it reformed twice. From 1995-2011, with a break in 2002, the party used a closed primary. In 2011 the party reformed further moving to an open primary, the “primaire citoyenne”. In the case of the PS the first reform actually happened while the party was still in power and experienced a good electoral outcome in 1990 and the second reform to further open the elections only took place after a long series of dramatic electoral defeats and setbacks. However, focusing on the most recent and most “democratising” reforms within parties, the hypothesis holds.

The Greens consistently increased their vote share, apart from 1990, since they first entered parliament in 1980 becoming government coalition partner from 1998-2005. Despite the continued electoral gains, reaching 10.7% in 2009, the party failed to re-enter government and reformed in 2012. Thus, the Greens perceived their electoral performance of winning votes but failing to re-enter government clearly as disappointing triggering reform and confirming the hypothesis.


Overall, all cases are recorded as “yes”. The first reform in the PS is the only exception but does not affect the parties overall classification as “yes”. The link between

electoral setback and leadership reform is supported by the findings of Cross and Blais (Cross and Blais, 2012a).


The second external factor is *being in opposition*. Reforms during time in opposition can be motivated by the party leadership either to promote party renewal or as a strategic electoral tool. Which of these motivations is more likely will depend on the timing of the reform relative to the next election, the closer the leadership selection is to the next national election, the more likely they are an electoral tool rather than a means of party renewal. Despite these different motivations for reform the overall point proves the second hypothesis that: *parties in opposition are more likely to democratise their candidate selection process*. The indicator is operationalised by looking at the party’s relative position in the legislature to other parties during the reform. It is measured as “in opposition status when reform took place”= yes and “not in opposition status when reform took place”= no. The variable is again dichotomous.

The diagrams below show the timing of the reform relative to the point when the party (re-)entered opposition:


The Greens




The PS




The UMP



The Conservatives



Labour



It can be seen that in the case of the PS, the Greens and Labour the decision to reform the leadership selection method was made shortly before the election. Thus this is more in line with the explanation of reform as an electoral tool. In contrast the UMP and Conservatives reformed shortly after entering opposition, more in line with the argument of reform as a possible means of party renewal. Beginning in opposition seems to create the necessary conditions that either forced or convinced the leadership that such reforms are needed. Thus all cases are recorded as “yes”. Again the study by Cross and Blais found the same in their study of parties in Westminster democracies (Cross and Blais, 2012b p. 41).

The third hypothesis is impact of *party newness*, defined as: “a new party enters the electoral market”. There is a big debate in the literature on political parties about how to define a “new party” stretching from definition based on a social cleavage formally not politically represented to more time-based definitions such as actual age or periods in parliament (Cross and Blais, 2012b p. 41). However, due to its organisational focus, this paper follows Hug’s (2001) definition for new parties as new if they build from scratch, thus organisational newly born parties (for more details see Bolleyer, 2013 p. 26). Mergers of established party organisations, splinters or successor parties originating from major factions of established parties are also not considered as new. Thus the paper only considers *organisational new parties* (Bolleyer, 2013 p. 26). Furthermore, parties are only considered new if they founded post-1968. The preceding social changes shook up the formally “frozen party system” of advanced democracies (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, Bartolini and Mair, 2007).

Citizen’s party de-alignment and higher flexibility created the opportunity for new parties to emerge (Hug, 2001, Mair, 1997).

If the party meets both criteria it is classified as new and is recorded with “yes”. Applying to this paper’s case the following picture emerges (sorted by founding date):

<b>Party</b>	<b>Founded post-1968</b>	<b>Organisationally New</b>	<b>New</b>
The Conservatives	No (1834)	No	No
Labour	No (1900)	No	No
PS	Yes (1969)	No	No
<i>Greens</i>	<i>Yes (1979)</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
UMP	Yes (2002)	No	No

The table shows that the sample consists of one new party (Greens) and four old parties (UMP, PS, Labour and Conservatives). This is in line with classifications by Bolleyer (2013). Thus being a new party seems not to explain the reform in leadership selection method in the cases here.

It can be seen that the hypothesis that young parties are more likely to reform seems not to hold for the sample. Even the Greens, the only party categorised as young here, did not opt for an inclusive selectorate from the start. Nor did they reform during the party’s formative period. Furthermore, all other parties in the sample reformed despite being classified as old parties.

The study by Cross and Blais (2013) finds that only four out of 16 parties under study were new parties and included members in their first set of leadership selection. Two other cases followed after their first general election, while the rest decided to include members in leadership selection despite being old parties (Cross and Blais, 2012b). Their results are more supportive, but this is probably due to their more simplistic categorisation of parties as old if they “have waged two election campaigns prior to the expansion of the selectorate“ (Cross and Blais, 2012b p. 41). But even using this definition none of the parties in this paper would have been classified as young when they reformed. Thus overall, party newness seems not to be a good indicator of a party’s inclination to reform its leadership selection method.

The last external stimulus to be analysed is the “*contagion effect*”. As the theoretical part shows, it can be distinguished between internal and external contagion effect. The former is the case if a party reforms following reform in other parties to maintain their competitive position. The latter refers to either a vertical shift; adopt selection methods previously used on lower levels, or a further widening of the selectorate. Both can exist in parallel to each

other but the presence of one is sufficient to be recorded positively. Again it is a dichotomous variable recoded as “yes” or “no”. The limitation of this hypothesis is that it cannot attempt to explain why the first party in a system would reform. Consequently the hypothesis cannot be viewed as an independent explanation but only as part of the more comprehensive list of the factors outlined above. The findings are summarised in the table below:

<b>Party</b>	<b>External</b>	<b>Internal</b>	<b>Overall</b>
The Conservatives	Yes	No	Yes
Labour	Yes	Yes	Yes
PS	No	Yes	Yes
UMP	Yes	Yes	Yes
Green	No	Yes	Yes

The Green party has a long history of providing local and regional party branches with the power to select their own candidates for all kinds of elections, but only in 2011 it opted for a closed primary on a national level. As it is the first party in nearly two decades in Germany to choose its front running candidate beyond the confines of a delegate conference, there is no case of external contagion.<sup>1</sup> Rather it was internal contagion based on the positive experience at lower levels.

In 1995, during the first reform, the PS was also the first party in France to reform so there was no external contagion effect. The second reform in 2011 can be partly explained by external contagions, as other parties followed, and the PS wanted to maintain its competitive advantage. However it seems to be more a case of internal contagion, though contrary to the hypothesis it was not triggered by positive experience but rather despite the negative experiences.

The UMP is a clear case of external contagion as it reformed following reforms in all other major parties. There is also evidence for internal contagion as it used a closed primary in the 2008 Paris mayoral elections.

The Conservatives are also a clear case of external contagion as it was the last major party to reform its leadership selection method. There also seems to be evidence for the internal contagion effect but in the reversed way, as during the last election local branches

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<sup>1</sup> The SPD used a closed primary in 1993 but never since then

were allowed to choose their candidates using closed local primaries. But so far there are no plans to extend the selectorate on national level or reform the two round selection system.

Labour also shows evidence for both. It is the last main UK party to move to a closed primary. In support of internal contagion the party moved from an Electoral College system to an OMOV, increasing inclusiveness.

Overall, in the case of the PS and the Greens internal contagion effect played a larger role, while the cases of the UMP, Labour and Conservatives were dominated by external contagion. Overall the fourth hypothesis, that parties are more likely to reform when a contagion effect is present, holds and all cases are recorded with “yes”.

The findings of the first part are summarised in the following table:

	Electoral setback	Opposition Status	New/Old Party	Contagion Effect	Cartelisation	Reform
Green	YES	YES	YES	YES		YES
Conservatives	YES	YES	NO	YES		YES
Labour	YES	YES	NO	YES		YES
PS	YES	YES	NO	YES		YES
UMP	YES	YES	NO	YES		YES

It is possible to identify a first pattern. All four cases feature electoral setback, opposition status and contagion effect. It seems individual factors are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for reform in leadership selection methods. But electoral setback, oppositional position and contagion effect together provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for reform. These findings and preliminary results are so far confirmed by the study of Cross and Blais (2012b p. 43). The next section aims to establish if the cartel party argument can be added to the list of factors leading to party leadership reform.

### ***Cartel Party and Leadership Selection Method***

The section investigates whether there is a link between party cartelisation and reform in leadership selection method. Katz and Mair argue that parties moving towards a cartel organisational model will adopt more direct leadership selection methods in order to

disempower middle level activists and strengthen the leadership (Katz and Mair, 1995 p. 21). Thus the question emerges whether leadership selection reforms are part and parcel of a wider party changes towards a cartel party? The paper will use three proxy indicators suggested by Katz (2001) to establish the level of party cartelisation: *level of party membership, source of party funding and role of membership* (Katz, 2001). They are operationalised in the following way:

<i>party membership level</i>	<i>source of party funding</i>	<i>role of membership.</i>	<i>Total Score:</i>
0=no decline or increase 1= increase in number but drop in quality 2= decline in membership	0= no/low level of state dependency 1= moderate level dependency 2=high level of dependency	0= large role and integration of membership 1= moderately integrated and limited impact 2= low level of integration and limited and controlled member impact	≤3=no cartelisation ≥3= cartelisation

Together they produce a continuous scale reaching from “full cartel party” to “not cartel party”. It is divided into “Cartelisation” and “no cartelisation” in order to transform it into a dichotomous variable. Three is chosen as a cut-off point as it allows parties to have a high score in one category but requiring them to have a low score in all the others. Highly cartelised parties use inclusive leadership selection to provide it with democratic legitimacy in an organisation that otherwise lacks participatory possibility and stifles membership activism. Thus the more cartelised the party the more inclusive selectorate, in order to maximise the party’s legitimacy and democratic credentials.


The findings are summarised in the table below. It shows that none of the parties are complete cartel parties but feature, to various degrees, several of its characteristics.

	The decline of membership levels	The dependence on state funding	The Role of membership and its relation to the leadership	TOTAL Score	<b>Cartelisation</b>
Greens	0	1	0	1	<b>NO</b>
Conservatives	2	0	1	3	<b>NO</b>
Labour	2	0	1	3	<b>NO</b>
PS	1	1	1	3	<b>NO</b>
UMP	1	2	2	5	<b>YES</b>



Looking at the first indicator, the graph below shows there seems to be a decline of the overall share of party membership as part of the electorate.


Party Membership as % of electorate (M/E)



Source: (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012)

However when looking at individual parties a more mixed picture emerges:

Party membership decline



Sources: (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen et al., 2012, Webb et al., 2002, Parti Socialist, 2012, McGuinness, 2012, Boissieu, 2013a)

The increase in membership in the French parties can be explained by the creation of the new categories, such as supporter status, and overall cheaper membership fees. Further both parties launched a massive recruitment drive just before their primaries in 2006 (PS) and 2012 (UMP). In line with the cartel party thesis the parties demonstrate a reduced need for

membership contributions towards party funding, and the reduction of many members' roles from activist to supporter, to democratically legitimise the leadership through the use of direct elections. There seems to be a decline in quality but not quantity.

The Greens lost a large part of their membership by 2005 and decline continued until 2007. Only in the year 2010 did the party manage to reach its 1999 level, and surpassed it. This decline seems to be related to the Greens' time in government. During this period there was a clear shift of power from the base of the party to the central leadership, due to the need to adapt to the new situation. The centralisation of the party and increase in the decision-making capacity of a small group can be viewed as part of cartelisation.<sup>2</sup> Since then the party leadership successfully reconnected with its members increasing membership level and maintaining the membership's quality.

The Conservative Party experienced a long membership decline (McGuinness, 2012). Syed and Whitely shows the Conservatives show a 17% decline in party activism during the 1990s (2004). Thus there is a clear decline in quality and quantity of members.

Overall Labour membership declined but it experienced a slight upturn in the second half of the 2000. However, not enough to reverse previous losses. Further party members' state that they are less active and the majority claims to spend no time on party activities (Syed and Whiteley, 2004). Thus there is a loss in quality and quantity.

This leads to the following coding:

	Score Indicator I
The Greens	0
The Conservatives	2
Labour	2
The PS	1
The UMP	1

The dependence on state funding is one of the main arguments supporting the cartel party thesis. It exists in all three countries, but to a very different degree. This paper only looks at direct public funding (for more types see Ohman, 2012).

The Green's annual Rechenschaftsbericht (statement of accounts) reveals that the share of public funding they received increased moderately over a period of 12 years. In

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<sup>2</sup> One example of this was the decision of the party leadership to vote for Germany's involvement in the war in Afghanistan, which many members opposed.

1999, state funding made up 33.1% of their income (Thierse, 2000), and in 2011 this amounted to 37.51% (Lammert, 2013).

In the same time period contributions from membership fees declined from 40.68% in 1999 to 21.63% in 2011 (Lammert, 2013). Despite an increase in membership, the share of income obtained from membership nearly halved. An additional 20.95% (Lammert, 2013) comes from contributions from MPs.


The party is highly independent of its members, providing autonomy to the leadership. From a financial perspective it is more beneficial to maximise its share of the vote by addressing the needs of the general public, rather than cater for the interest of a small membership with declining importance for the party's income, supporting a qualitative shift towards a cartel party structure.

In 2003 UMP's membership contribution accounted for just 3%, while 77% came from public funding in 2003 (Sauger, 2008). In 2007 balances improved slightly with 11.8% from members and 67.2% from the state (Politique.Com). The dependence on the state is further underlined by the party's near bankruptcy, when the electoral commission refused to reimburse UMP's presidential campaign spend (Laurent, 08/07/2013). Overall, UMP leadership extremely independent and nearly has full control in the party. In line with the cartel argument direct membership votes are an efficient way to increase democratic legitimacy for the leadership.


In 2007 the PS share of public funds is much lower 40.1%, membership contributions matter more with 19.6% (Politique.Com). However, historically public funding represented large parts of the income with an average of 45% from 1993-1997, increasing to 53% from 1997-2001 and peaking at 85% in 2002 (Bachelot, 2008 p. 396). The influx of members in 2006 seems to have normalised the balance between public funding and membership contributions. Despite this the leadership remains relatively independent and can operate with little constraints on its decision making power. However, as Carol Bachelot points out, in the case of a reduction in public funds and negative electoral performance, the PS still relies heavily on membership contributions (2008 p. 369). Thus, it has to engage in activities to keep members motivated and engaged, at least financially. The reforms of the presidential candidate selection method can be viewed as part of this strategy.

In the UK, public resources for parties are very limited, consisting of "short money" for the opposition and since 2000 "policy development grants" (Institute for Democracy and

Electoral Assistance)<sup>3</sup>. After moving back to opposition in 1997, the Conservatives received just over a million pounds in “short money” slowly increasing to £4.7 million in 2010 (Kelly, 2013). Membership contributions are very low. The party is highly dependent on donations, especially during elections (The Electoral Commission, 2013):




The next table below shows that the party is highly dependent on individual and company donations (Unlock Democracy, 2012):



However it does not support the cartel party thesis due to a lack of dependence on state funding. Leadership is less dependent and needs to act carefully so as not to lose vital donors. Thus the reform seems a real attempt to renew links with members and especially donors.

<sup>3</sup> Policy Development Gants is limited £2 million annually.

The case of Labour is very similar. The graph above indicates that Labour is highly dependent on donations for electoral campaigns. The main source of donations are Trade Unions as the diagram, below indicates (Unlock Democracy, 2012):



This partly contains the party leadership's actions but also demonstrates a low dependence on membership contributions. Short money is also low with 6.5 mil. in 2013/14 (Kelly, 2013). Thus Labour does not confirm the cartel party thesis prediction of dependence on state funding.

The coding in the table below reflects the variety in the degree of dependence on state funding:


	Score Indicator II
The Greens	1
The Conservatives	0
Labour	0
The PS	1
The UMP	2

The role of party members in cartel party changes and membership rights becomes more restricted and activism is limited to the local level. Often members are seen to provide funding and, most importantly, democratic legitimacy, to create this new membership

function cartel parties often adopt a stratarchic organisational structure (Carty, 2004). Detterbeck suggests four indicators to capture this shift (Detterbeck, 2005):

- Composition of national party executives
- Candidate selection
- Internal policy decision making
- Election campaigning


In the Greens the national executive is clearly separate from the party in office with only 1/3 of its members allowed to be MPs and members cannot be heads of the parliamentary group simultaneously (Satzung Des Bundesverbandes BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, 2012). The party constitution guarantees lower levels control over constitutional, financial and personnel decisions providing high independence. All executive decisions and the party program have to be taken by a membership or delegate vote. Only candidate restriction is membership. As the table below shows they spent very little on their electoral campaigns (Lammert, 2012):



The Greens can be described as stratarchically organised, with strong local power but high local and membership influence on the national level, thus not cartelised.

The Conservatives did not have an executive board until 1998, but it is now “the supreme decision-making body in matters of Party organisation and management.”(The Conservatives Webpage) Despite party constitution regulations (The Conservatives Webpage) it is clearly dominated by the latter two and includes a high proportion of political office holders and professionals. Candidate selection is highly controlled as they need to apply centrally, and be approved by the national party before a local constituency vote. Internal policy making is also a highly centralised process, as policies are produced and enforced by the Conservative Campaign headquarters. Parties are only allowed to spend a

fixed amount per seat totalling £19.5 million (2010 election) (The Electoral Commission, 2013). The Conservatives spent £16,682,874 in 2010 and £17,852,240 in 2005, both highly capital-intensive campaigns and consistently spent more than the other parties (The Electoral Commission, 2014):




They seem to be highly centralised with little space for membership involvement resembling the classical hierarchical party model rather than the stratarchical organisational form preferred by cartel parties.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) is the governing body of the Labour Party. It is highly controlled by party and trade union elites and makes no provisions for the inclusion of ordinary members. Furthermore, all its members are also part of the National Policy Forum (NPF) and oversees party policy-making formulation for the general election manifesto. They also work together with the shadow government ministers throughout the year. Thus there is little separation between the party in central and public office. Internal policy decision making is highly controlled by the NEC. However the NPF, is larger and containing individual party members, has some very limited influence. All members who are part of the party for longer the six months are allowed to participate in the selection meeting. Candidate requirements are moderately strict, however all candidates have to follow the criteria prescribed by the NEC. During the 2010 election campaign Labour spent 8,009,483.43, in 2005 17,939,618.00 and 2001 10,945,120.00 (The Electoral Commission, 2014). The 2005 capital-intensive campaign seems to be an exception. This could imply more dependence on party membership activities. Labour is highly centralised with little space for membership involvement, resembling the classical hierarchical party model rather than the stratarchical organisational form preferred by cartel parties.

In the PS, both main decision making bodies of the party, the National Council and National Bureau, are dominated by public office holders from both the regional and national level. The average percentage of public office holders in the national council between 1993 and 2003 was 72.1% (Bachelot, 2008). Lower levels have some control over candidate selection processes but it is further decreased with the use of open primaries to select local candidates, also reducing incentives to join (Parti Socialiste 'Primaires Citoyennes'). Candidate selection for the national legislature and policy formation remains under the control of the national bureau. Parties can spend max 11 million euros during a campaign (2012) (Laurent, 08/07/2013). The PS's capital intensive campaign focuses on direct support of candidates rather than on general advertising (Commission nationale des comptes de campagnes et des financements politiques) and membership involvement is high. Overall the national leadership aims to include members in all aspects of the party, but since the introduction of open primary membership declined leading to increasing capital dependency. Thus facilitating a shift towards cartelisation.

In the UMP, power is shared between the Polit Bureau and the National Council, both dominated by current and former officeholders (UMP, 2013b). Lower levels enjoy a certain degree of freedom to select candidates but all candidates need to be approved by the national council. However the list for national elections is drafted by a national election committee and (UMP, 2013c) approved by the national council. The party leadership can trigger a primary with very strict candidate requirements (UMP, 2013b). The graph shows the very capital intensive electoral campaigns with a high share spent on advertising the party as a whole (Laurent, 08/07/2013):






The near bankruptcy when the national election committee first refuses to refund the party after the last presidential election (Laurent, 08/07/2013) underlines the capital dependency of the UMP rather than membership activism. The role of the membership is very restricted and leadership very powerful thus the UMP seems to be the closest to the cartel model.

As the above analysis shows the nature of membership and its relation to the leadership varies vastly between the cases, as the table below shows:

	Score Indicator III
The Greens	0
The Conservatives	1
Labour	1
The PS	1
The UMP	2

The scale below summarises the findings for each indicator, total score for each case (max. 6, min. 0) and dichotomous classification of each party relative to each other:



Katz (2001) argues that cartel parties democratise most in form while ensuring high centralised control in practice. This party description holds as The UMP, with the highest score, has strict candidate requirements (UMP, 2013a) and needs the High Electoral Commission approval, leading to only two candidates qualifying in 2012 (Boissieu, 2013a). The recent debate to move from the current closed to an open primary further confirms Katz’s argument. In contrast, the PS uses similar strict criteria (PS 'Les Primaires) but if met he/she directly qualifies leading to more candidates (Boissieu, 2013b). The Conservatives, Labour and PS score the same (3) as their selection method is very centralised and controlled, but overall gives a low cartelisation score. The Greens have the lowest cartelisation score but a closed primary with open candidacy further confirm Katz theoretical argument.

It seems inclusiveness in form can be effective way to window-dress highly centralised and restrictive selection rules in substance.

Overall the evidence from testing the cartel party argument as an explanatory factor for reform seems rather inconclusive as there seems to be a clear lack of a link between cartelisation and reform as all parties reformed at very different stages of cartelisation. In contrast to the other cases in the UMP and PS, there seems to be strong evidence that the leadership passes reforms to reduce the power of the middle level and strengthen the leadership. In the Conservatives and Labour the reforms reflects traditional hierarchical organisational form with highly autonomous leaders while in the Greens the paper agrees with Detterbecker suggested that they are becoming part of the German *party cartel* but not a *cartel party* (Detterbeck, 2008).

Thus cartelisation seems not to be a sufficient condition for leadership reform and does not contribute to the set of factors already identified as necessary and sufficient for reform.

**Conclusion**

The table below summaries the findings for the five factors considered to cause reform in leadership selection method:

	<b>Electoral setback</b>	<b>opposition Statues</b>	<b>New/Old Party</b>	<b>Contagion Effect</b>	<b>Cartelisation</b>	<b>Reform</b>
Green	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
Conservatives	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Labour	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
PS	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
UMP	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

The paper found a strong link between external factors and leadership reform but in contrast to the literature (Katz, 2001) a weak, if any, link between party cartelisation and reform. The findings of the external factors, a part of party age, are confirmed by Cross and Blais’ study of reforms in Westminster Democracies (Cross and Blais, 2012b).

Wauter’s (2013) also used Blais and Cross framework to study the cause of leadership reform in Belgium. In his study of ten parties he also finds evidence for the contagion effect, especially in the 1990’s, and that reforms are introduced “when the party is in a crisis”, however they seem to be not directly caused by electoral defeat or being in opposition. Further, party age seems to start to play a role only in the 2000’s as all three newly-founded

parties adopted primaries within a short period their founding. In Belgium there seems to be a stronger link between cartelisation and reform as party elites are often keen to introduce primaries to reduce the power of the middle-level elites. The cases analysed here confirm the importance of external factors but also the increasing link between party cartelisation, organisational reform and intra-party regulations.

The paper shows in all five cases electoral setback, opposition status and contagion effect were present and together provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for leadership reform. Again this is confirmed by Cross and Blais (2012b p. 43). However cartelisation seems not to provide a further necessary nor sufficient condition to explain the reform as all cases reformed with different degrees of cartelisation. Nevertheless, this latter aspect might strengthen over time and requires further research in order to fully evaluate the origin and impact of reforms in leadership selection method and its effect on intra-party democracy.

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