Uncooperative parliaments in the European Union: Varying degrees of cooperativeness related to the Inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance

Abstract:
In the area of Economic and Financial Governance, inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament takes place in an inter-parliamentary conference which was established on the basis of Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. It would allow them to work together, to discuss, exchange information and even exercise joint control. However, the relationship between the two parliamentary levels is (still) characterised by conflict, rather than cooperation, as the first meetings of the new conference show: some EU parliaments are more cooperative than others.

This paper compares the European Parliament and three national parliaments (Denmark, France, Germany): Their behaviour towards inter-parliamentary cooperation in Economic and Financial Governance both inside and outside the arena of that conference (agenda-setting, participation in ad-hoc meetings and inter-parliamentary conferences, written contributions) is analysed in order to examine which parliamentary actors take the initiative and/or participate in activities related to this inter-parliamentary conference. The following classification of parliamentary actors (and parliaments) as inward-looking, passively cooperative or actively networking that is developed in this paper, contributes to understanding the challenges of inter-parliamentary cooperation even beyond Economic and Financial Governance.

Introduction

The coordination of fiscal and economic policies in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) mainly takes place between the European Commission and national governments in the Council, based on the Six-Pack, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) and the Two-Pack (Craig 2014; Dehousse and Boussaguet 2014). The TSCG has not only strengthened the coordination of these policies, but also provided for the creation of an inter-parliamentary conference in order
to “discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this treaty”. Executive
dominance in fiscal and economic policies leads to decisions which only get pro forma-
legitimised in parliamentary procedures (Enderlein 2013: 732) and could thus prompt
national parliaments and the European Parliament to work together and “exert
countervailing power, both individually and collectively” (Curtin 2014: 30). Inter-
parliamentary cooperation in Economic and Financial Governance has, however, met
challenges similar to those encountered elsewhere: The general relationship between the
two parliamentary levels is (still) characterised by conflict, rather than cooperation

Cooperativeness, defined here as doing something together or working together with
others towards a shared aim, varies considerably among EU Parliaments related to the
inter-parliamentary conference. Quite a few parliaments can actually be considered
“uncooperative”. This paper has the objective to examine these varying degrees of
cooperativeness: What factors explain variation in parliamentary cooperativeness
related to the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG? The concept of
parliamentary cooperativeness (developed in the paper) links preferences of (national)
parliaments and their behaviour, based on their activities and their attendance at the
inter-parliamentary conference.

This paper will analyse preferences and activities of the Danish Folketing, the French
Assemblée nationale, the German Bundestag and the European Parliament in the
context of Article 13 TSCG (e.g. agenda-setting, participation in ad-hoc meetings,
written contributions) in order to illustrate how key players reacted to the provision that
“the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will
together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference […] to discuss
budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.”

It will then introduce a new dataset of national parliaments’ attendance records at the
inter-parliamentary conference and will provide first results for different hypotheses
explaining variation in attendance. A set of independent variables will be tested in order
to find out which factors matter and to what extent they explain variation in attendance
between (national) parliamentary chambers. The preliminary results indicate that 1) the
larger the number of its MPs, 2) the more actively it is scrutinizing EU affairs and 3) the
smaller its majority in favour of ratifying the TSCG, the higher is the average
attendance of (the chamber of) a national parliament at the inter-parliamentary
conference.

Finally, the assessment of parliamentary cooperativeness related to this conference – of
the 18 months since its creation in October 2013 as well as of the deliberations
beforehand – allows developing a classification of parliaments and parliamentary actors
as inward-looking, passively cooperative or actively networking that could constitute a
basis for further research.

Article 13 TSCG is the product the intergovernmental negotiations in December 2011
and January 2012 and has undergone significant changes during the negotiating process,
revealing the difficulties met by the Member States in reaching an agreement on this
point (Kreilinger 2015a: 273). The original objective of the treaty article was that

1 Article 13 TSCG.
2 Article 13 TSCG.
3 Data collected by the author. The conference has met four times so far: October 2013 in Vilnius,
national MPs meet regularly and that this would happen in close association with the European Parliament. During the negotiations Article 13 was completely revised twice and in only the later drafts of the treaty a link was drawn to the existing inter-parliamentary structures (Kreilinger 2012). Member States may have included the Article into the treaty in order to facilitate the national ratification processes of the TSCG. The final wording of Article 13 agreed by the Contracting Parties is the following:

“As provided for in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.”

In the national ratification processes of the TSCG and in discussions about how to achieve a “genuine EMU” the question of the implementation of Article 13 TSCG emerged on the agenda and parliaments started to address the issue. In 2012/13 both chairpersons of European Affairs Committees and Speakers of Parliaments held informal ad-hoc meetings in sub-groups and tried to coordinate their positions (Cooper 2014; Kreilinger 2013). After many actors had articulated their preferences, sometimes both individually and collectively, the Speakers’ Conference in April 2013 (the annual meeting of the Speakers of all EU Parliaments) agreed on a compromise about the organisation of the inter-parliamentary conference (Conference of Speakers 2013). The Speakers’ Conference plays a role of coordination and even rule-making in inter-parliamentary cooperation (Griglio and Lupo 2014: 134) and its Presidency Conclusions provided the basis for bringing Article 13 TSCG into practice in October 2013 (Kreilinger 2013: 14). Since then, the inter-parliamentary conference has discussed about whether it should adopt Rules of Procedure and possible provisions to be included into them. The Speakers’ Conference in April 2015 discussed and approved principles on the Rules of Procedure which shall be transposed by the next inter-parliamentary conference (Conference of Speakers 2015; Kreilinger 2015b).

This paper is structured as follows: After a brief review of the literature on inter-parliamentary cooperation, the second section develops the research design of this paper and explains hypotheses, data, methodology and case selection. The third section examines the preferences and activities of the Danish Folketing, the French Assemblée nationale, the German Bundestag and the European Parliament. After that, section four extends the analysis and presents first quantitative evidence on the attendance at the conference. This allows, in section five, developing a preliminary classification of parliaments according to their “cooperativeness”.

1. Inter-parliamentary cooperation between National Parliaments (of EU member states) and the European Parliament

There is a “small but growing body of research on inter-parliamentary cooperation between the EU’s national legislatures (and the European Parliament)” (Raunio 2014a: 554). The inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG is an “Inter-parliamentary cooperation between National Parliaments (of EU member states) and the European Parliament”.

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4 Article 13 TSCG.
Institution” (IPI): as a rather special case, it brings together national parliaments (of EU member states) and the European Parliament. But the term IPI that has been widely used in order to capture this global phenomenon beyond the EU-internal context (Cofelice and Stavridis 2014; Costa et al. 2013; Marschall 2007) is also applicable to Economic and Financial Governance in the EU.

In the “multilevel parliamentary field” of the EU (Crum and Fossum 2009), institutionalised arenas of cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament, like the Inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG, exist alongside other, informal ways of cooperation (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 12-15; 20-27). It might be tempting to perceive the European Parliament as uncooperative and national parliaments as too quarrelling to find a common position. The reality, however, is somewhat more difficult: Empowering an inter-parliamentary conference, even if only as a place to “discuss”, affects each parliament. To some extent, this can be seen as a process of parliamentary co-evolution (see Winzen et al. 2015) which leads to different individual reactions: While some parliaments want to give an advisory role to that conference, others would like it to be a strong body for “joint scrutiny” (Cooper 2014). In Financial and Economic Governance, similar to CFSP/CSDP, a conflict of “overlapping authority claims” (Herranz-Surrallés 2014) can be observed. Just like the empowerment of national parliaments shows considerable variation (Auel et al. 2015a; Bergman 1997; Karlas 2012; Raunio and Hix 2000; Winzen 2012, 2013), their cooperativeness also varies considerably.

According to the Lisbon Treaty national parliaments “contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union […] by taking part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament”. The specific legal basis for inter-parliamentary cooperation can be found in Protocol n°1 on the Role of National Parliaments annexed to the EU treaties: “the organisation and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union shall be determined by the European Parliament and National Parliaments.”

From early studies on inter-parliamentary cooperation (Bengtson 2007; Costa and Latek 2001; Larhant 2005; Neunreither 1994, 2005), the literature has specialised into more detailed analyses of inter-parliamentary conferences: The “line of argument on conflict and cooperation has been extended” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 21), when two new policy-specific inter-parliamentary conferences (on CFSP/CSDP and Economic Governance) were created in 2012 and 2013, following the model of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC) which had been established in 1989 (Hefftler and Gattermann 2015). Article 10 of Protocol No 1 annexed to the EU treaties contains a provision on inter-parliamentary conferences and states that a “conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs […] shall […] promote the exchange of information and best practice between National Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organise inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics […]. Contributions from the conference shall not bind National Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions.”

The Inter-parliamentary conference on CFSP/CSDP substituted the Assembly of the West European Union in 2012 (Herranz-Surrallés 2014; Stavridis 2014; Wagner 2013)

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5 Article 12 TEU.
6 Article 9, Protocol n°1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the EU Treaties.
7 Article 10, Protocol n°1, supra.
and the Inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance on the basis of Article 13 TSCG was created in 2013 (Cooper 2014; Kreilinger 2013). Research has to some extent analysed attendance at inter-parliamentary conferences and meetings (Hefftler and Gattermann 2015; Wagner 2013), but still lacks detailed explanations for the variation in the behaviour of parliaments and parliamentary actors with respect to the new inter-parliamentary conference after their creation.

Interestingly, inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments of EU member states and the European Parliament has been widely assessed as beneficial, both from a rationalist and a normative perspective, but has encountered lack of political will or even stalemate (Kreilinger 2014): Inter-parliamentary cooperation could reduce informational asymmetries, favour the exchange of specialised knowledge, facilitate policy formulation, and foster mutual understanding and a transnational public debate (Benz 2011: 11; Herranz-Surrallés 2014: 2-3; Kraft-Kasack 2008; Neunreither 1994). Inter-parliamentary cooperation could also contribute to reducing the democratic deficit by strengthening both elements of the dual legitimacy on which the political system of the EU relies – the democratic institutions of the Member States and the directly elected European Parliament (Neunreither 1994). This is even more puzzling because “the intergovernmental logic brings with it an inter-parliamentary balancing” (Fabbrini 2013: 12): the main theoretical rationale behind resorting to inter-parliamentary cooperation in Economic and Financial Governance lies in the use of intergovernmental legal instruments in that area. More far-reaching concepts for multi-level parliamentarism insist that “[t]he dominance of the member state governments in the European Council needs to be balanced with an equally strong voice of parliamentary representation” (Neyer 2014: 135). But the TSCG and the Treaty establishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) do “little or nothing to anchor new regulatory functions for the Union in democratic institutions” (Dawson and de Witte 2013: 834) and relations between national parliaments have so far “not develop[ed] into a balanced multilateral interplay including parliaments from all member states on the same footing” (Benz 2011: 11).

The literature has identified two competing ideas of inter-parliamentary cooperation that exist among EU parliaments: “centralised scrutiny” means that inter-parliamentary cooperation is dominated by the European Parliament, with only very limited input by national parliaments; the alternative concept is “joint scrutiny”: national parliaments and the European Parliament working together (Cooper 2014: 2). Their reactions to and perceptions of each others’ empowerment and each others’ role in an inter-parliamentary conference are an important factor: “Disagreements typically oscillate around general questions of legitimacy, basic issues such as the formal weight to be given to the two parliamentary levels, and around the competences and objectives of such a conference” (Kreilinger 2014: 58).

The empowerment of the two parliamentary levels has recently been described as a “co-evolution” (Winzen et al. 2015): National parliaments (Auel and Benz 2005; Hefftler et al. 2015; Raunio 2014b; Winzen 2012, 2013) and the European Parliament (Hix and Høyland 2013; Rittberger 2003) have both been empowered gradually, including in the area of Economic and Financial Governance (Auel and Höing 2014; Deubner 2014; Maurer 2013; Rittberger 2014). According to Herranz Surralles’ assessment of “overlapping authority claims” (2014), the underlying explanation of the profound disagreements between national parliaments and the European Parliament is a mismatch between the daily EU policy making and formal treaty powers: an incremental and informal empowerment of the European Parliament (in Economic and Financial
Governance, too) clashes with national parliaments and their constitutional role linked to intergovernmental treaties and their domestic role in controlling national governments. This prevents sharing (and pooling) the parliamentary scrutiny tasks in EMU governance (Deubner 2014: 37).

Parliaments are, however, not a “black box” and it is necessary to distinguish the behaviour of governing parties and of the opposition as well as frontbench and backbench MPs (Auel and Benz 2005; Auel 2007; Holzhacker 2002; Raunio and Hix 2000). Individual parliamentary actors that constitute a parliament behave differently towards the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG: They can take the initiative or try to block it, they participate in activities inside and outside the arena of that conference, they write contributions and amendments with respect to draft Rules of Procedure or more general topics. Taking parliaments as unitary actors risks ignoring what parliamentary parties and individual MPs do, how often and why. Inter-parliamentary cooperation can affect the power relations within parliaments (Miklin 2013) and intra-party ties in the EU multilevel system are, for example, used by German MPs in order to obtain EU-related information, including “partisan links to the EP to learn about specific policies and policy-making dynamics at the EU level” (Wonka and Rittberger 2013: 639). Another study finds that the frequency of initiating parliamentary scrutiny at the national level by opposition MPs in the German and Czech bicameral systems is determined by the strength of their national delegation within the European political group in the European Parliament (Finke and Dannwolf 2013). Since the creation of the inter-parliamentary conference is part of the response to the financial and economic crisis, the behaviour of parliaments during the crisis could also be relevant for explaining their “cooperativeness”: National party positions on EU anti-crisis measures are more strongly determined by country than by ideology or membership in government, e.g. parliamentary parties in debtor states are likely to opt for Keynesian anti-crisis measures, regardless their ideological stance or being in government/opposition (Maatsch 2013). This shows that research on inter-parliamentary cooperation in a more general perspective helps developing explanations for activities, behaviour and cooperativeness in inter-parliamentary relations.

2. Research Design

An analysis of the factors explaining cooperativeness among EU parliaments with respect to a new inter-parliamentary conference requires examining how parliaments, parliamentary parties and individual MPs/MEPs have reacted to such a conference and what factors could explain their varying degrees of cooperativeness or, more broadly, their different behaviour. This section explains the research design of the paper. It has the objective to contribute to research about how/why parliaments cooperate in the EU (or not) and asks the following research question: What factors explain variation in parliamentary cooperativeness with respect to the Inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG?

This paper follows a mixed-methods research design. After an in-depth qualitative analysis of the preferences and activities of individual parliaments and parliamentary

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8 Parliamentary actors can do this individually, in sub-groups and as the representative of their committee or the whole assembly – or on their own.
actors with respect to the institutional design of the conference (in order to study the context of the Article 13 TSCG conference), this paper will provide a quantitative analysis of the attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference. Thus it will combine a case-oriented approach with the qualitative analysis of the cooperativeness of national parliaments (Denmark, France, Germany\(^9\)) and the European Parliament with a variable-oriented approach in the multiple linear regression analysis of possible explanations for variation in cooperativeness for all 28 national parliaments\(^10\) (Porta 2008; Ragin 1991). Such a multi-methods research design responds to the comparative element of researching inter-parliamentary cooperation and allows for a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. While in the qualitative part the individual cases are analysed in detail and parliamentary party groups or even MPs will be the level of analysis, the quantitative part presents the new dataset and provides explanations for variation – with parliaments or chambers as the level of analysis. The European Parliament, as a distinct case from the 28 national parliaments, will only be studied in the qualitative part.

This approach is not a classical mixed-methods design and might seem counter-intuitive. But the organisation “qualitative before quantitative” follows the chronological order of event (parliaments articulated their preferences and developed specific activities in 2012 and 2013; the conference only had its first meeting in October 2013) and it is also the result of data availability: while attendance records have been examined for other inter-parliamentary conferences (Wagner 2013) and are available for the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG (see section 2.2), an in-depth examination of preferences and activities is necessary in order to capture the dynamics between and within parliaments (see section 2.1). It also has to be taken into account that some parliaments have not articulated their preferences and have not been active, but rather “inward-looking” (Kreiling 2015a).

2.1 Cooperativeness I: Preferences and Activities – the qualitative analysis

How cooperativeness is expressed in preferences and activities with respect to the institutional design of the conference (e.g. report and resolutions on inter-parliamentary cooperation, ad-hoc meetings), is covered in the qualitative analysis. The “data” for the cases and for the qualitative analysis are resolutions and reports adopted in national parliaments as well as meetings attended by and letters or working papers sent between parliaments.\(^11\) The qualitative analysis will analyse high and low cooperativeness that can be observed the behaviour of the European Parliament, the Danish Folketing, the French Assemblée nationale and the German Bundestag.

The three national parliaments constitute, for different reasons most-likely cases of high cooperativeness:
- Denmark\(^12\) has a strong and active parliament (Christensen 2015) that sees itself (and not the European Parliament) as the true source of legitimacy for EU

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\(^9\) These three national parliaments constitute most-likely cases.
\(^10\) Or 41 parliamentary chambers: An Upper House like the German Bundesrat, composed of Länder executives, is also a parliamentary chamber.
\(^11\) Available on the IPEX website and on the websites of parliaments.
\(^12\) The TSCG was signed and ratified by Denmark despite its opt-out from the Euro.
issues; its scrutiny system on EU legislation and the European affairs committee are very strong (Raunio and Hix 2000; Winzen et al. 2015: 9-12).

- The French parliament has relatively strong formal prerogatives, but only a “moderate [level of] activity” (Thomas and Tacea 2015: 173): The role of national parliaments in the EU is often discussed in the French Assemblée nationale (Rozenberg 2011), probably to allow MPs to discretely articulate criticism about the EU and “as a consequence of the limited weight of the French Parliament within the domestic political system” (Kreilinger et al. 2013: 24).

- Germany was the driving force behind the TSCG and has always been among the most vocal supporters of the European Parliament (Winzen et al. 2015: 12). Bundestag (and Bundesrat) were able to gain significant scrutiny powers with the treaty revisions of Maastricht (1993) and Lisbon (2009) as well as during the Euro crisis, mostly in reaction to decisions by the German Constitutional Court, significantly strengthening national scrutiny (Calliess and Beichelt 2013; Höing 2015).

The relationship between the European Parliament and national parliaments has not been without tensions and their respective empowerment stands for a process of “parliamentary co-evolution” (Winzen et al. 2015). National parliaments’ preferences for the precise organisation of this kind of inter-parliamentary cooperation differ and their positions cannot be understood without considering the European Parliament.

In the negotiations on the conference of Article 13 TSCG, the four cases to be analysed have played important roles and adopted strong and visible positions (Cooper 2014; Kreilinger 2013).

But this paper also aims at looking into the parliamentary chambers (not just analyse variation between them) and examine parliamentary party groups and even, to some extent, the behaviour of individual MPs: The main conflict line in EU affairs at the national level is not between government and parliament, but between governing parties and opposition parties (Benz 2011; Hefftler 2015; Kinski 2012). Variation in preferences and activities between different parliamentary actors (between governing parties and opposition parties) could be explained by the effect of inter-parliamentary cooperation on the domestic balance of power. Opposition parties can be assumed to be more cooperative than governing parties, possibly due to the information asymmetries (Krehbiel 1992) vis-à-vis the government (governing parties do not suffer from this, because of their links to the government) that they try to reduce with the help of inter-parliamentary cooperation: The possibilities at such a conference to discuss and to exchange best practices could provide a remedy against the information asymmetry from which they suffer vis-à-vis their governments. (Curtin 2014: 30). For the opposition, inter-parliamentary cooperation “may […] often be the only way to bypass […] government, to look for allies and make their voices heard, or […] to coordinate their activities with other actors” (Miklin 2013: 27). Raunio and Hix underline that “[e]ven when the minister acts as the agent of the legislature, that is, on the basis of parliament’s instructions, the possibility for shirking is always present due to informational asymmetries” (2000: 158). Any EU-related information that is obtained “can […] be used in the process of domestic party competition” (Raunio and Hix 2000: 162), affect the domestic balance of power and is thus extremely valuable for the opposition which has an incentive to be more cooperative than the governing parties. It is, however, not sufficient to distinguish only between governing and opposition parties: National parliamentary parties which belong to a European political group or party federation engage more actively than non-affiliated parties (Miklin 2013: 28). In
addition to that, Hefftler points out that “the organization of committee membership and appointments to committee chairs will partially determine the extent in which opposition MPs participate in inter-parliamentary meetings” (2015: 7). This knowledge also applies to inter-parliamentary cooperation in Economic and Financial Governance and will guide the qualitative analysis.

Beyond the cases to be analysed here, a larger study covering more parliaments could provide additional insights: Many other parliaments are probably inward-looking parliaments13 and constitute a silent group of national parliaments that carries the responsibility for the absence of a collective position related to inter-parliamentary cooperation. The quantitative part of this paper will provide some insights on the attendance of these parliaments.

2.2 Cooperativeness II: Attendance – the quantitative analysis

In its quantitative part, this paper will test three hypotheses about parliamentary cooperativeness related to the Inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG in order to explain variation among all 28 national parliaments (or 41 parliamentary chambers) with respect to their attendance at the conference.

The first hypothesis looks at parliamentary capacity: The inter-parliamentary conference is attended by MPs from various committees, following the different internal organisation of parliaments and the provision of Article 13 TSCG to set up a “conference of representatives of the relevant committees”. In order to measure parliamentary capacity, the total number of MPs is used here as a proxy for parliamentary capacity. “In a large parliamentary chamber it is more likely that one or several MPs can fit the inter-parliamentary meetings in their schedule” (Hefftler 2015: 7), thus a higher total number of MPs should trigger higher attendance at the conference:

\[ H1: \text{The larger a parliamentary chamber, the higher its attendance at the conference.} \]

Hypothesis 2 addresses how actively parliaments scrutinize EU affairs in general: The overall level of activity of a parliament in the scrutiny of EU affairs (Auel et al. 2015b) could explain variation in cooperativeness. National parliaments could adopt a similar behaviour towards an inter-parliamentary conference as towards scrutinizing EU affairs (cooperative/active). As path-dependent institutions (Benz 2004), parliaments that are more active in scrutinizing their government in EU affairs would also be more active related to the inter-parliamentary conference, i.e. be more cooperative; less active parliaments (which give a “carte blanche” to their government) would be less cooperative, too. However, the opposite logic seems more plausible: Parliaments and MPs which are less active in scrutinizing EU affairs at the national level, would try to compensate for information asymmetries (Krehbiel 1992) by being particularly cooperative at the EU level (and not follow the “traditional” way of strengthening/using domestic scrutiny procedures). Consequently, parliaments with high scrutiny activity at the national level would tend to see little added value in cooperation with their fellow parliaments, because they already are well-informed and do not suffer from information asymmetries. But those parliaments whose scrutiny activity at the national level is low – either because they lack the prerogatives or because they do not use them (Auel and

13 See Section 5.
Tacea 2013) – would tend to see inter-parliamentary conferences as a possibility to obtain information that they do not get from their government. Parliaments would become better informed and reduce information asymmetries vis-à-vis their government with information from their counterparts and EU institutions:

H2: The less active a parliament is in scrutinizing EU affairs at the national level, the higher the average attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference.

The third hypothesis addresses scepticism towards the coordination of economic and financial policies. The TSCG was ratified in national parliaments: votes took place in the chambers of the contracting parties of the treaty (Novak 2013). A smaller majority for the TSCG (the treaty was ratified by all contracting parties) signals that some MPs and/or parliamentary party groups are opposed to the TSCG14; they would see their attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference as “checks and balances” to the (large) pro-TSCG majority:

H3: The lower the parliamentary support for the ratification of the TSCG, the more cooperative a parliament is related to the inter-parliamentary conference.

The attendance records of MPs and MEPs at the Inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance are the basis for a new dataset that has been created.15 The dependent variable is the mean attendance of all four conferences that have taken place between October 2013 and February 2015.

For the data on parliamentary capacity (H1) this paper relies on the PARLINE database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. To test H2 on the impact of the overall activity in scrutinising EU affairs, the OPAL activity score (Auel et al. 2015a) is used. It covers the time period from 2010 to 2012 for the chambers of all Member States except Croatia. This score is the only comprehensive assessment of EU-related parliamentary activities. It ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest) and comprises four main activities: mandates/resolutions, meetings of European affairs committees, plenary debates, and opinions submitted to the European Commission within the Political Dialogue. This activity index should have more explanatory power than indices about the institutional strength of EU affairs committees or budget committees (Auel et al. 2015a; Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012, 2013; Yläoutinen and Hallerberg 2009), because prerogatives are “not necessarily automatically translated into behaviour” (Auel et al. 2015b: 283). The regression analysis also tests the OPAL score on institutional strength (Auel et al. 2015a). For H3, scepticism towards the coordination of economic and financial policies measured by the share of non-votes in a chamber for the ratification of the TSCG, this paper draws on a compilation by the European Parliament (Novak 2013). The variable “Majority in favour of TSCG at ratification” measures the parliamentary opposition against the large majorities that ratified the TSCG in all parliamentary chambers.

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14 Voting behaviour on this occasion could be influenced by other factors, including whether a parliamentary party group is obliged to support the treaty (governing party) and the size of the government majority or whether a qualified majority was required for the ratification.

15 The lists of participants are available from the dedicated websites of the Presidency Parliament or the website of the European Parliament’s Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments and complemented with additional information on participating MPs and MEPs from other sources.
Table 1: Dependent variable and independent variables\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference (mean)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.744</td>
<td>1.630</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of MPs</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>234.6</td>
<td>191.7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAL activity score\textsuperscript{17}</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.0300</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority in favour of TSCG at ratification\textsuperscript{18}</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAL score institutional strength\textsuperscript{19}</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Accession</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.985</td>
<td>20.43</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>2,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicameral/bicameral parliament</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following two sections (3 and 4) provide the empirical analysis of cooperativeness related to the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG.

3. Cooperativeness of parliaments: Denmark, France, Germany, the European Parliament

In this section, the cases of the Danish, French, German and European parliament are examined. Parliaments are not taken as unitary actors, but positions and activities of frontbench and backbench MPs, governing parties and opposition parties are clearly identified as such and are included in the comparative analysis.

Two processes can be distinguished: On the one hand “communicating”, which links the preferences (about how an inter-parliamentary conference should work) to activities: Parliaments and parliamentary actors have the possibility to communicate them (resolutions, reports and letters). On the other hand “influencing & adapting”, which refers to parliamentary actors, e.g. committee chairs, who try to influence the negotiation outcome: they set the agenda, participate in ad-hoc meetings, and write contributions or amendments to the draft Rules of Procedure.

3.1 Parliaments communicate their preferences and start activities

The European Parliament has traditionally been sceptical about enhancing the role of national parliaments, fearing that this might undermine its position (European Parliament 2012: 19; Kreilinger 2013; 2015a: 276-78; Manoli and Maris 2015). The

\textsuperscript{16} Additional independent variables cover the year of accession of a Member State and whether a parliament is unicameral or bicameral.
\textsuperscript{17} N=40: No data for Croatia (unicameral).
\textsuperscript{18} N=30: The Czech Republic (bicameral) and the United Kingdom (bicameral) have not signed the treaty. In Cyprus (unicameral) no parliamentary ratification was required. Ireland (bicameral) held a referendum. Croatia (unicameral) was not a EU member state and has not signed the treaty yet. One chamber in the Netherlands (Eerste Kamer) and one chamber in Slovenia (Senate) approved the treaty without a vote. Data for one chamber in Spain (Congreso) is missing. As a consequence, there are no values for 11 parliamentary chambers.
\textsuperscript{19} N=40: No data for Croatia (unicameral).
successive “Four Presidents’ reports” between June and December 2012 were written without participation of the European Parliament or its President. In an own-initiative report on a genuine EMU, the European Parliament stated in November 2012 that only itself, “as parliamentary body at the Union level for a reinforced and democratic EMU governance” (European Parliament 2012: 19), had full democratic legitimacy to exercise control in that area. The possibility of creating a mixed parliamentary body was described as “both ineffective and illegitimate”. It also stressed “the full legitimacy of the European Parliament, as parliamentary body at the Union level for a reinforced and democratic EMU governance.”

The French Assemblée nationale, although experiencing some internal coordination problems between the Foreign Affairs, Finance and European affairs committees (Thomas and Tacea 2015: 186-87), was in favour of quickly establishing the inter-parliamentary conference. The report in favour of ratifying the TSCG (by Socialist MP and Vice Chair of the European affairs committee Christophe Caresche) stated that it is “necessary to implement this Conference as soon as possible, by taking the initiative to make specific proposals that engage in constructive negotiations with our European partners” (Assemblée nationale 2012: 65) and proposed to follow the model for CFSP and CSDP with 6 MPs per national parliament and 16 MEPs that would accompany and control the European Semester.

In the discussions around the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG, German MPs presented their ideas, for example MP Axel Schäfer (SPD, at the time in opposition) who advocated clearly in favour of an inter-parliamentary conference (Schäfer and Schulz 2013), but the Bundestag as a whole did not articulate an institutional position (Deubner 2013: 48).

These examples from France and Germany illustrate that either governing or opposition parties could be more cooperative. Possibly, centre-left parties – with the French socialists initially opposed to the TSCG, now in government and de facto obliged to ratify the treaty in exchange for a symbolic “Pact for Growth and Jobs” (Rozenberg 2015: 7) – saw the provision for creating an inter-parliamentary conference as a vehicle to counterbalance the pro-austerity discourse that was dominant in the EU in 2012/2013. It was in any case the French National Assembly that was able to set the agenda and took the initiative.

Inter-parliamentary cooperation in Economic and Financial Governance has had to face challenges because the precise inter-parliamentary relationship has never been clearly defined. Centralised scrutiny would mean that the European Parliament dominates scrutiny and national parliaments only give very limited input, whereas with joint scrutiny national parliaments and the European Parliament would cooperate more closely (Cooper 2014). The European Parliament and the other EU institutions prefer centralised scrutiny and many of their contributions in the negotiations on the implementation of Article 13 TSCG show that their objective has been to keep the inter-parliamentary conference, as an element of joint scrutiny, weak. The obstacle towards cooperativeness seems to have been the same as in the case of the inter-parliamentary conference on CFSP/CSDP: “overlapping authority claims” (Herranz-Surrallés 2014), but in Economic and Financial Governance major reforms took place within a short period of time between 2011 and 2013, while in CFSP/CSDP preferences could be articulated over a much longer time period in the 2000s.
3.2 Parliaments try to influence the negotiation outcome (and later adapt to it)

In November 2012 and March 2013 the chairwoman of the European affairs committee in the Danish Folketing, Eva Kjer Hansen, organised informal ad-hoc meetings with her counterparts. At their second meeting, the chairpersons of European affairs committees from 15 member states declared their preference for “establishing a small effective conference focused on substantial issues – to be held in the margins of the biannual COSAC-meetings” (Folketing 2013). This shows the institutional self-interest of European affairs committees trying to keep control over EMU issues and avoid empowering their fellow MPs who are most likely to come from budget, finance and economic committees in the case of the Article 13 TSCG conference, but it also shows that the Folketing articulated its preferences and succeeded in building a large coalition with fellow chairpersons of European affairs committees. In the case of the first “yellow card”, issued by national parliaments in 2012, the Danish Parliament also demonstrated its ability to engage beyond in inter-parliamentary coordination (Christensen 2015: 283).

Table 2: Governing/opposition party and key actors in selected parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark Folketing</th>
<th>France Assemblée nationale</th>
<th>Germany Bundestag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Parliament</td>
<td>Unicameral</td>
<td>Bicameral</td>
<td>Bicameral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker of the parliament</td>
<td>Mogens Lykketoft (A, governing party)</td>
<td>Claude Bartolone (PS, governing party)</td>
<td>Norbert Lammert (CDU, governing party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson of European affairs committee</td>
<td>Eva Kjer Hansen (V, opposition party)</td>
<td>Danielle Auroi (EELV, 3/2014 governing party, 3/2014 opposition party)</td>
<td>Gunther Krichbaum (CDU, governing party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Speakers of Parliaments of the six founding Member States\(^{20}\), including Norbert Lammert and Claude Bartolone, endorsed the French concept of the inter-parliamentary conference at a meeting in Luxembourg in January 2013 in a working paper (National Parliaments 2013). For euro area matters, the French would even like to establish (within that conference) a “Joint Conference Committee” composed of 6 MPs per national parliament from countries whose currency is the euro and 16 MEPs for the European Parliament. The Bundestag was present at the meeting in Luxembourg and thus endorsed the working paper. But only at a very late stage, in the run-up to the first meeting of the conference in Vilnius in October 2013, the German position was made clear in a letter: It would be “premature” to seek the adoption of Rules of Procedure at that point, but the delegation welcomed the idea to discuss the aims and functions of the inter-parliamentary conference (Bundestag 2013).

The ad-hoc meetings in Copenhagen and Luxembourg mean that some kind of “multi-speed inter-parliamentary cooperation” (Fromage 2015) has emerged alongside the new inter-parliamentary conference, but the preparatory work of these meetings has been

\(^{20}\) Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
deemed as crucial for advancing the discussion of “fundamental issues concerning the arrangement of the conference” (Griglio and Lupo 2014: 136).

Eva Kjer Hansen, an opposition MP who took the initiative as the chairwoman of the (powerful) Danish European affairs committee, stands for an opposition party that is more cooperative related to the inter-parliamentary conference than a governing party while the activities of French governing Socialists are an example for governing parties being more cooperative related to the inter-parliamentary conference than opposition parties.

Table 3: Article 13 TSCG: Preferences of parliaments and parliamentary actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Key statement(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Chairpersons of European affairs committees of 11 National parliaments</td>
<td>“worrying lack of proposals as to how the role of national parliaments can be strengthened more concretely” (Folketing 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>“the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body […] would be both ineffective and illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view” (European Parliament 2012: 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Speakers of 6 National parliaments</td>
<td>“consider that […] a conference […] must be set up. […] [T]his conference would discuss topical issues of Economic and Monetary Union, including agreements in the framework of the European Semester, in order to reinforce dialogue between the national Parliaments and with the European Parliament” (National Parliaments 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>Chairpersons of European affairs committees of 15 National parliaments</td>
<td>“[w]e […] have no desire to build new inter-parliamentary bodies. Instead, we believe that existing structures and resources should be exploited to their full potential” (Folketing 2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European Parliament pursues the idea of “centralised scrutiny” and sees only itself as able “to stress the points of convergence and the shared interests amongst the parliamentarians and citizens of different Member States, instead of aiming at achieving exclusively national interests” (Fasone 2012: 18). Simon Sutour, chairman of the European affairs committee of the French Senate, stated that the European Parliament “has put pressure on other EU institutions to convince them that parliamentary oversight of the new governance is primarily ensured by itself” (Sénat français 2013). During the negotiations on the institutional design of the inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance – still not completed – the European Parliament “pursues the sometimes contradictory goals of keeping the conference weak, but at the same time maintaining [or securing] a privileged position for itself in the new structure” (Cooper 2014: 2).

21 The letter of 7 December 2012, sent by the Danish Folketing to the President of the European Council, was supported by representatives of the following chambers: French National Assembly, German Bundestag, Luxembourg Parliament, Portuguese Parliament, Irish Oireachtas, Finnish Eduskunta, Parliament of Latvia, Swedish Parliament, Hungarian Parliament, Polish Senate.

22 The letter of 8 April 2013, addressed to the Speaker of the Cypriot parliament as the host of the Speakers’ Conference, was signed by Chairpersons of the Danish Parliament, the Estonia Parliament, the Czech Chamber, the Slovak Parliament, the Romanian Senate, the Slovenian Parliament, the Latvian Parliament, the Belgian Parliament, the UK House of Lords, the Luxembourg Parliament, the Irish Oireachtas, the Hungarian Parliament, the Lithuanian Parliament, the Finnish Eduskunta, the Czech Senate and the Swedish Parliament.
4. Attendance patterns among all 28 national parliaments (or 41 chambers)

This section presents first empirical evidence on the attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference and on general cooperativeness among EU parliaments. It examines attendance patterns despite the absence of formal rules (section 4.1) and tests the hypotheses with a multiple linear regression analysis (4.2).

4.1 First empirical evidence on attendance at the conference

The Speakers’ Conference agreed at its meeting in Nicosia in April 2013 that the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG “could be built upon the formula of the Conference on CFSP and CSDP, replacing the meetings of the Chairpersons of relevant Committees, organised by each Presidency, thus rendering it cost-effective. The composition and size of each delegation rests upon each Parliament” (Conference of Speakers 2013: 5). This does not mean that each national parliament is supposed to send 6 MPs (and 16 MEPs for the European Parliament) like in the case of the inter-parliamentary conference on CFSP and CSDP, but that size and composition of the individual delegations are not pre-determined. Varying size of the delegations is a well-known phenomenon at COSAC (Benz 2011; Kreilinger 2013: 5).

Figure 1: Attendance at each of the four inter-parliamentary conferences23 (by chamber)

As the graphs of Figure 1 show, the records of attendance of the inter-parliamentary conferences between 2013 and 2015 confirm great variation in attendance. The conference meets twice a year. Attendance is higher when the conference takes place in

Brussels (first semester) than when it takes place in the capital of the parliament whose country holds the rotating Council Presidency (second semester). Parliaments chairing a conference (as co-chair with the European Parliament in the first semester) have larger delegations (Lithuania 10/2013, Greece 1/2014, Italy 9/2014, Latvia 2/2015) than if they are not in charge. The Annex to this paper contains data on the relationship between the geographical distances from each national capital to the host cities of the conference (Vilnius, Brussels, Rome) that is not included in the Regression Models.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the relationship between the dependent variable (mean attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference) and individual independent variables. While the Regression Analysis will use the 41 parliamentary chambers as the level of analysis (and have a dummy variable for bicameralism), the following graphs distinguish between unicameral and bicameral national parliaments.

Interestingly, the relationship between the mean attendance and the OPAL Activity Score is stronger for bicameral parliaments than it is for unicameral parliaments (to be tested as H2, see Figure 2). Among the bicameral parliaments, the German Bundestag with high scrutiny activity also has a high level of attendance and the French Assemblée nationale has one of the largest delegations, although it is not very active in EU scrutiny. Denmark’s attendance is considerably lower despite scrutinizing general EU affairs more actively. The regression analysis will show how strong the relationship is for all parliamentary chambers.

*Figure 2: Relationship between (mean) attendance and OPAL Activity Score*

![Graph](image)

The relationship between the vote on the ratification of the TSCG (measured by the share of Yes votes in a parliamentary chamber) and the mean attendance will be tested as H3. Apparently, parliamentary chambers with a tighter vote have indeed larger delegations (see Figure 3). The mean attendance of the Danish Folketing is considerably lower than those of other unicameral parliaments with similar majorities in favour of the TSCG, while the Bundestag can be considered an outlier. For the Assemblée nationale, the relatively high attendance despite a majority of around 85% could be explained by the reluctance of many centre-left MPs towards the spirit of the TSCG (see Section 3.1).
Figure 3: Relationship between (mean) attendance and majority in favour of TSCG

(uni/bicameral)

4.2 Explaining attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference

This section tests the three hypotheses with a multiple linear regression analysis that was run on STATA 13.1.

Model 1 tests two “background” variables, the parliamentary capacity (Model 1a) measured by the total number of MPs and the country’s year of accession to the EU (Model 1b). Both are statistically significant (95%/90%) and, taken together (plus the dummy variable unicameral/bicameral parliament), they account for about 14% of the variation in attendance at the conference. The total number of MPs, as a proxy for the institutional capacity of a chamber, is added to all subsequent models and is always significant, but at different levels. It is the most important variable to predict attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG. The higher the number of MPs of a chamber, the larger its delegation (H1a) is confirmed: The average size of the delegation of a chamber (2.7 MPs) to the inter-parliamentary conference becomes (depending on the regression model) 0.3 to 0.4 members larger for every increase of 100 MPs in the total number of MPs of a chamber.

Model 2 tests two variables on EU scrutiny: the OPAL score on institutional strength (Model 2a) and the OPAL activity score (Model 2b). In line with expectations, institutional strength of a parliament in EU affairs does not explain attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference, but the overall scrutiny activity does: The more actively a chamber scrutinises EU affairs (in plenary and committee meetings, resolutions and via the political dialogue), the higher its average attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference. This means that H2 (the less active a parliament is in scrutinizing EU affairs at the national level, the more cooperative a parliament is related to the inter-parliamentary conference) is not confirmed: When the OPAL activity score increases by

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24 Using chambers as the level of analysis takes into account bicameralism, but is a challenge for the analysis. The average attendance of 40 chambers at the inter-parliamentary conference was regressed on different independent variables. Uni/Bicameralism is used as a dummy variable.

25 Italy was excluded for the 3rd inter-parliamentary conference in Rome, due to its outlier status (N = 30).

26 Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea find that “stronger parliaments do tend to be more active, but [that] this is far from being systematic” (2015b: 287).
Table 4: Regression Models – Explaining attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 1b</th>
<th>Model 1'</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
<th>Model 2b'</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 4'</th>
<th>Model 4''</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total_MPs</td>
<td>0.00332**</td>
<td>0.00282**</td>
<td>0.00236*</td>
<td>0.00495***</td>
<td>0.00495***</td>
<td>0.00495***</td>
<td>0.00158</td>
<td>0.00161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00133)</td>
<td>(0.00133)</td>
<td>(0.00137)</td>
<td>(0.00158)</td>
<td>(0.00158)</td>
<td>(0.00158)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>accessionyear</td>
<td>-0.0285**</td>
<td>-0.0224*</td>
<td>-0.0185</td>
<td>-0.0209</td>
<td>-0.0206</td>
<td>-0.0206</td>
<td>-0.0206</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0133)</td>
<td>(0.0130)</td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPALinststr</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.656**</td>
<td>2.886</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>2.099</td>
<td>2.901</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.747)</td>
<td>(1.747)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.115)</td>
<td>(2.145)</td>
<td>(2.099)</td>
<td>(2.901)</td>
<td>(2.901)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPALactivity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.656**</td>
<td>2.886</td>
<td>0.702</td>
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<td>(2.145)</td>
<td>(2.099)</td>
<td>(2.901)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCG_maj</td>
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<td>-4.375*</td>
<td>-4.402*</td>
<td>0.478</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.733)</td>
<td>(2.725)</td>
<td>(2.335)</td>
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<tr>
<td>uni_bicameral</td>
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<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>6.32e-05</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.521)</td>
<td>(0.556)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.556)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.814***</td>
<td>59.17**</td>
<td>46.24*</td>
<td>1.654*</td>
<td>1.847***</td>
<td>38.06</td>
<td>8.103***</td>
<td>46.76*</td>
<td>46.28*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(26.29)</td>
<td>(25.87)</td>
<td>(0.890)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
<td>(26.76)</td>
<td>(2.308)</td>
<td>(25.99)</td>
<td>(26.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

27 See footnotes to Table 1 (p. 11 of this paper) for the different numbers of observations in the models and independent variables.
0.1, the average size of the delegation of a chamber is about 0.45 MPs higher. Parliaments that are domestically not active do not develop inter-parliamentary activities instead; low cooperativeness follows from low EU scrutiny activity. In Model 2b' and in the complete Model (4') the overall EU scrutiny activity is, however, no longer significant at the 95% level. Model 2b', which combines the total number of MPs, the accession year, the OPAL activity score and the dummy variable unicameral/bicameral parliament, accounts for about 16% of the variation in attendance between chambers.

Model 4' (the complete model) adds the variable on the share of votes in favour of ratifying the TSCG in each chamber: tested alone, in Model 4, it is significant at the 95% level. The lower the parliamentary support for the ratification of the TSCG, measured by the share of Yes votes in each chamber, the higher the average attendance at the conference (H3 confirmed). For a drop of the share of Yes votes by 10 percentage points, the average attendance increases by 0.6 MPs. It seems likely that parliamentary party groups opposed to the TSCG see attendance of their MP(s) as “checks and balances” to the (large) pro-TSCG majority. If put together with the previously tested variables (total number of MPs, accession year, OPAL activity score) it is only significant at the 90% level, but this complete model (Model 4') accounts for 39.4% of the variation in attendance between chambers. When in Model 4'' the OPAL score on the institutional strength of a chamber is added, the adjusted $R^2$ decreases to 36.8%.

Surprisingly, the dummy variable bicameralism does not have an impact. The expectation that unicameral parliaments would send larger delegations than bicameral parliaments was not confirmed. Apparently, attendance at an inter-parliamentary conference is not influenced by the existence of another chamber or at least does not result in statistically significant cross-national variation.

This carefully points to the following preliminary result: The larger the number of its MPs, the more active it is in EU scrutiny, and the smaller its majority in favour of the TSCG, the higher is the average attendance of a parliamentary chamber at the inter-parliamentary conference.

In addition to that, inter-parliamentary behaviour is probably affected by the resources that are available in a national parliament (Hefttler 2015: 7-8; 18-20). The motivation of the individual MP to participate is a factor that might also play an important role: Parliamentarians have to juggle between commitments linked to (national) party, (local) constituency, the domestic political arena and international activities, like inter-parliamentary cooperation. Research has shown that the importance that individual MPs attribute to the EU for the success of their work has a significant effect on their activities for obtaining EU-related information (Wonka and Rittberger 2013: 624).
5. A preliminary classification of parliamentary cooperativeness

Beyond the narrow case of the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG, this paper proposes to classify the behaviour of parliaments and parliamentary actors (parties belonging to government/opposition) towards inter-parliamentary cooperation along three different roles\(^{28}\) as a) inward-looking if they rarely engage beyond the minimum requirements; as b) passively cooperative if they participate in additional activities aimed at discussing inter-parliamentary cooperation; and as c) actively networking if they try to build coalitions in order to bring inter-parliamentary cooperation forward (Kreilinger 2015a: 280–86). For national parliaments and parliamentary actors at the national level, the three different “ideal type” roles in inter-parliamentary cooperation are defined as follows:

- **Inward-looking**, if they rarely engage in inter-parliamentary cooperation beyond the minimum requirements and put their priorities on the domestic arena. MPs belonging to this category have not been “emotionally Europeanised” (Rozenberg 2012). Such parliaments could be seen as “gatekeepers” (Sprungk 2013: 551) that have the objective to prevent, for example, legislation at the national level rather than shape it at the European level or see themselves as a national “public forum” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33). They are not Europeanised in their attitude towards inter-parliamentary cooperation, but can be Europeanised in other activities related to EU affairs.

- **Passively cooperative**, if they participate in additional activities aimed at discussing inter-parliamentary cooperation and dedicate some additional resources to cooperation with their fellow parliaments, but do not try to set the agenda. They articulate their preferences on the precise organisation of inter-parliamentary cooperation only when it is necessary. These parliaments and parliamentary actors are Europeanised as passive “European players” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33), so they could belong to this ideal type for general parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, but need not. Compared with the inward-looking category, they better understand the negotiation situation at the European level.

- **Actively networking**, if they try to build coalitions in order to influence the organisation of inter-parliamentary cooperation and have a network “beyond the own domestic parliamentary arena” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 33), for rational or (in the case of MPs) for emotional reasons, too. Such a parliament organizes extraordinary meetings with like-minded parliaments, it performs a “networking role” (Sprungk 2013: 551) with other parliaments (as well as supranational institutions) in an active way and could be seen as a “European player” (Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015: 34) in the domain of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In comparison with national parliaments and parliamentary actors that are only passively cooperative, they are able to coordinate themselves more easily with their counterparts. Europeanization has, however, affected actively networking parliaments differently: They can be suspicious of giving a greater role to the European Parliament (Winzen et al. 2015) or even be suspicious of only including it into inter-parliamentary cooperation beyond the absolute minimum – and could ultimately even imagine pursuing cooperation among national parliaments outside the EU treaties (Kreilinger 2014).

The inter-parliamentary conference was created, but deadlock has emerged with regard to the adoption of the Rules of Procedure and much of the determination to establish some kind of

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\(^{28}\) These roles do not substitute other classifications of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. The roles are rooted in national parliamentary practices in each Member State and based on divergent visions of what function(s) a legislature should perform. This classification has been inspired by classifications for national parliaments in other domains; see Rozenberg and Hefftler (2015) as well as Sprungk (2013).
powerful inter-parliamentary control has been lost (Kreilinger 2015a: 287). Parliaments or chambers have not taken clear-cut decisions about their behaviour towards the inter-parliamentary conference, listing what they intend to do and their means. But it is possible to observe practices that have emerged after four conferences with respect to attendance (see section 4) and it is also possible to examine preferences and activities (see section 3).

But to what extent did the three national parliaments of section 3 follow one of the roles towards inter-parliamentary cooperation (inward-looking, passively cooperative, actively networking)?

- The Assemblée nationale has tried to strengthen its own position against the government by exploiting the opportunities at the EU level to achieve this. It has had the clear objective to establish a strong inter-parliamentary body in order to give national parliaments a voice against intergovernmental and supranational EU institutions. Its positions are, however, far beyond the status-quo of inter-parliamentary cooperation and it has been difficult to find allies that share these bold objectives. Nevertheless the Assemblée nationale has been an actively networking parliament. Its average attendance at the inter-parliamentary conference is 5.25 MPs (2.75 MPs for the French Senate) is well above the average.

- The German Bundestag has not been interested in establishing an inter-parliamentary conference on economic affairs quickly and in a letter its President Norbert Lammert has insisted on limiting the conference to being an advisory body (Bundestag 2014). As a consequence, the German parliament can be seen, until autumn 2013, as an inward-looking parliament, before turning into a passively cooperative parliament that did not seek to build coalitions. This passive attitude could be explained in light of the significant domestic powers of oversight in EU and EMU affairs which were only obtained as a result of judgments of the Federal Constitutional Court. Interestingly though, attendance rates are very high (7.5 MPs, plus 2 participants for the German Bundesrat) and could reflect that the status-quo fits very well to the preferences of the Bundestag.

- Finally, the Danish Folketing has been an actively networking parliament in order to pursue its objectives, adopting a reluctant position towards an ambitious institutional design of the inter-parliamentary conference. Since the creation of the conference, contributions are rare and attendance is low (average: 1.5 MPs) – a development which could be explained by a huge divergence between the status-quo and the position of the Folketing on the inter-parliamentary conference.

Conclusion

While EU parliaments are “increasingly orientated to one another […] each is becoming an intrinsic part of the others’ operating environment” (Crum and Fossum 2013: 252) the behaviour towards each other in the context of the Inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance shows considerable variation. This paper has put forward the term cooperativeness in order to capture behaviour in the process from the provision of the TSCG for creating an inter-parliamentary conference – discussing “budgetary policies and other issues covered by this treaty”29 – to the maturing inter-parliamentary conference of 2015.

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29 Article 13 TSCG.
This paper analysed specific activities (e.g. agenda-setting, participation in ad-hoc meetings, written contributions) of particular chambers and parliamentary actors in the context of Article 13 TSCG in detail. This served to illustrate varying degrees of cooperativeness: tracing the behaviour and analysing specific activities confirmed the previous findings and allowed to give more precise accounts for different cooperativeness of individual parliamentary actors (e.g. chairpersons of European affairs committees or opposition parties). This paper has also drawn on a new dataset of the attendance records at the four inter-parliamentary conferences that have taken place since 2013. In order to respond to the research question about the factors that explain variation in parliamentary cooperativeness related to the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG, different regression models were tested to explain variation in attendance between parliamentary chambers. The preliminary results indicate that 1) the larger the number of its MPs, 2) the more actively it is scrutinizing EU affairs and 3) the smaller its majority in favour of ratifying the TSCG, the higher is the average attendance of (the chamber of) a national parliament at the inter-parliamentary conference. The paper could thus shed some light into the black box of behaviour in inter-parliamentary relations, assess attendance patterns at the Inter-parliamentary conference on Economic and Financial Governance – and provide explanations for them. The positions of parliaments and parliamentary actors are based on broader attitudes towards inter-parliamentary cooperation that can be classified according to three different roles as inward-looking, passively cooperative or actively networking. The brief analysis of the cooperativeness of individual chambers related to the conference of Article 13 TSCG revealed that Folketing and Assemblée nationale were both actively networking (although following different objectives) while the Bundestag had initially been inward-looking, but turned into a passively cooperative chamber. Preferences and activities differ largely from attendance patterns, but classifying cooperativeness could be useful for understanding inter-parliamentary cooperation even beyond that conference and Economic and Financial Governance.

Diverging preferences among national parliaments and reluctance from the European Parliament have so far prevented a smooth implementation of the provision of Article 13 TSCG. Deadlock, in particular, has emerged with regard to the adoption of the Rules of Procedure. Much of the determination to establish some kind of powerful inter-parliamentary control has been lost. Thus one can say that parliaments have, once again, failed to be a collective actor at the EU level (Kreilinger 2013: 17; 2015a). The first empirical evidence of this paper could help to design better formats of inter-parliamentary cooperation. The Euro crisis and the response to it have put national governments at the centre of EU policy making while parliamentary actors are standing at the sidelines: Quite a few backbenchers must still learn “to fight back” (Raunio and Hix 2000) against the executives.
Annex

Figure 4 Relationship between the geographical distances from each national capital to the host cities of the conference (Vilnius, Brussels, Rome)  

The underlying hypothesis assumes that higher geographical distance between a national capital and the host city of the conference means more tedious travel, makes it less likely for MPs to attend the conference and leads to smaller delegations.

H4: The higher the geographical distance between a national capital and the host city of the conference, the smaller the delegation at the conference.

The geographical distances between all national capitals and the respective host cities of the conference was calculated on the Erasmus+ website: [http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/tools/distance_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/tools/distance_en.htm)
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