

Congrès AFSP Aix 2015

ST 51 : Sociologie politique des interventions internationales: Ce que les « terrains » font aux acteurs de la paix

Dr. Catherine Goetze, Senior Lecturer, School of Global Studies, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, c.goetze@sussex.ac.uk

Learning in Peacebuilding. Mission Impossible?

Abstract:

The failure of many peacebuilding and statebuilding missions in the recent past to maintain peace and lead the transformation of post-conflict countries has led to a number of analyses which put forward administrative, political, economic-financial and other difficulties of these missions. However, very few look inside the missions in order to assess if learning and reform is possible at all. This article proceeds inductively by first observing a particularly strong shared “world peace” culture in these missions, across age, nationality, organizational background or professional career of interviewed staff. Second, the article draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s social field analysis and on Weick’s sensemaking approach to elaborate an interpretative framework that allows assessing if this strong organizational culture is beneficial to learning processes or not. The article concludes that the strong organizational culture in peacebuilding missions is not beneficial to organizational learning as it results from organizational ambiguity and personal uncertainty of staff who are consequently engaged in identificatory sensemaking processes. In this case, learning from the margins (in this case the field missions) is not possible.

Keywords: peacebuilding; international organisation; organisational learning; reform; international staff

Introduction

Peacebuilding¹ has had only partly success in the past two decades. Even if in most cases fighting stopped durably (and in some prominent cases like Congo not even this goal was achieved), it often failed to create the conditions for durable social and political change. Mandates of peacebuilding missions have therefore been constantly renewed, establishing in some cases like Bosnia or Kosovo a sort of new trusteeship (Knaus and Martin 2003 ; Chandler 2006; Bliesemann de Guevara 2010; Chandler 2010). Various analyses have identified a number of factors for this mixed spreadsheet of peacebuilding, from the not only semantical contradiction of externally imposed democratization and peacebuilding to the bureaucratic coordination problems (Chandler 1999; Bain 2003; Chandler 2006; Paris 2009). One major focus

¹ To be precise, the article talks of peacebuilding and statebuilding in the form of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. For simplicity only the term „peacebuilding“ will be used even though both terms

has been on the lack of local ownership and the one-size-fits-all approach of peacebuilding based on the “liberal peace” paradigm promoting democracy and liberal market economy (Chesterman 2004; Paris 2004; Pouligny 2005; Sending 2009). Many of these accounts of peacebuilding commonly conclude with an appeal to improve policies and to develop mechanisms of organizational learning which allow integrating “lessons learnt” on the ground and which fructify the deep local knowledge that peacebuilders, NGOs and locals bring to the missions (Campbell 2008; Howard 2008; Autesserre 2010). These appeals are based on the assumption that the main reason for mission failure is the weak rooting of peacebuilding within the local populations. Yet, calls for organizational learning have left the question open who exactly should instigate learning processes in the organization and what the conditions for their success are. This article fills this gap by looking at the relationship between organizational culture and the capacity to learn from past experiences and failures in peacebuilding missions. Such insights are helpful in order to improve peacebuilding in particular but also for the understanding of international organizations and their working in general. The focus has been in the past on the principal-agent relationship of international organization with very little analysis of their internal workings. Hence, the question if and how international organizations can learn, arguably the basis for any reform, adaptation and change, has not yet found many answers (Biermann and Bauer 2005; Siebenhüner 2008; Zito 2010).

Paris (2004), Autesserre (2010) and Sending (2009) argue that mind frames and perceptions of conflict situation and peacebuilding held by the peacebuilders are a central key to explaining their resistance to change. Yet, if they are right, this constitutes one of the major paradoxes of peacebuilding as the peacebuilding culture emphasizes liberal values of tolerance, democracy, pluralism, and cosmopolitanism up to the point that the basic paradigm for peacebuilding is called the “liberal peace” (Paris 2004). These mindsets should generate, by their very nature, an open, reflexive and adaptive attitude among peacebuilders and facilitate learning processes. After all, this the deep hope associated with cosmopolitanism, that it will make the living together of many cultures and nations easier as it allows empathy, understanding and adaptation, hence global democracy (Nussbaum 1994; Held 2005; Fine 2007).

Another argument commonly found to explain the failure of change postulates that the organizational aspects of peacebuilding, namely high ambiguity of peacebuilding missions, strong bureaucratic politics, failing coordination and in-fights within the peacebuilding organizations prohibit change. Yet, it often remains open how organizational dysfunction impacts on processes of learning and organizational change. Most studies neglect the micro-level of the organization and so they only partially consider structural features of organizations and how these situate learning processes. They also do not identify who exactly within the organization should learn and how the learning process develops. If learning is to be understood as the integration of new knowledge that may optimise existing structures, processes and activities so that the organizational goals can be better achieved, then it needs to be clarified who advances this knowledge, who promotes it and who formalizes it into organizational practices.

Research on organizational learning in sociology and business studies, notably such on situated learning and on sensemaking in organizations, have considered the importance of the organizational culture and structure for organizational learning and change. An organizational learning approach assumes, similar to principal-agent

approaches, that international organizations are more than simply executors of state interests, and that they develop their own agendas and shape their activities and mandates. Yet, learning processes are shaped by the formal and informal structures of an organization, and most notably by the distribution of power and influence within it. From this point of view, narratives about the organization's aims are factors of power structures and allow the identification, integration or marginalisation, if not exclusion, of organizations members into the various layers of authority and power within it.

The article will heuristically explore this relationship between the organizational features of peacebuilding and how they shape the conditions of possibility for learning processes. The organizational culture – the “liberal peace” culture – will be considered in this context from an organizational angle, i.e. by asking for its role within the organization. From this point of view, it can notably be interpreted as a sensemaking narrative, hence as the result of individual efforts of sensemaking within an extremely complex, ambiguous even contradictory and conflicting organizational environment. If the liberal peace paradigm is considered a sensemaking narrative it has a crucial role as identification anchor and is not likely to change. To put the hypothesis in a nutshell: because the organizational environment of peacebuilders is extremely ambiguous and, consequently, puts the individual in a situation of professional and cultural precariousness, there is a strong need to make sense of their own work and identity as peacebuilders by reaffirming the shared values of liberal human rights and democracy.

In the case of international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE, which are at the centre of this study, the differing, competing and sometimes conflicting state interests, the deep internal fragmentation between departments which are additionally cross-cut by national differences in work and communication cultures, the heavy material constraints of the organizations, the precariousness of many peacebuilder's careers (fixed-term contracts, high mobility etc.), all contribute to a large amount of internal tensions which individuals can bridge by appealing to a “higher goal”, an intrinsically “good” set of values that give their individual actions and their professional, and sometimes also private identity a specific sense and purpose as it has been observed in other professional contexts (Wilson and Musick 2003; Grant and Sonnentag 2010). This liberal peace culture is underscored by commonly shared historical, political, literary references to non-violence, liberalism and humanism that have been transmitted through similar socio-cultural and educational backgrounds of peacebuilding staff. It functions as a cognitive and mental ordering principle that sets internal/external boundaries as well as the limits up to which the organization can be challenged from the outside. The internal/external boundary is hence distinctively drawn between “us” who share those values and the “other” who, as part of the story being told, is said to do not. This has the important implication for the question of possible changes to peacebuilding that the liberal peace paradigm is not unquestionable simply because its inherent values lead to ill-conceived policies on the ground, as some have argued, but because it fulfils an essential stabilizing function inside the organization as it confirms the identities of peacebuilding staff and without which peacebuilding missions would be entirely impossible.

This analysis is derived from interviews done with UNMIK and OSCE staff on their role, worldviews and daily work routines which will be presented in the first section of this article. Even though it was expected that interviewees will adhere to democratic values and display a multi-cultural openness towards the world, the very

high degree to which the interviewed shared values and cultural references was striking. The liberal peace paradigm is not only overwhelmingly present; most interviewed staff also narrate this paradigm in exactly the same terms (see for a similar observation Autesserre 2009: 253). The second section develops the theoretical framework of situated learning in organizations and with a special focus on sensemaking. This framework will be used to interpret the empirical findings of the first section in order to explain the relationship between organizational culture and structure for learning processes.

Peacebuilders: strong values, weak professional positions

In the project “Who governs?” 54 former and current staff at the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), at the OSCE offices in Pristina and 14 staff at the United Nations Headquarters in New York were interviewed with semi-structured questionnaires (in the following these will be referred to as “peacebuilders”). The interviews consisted of three parts: the first section asked for basic sociological data (family background, education); the second section for world views by giving a number of statements to which respondents could agree or not and through open-ended questions; the third section finally asked for their daily working routines and their appreciation of their work. The original aim of the interviews was explorative and heuristic, namely to identify the particular characteristics of those people who work for peacebuilding missions. In the context of this article, the relationships between section 2 and 3 are particularly relevant as they show for one that a very strong commonly shared culture exists and that peacebuilders work under rather precarious working conditions.

Political Values and Worldviews

Questions in this section aimed at exploring the degree to which peacebuilders displayed liberal thinking; they asked for cultural references like their favourite readings, their “heroes” in the past and present, and their historical references. It was one of the project’s basic assumptions that the United Nations and OSCE recruitment process would pre-select staff so that a general adherence to “world peace” values should be the norm. These more “personal” questions sought therefore for differentiations how these beliefs in world peace, human rights, democracy etc. are expressed in concrete historical or literary narratives. The expectation was that already the different nationalities of the respondents would lead them to name a broad variety of personalities.

Yet, this is not what happened. On the contrary, these two questions confirmed the cultural homogeneity. Mahatma Gandhi was clearly on the top of the list of the list, together with Martin Luther King and “ordinary people”. The majority of heroes mentioned were male, white personalities from industrialised OECD countries with the notable and almost single exceptions of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela (only three respondents named other

personalities from their national histories in Haiti and Kenya). No other colonial liberation struggle personality (Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ho Chi Minh to name a few) was named, and historical or current political leaders of former colonies were only very marginally mentioned.

The common characteristic of these four personalities respondents put forward mentioned was their non-violent struggle. Non-violence was also the most commonly mentioned political values which respondents added to the open list of their core political values. Hence, “freedom fighters” were a priori excluded from the list of heroes but only in the case of Third World personalities. A number of historical European personalities who had not been shy using violence were cited such as Winston Churchill, Graf Bismarck, Catherine the Great, or Charles de Gaulle.

A similar strong consensus was apparent when asked for the most memorable historical event. The large majority of respondents indicated the fall of the Berlin Wall and named the Shoah the most horrible historical event. Both characterized the political history, culture and ethics of the Western, industrialised world. Remarkable events in the non-OECD world were only marginally named.

The questions in section 2 (political values and world views) were designed with three distinct political profiles in mind: conservative, liberal-meritocratic, and egalitarian (or in continental European political traditions: social-democrat). The results showed a strikingly homogenous culture with a strong prevalence of cosmopolitan-liberal values. A principal factor analysis of answers given to the question which values the respondents consider as important in politics revealed in fact four profiles, none of which “left” (Table 1 and 2 at the end of the paper).

Table 1: Profiles of political values

Table 2: Agreement with four profiles

Of these four, the cosmopolitan profile found most support (Table 2). Even though the conservative profile also found strong support it was also strongly contested. The social-democratic values, however, did not come together in a clearly distinct profile and generally speaking values on the liberal to conservative continuum scored much better than values more to the “left” of the political spectrum. Notably those values that could be associated with radical politics, such as “conflict” or a contestation of state sovereignty, found very little agreement.

The liberal and reformist approach to politics also showed when asked about measures interviewees would take to change the world if they could. Some of the proposed measures were meant as contestation of the liberal consensus, for instance the proposition to restrict private property or to open borders to refugees (hence, undermining the dominance of the state sovereignty norm), yet, the large majority of interviewees chose values which were characteristic of a liberal, reformist and interventionist approach to world politics particularly with respect to human rights (“promote human rights” and “democracy” for instance).

Overall, two findings can be inferred from the section asking for values of peacebuilders. First, the large majority of staff share the same values of liberal human rights and a reformist yet interventionist approach to world politics which clusters around Western and mainly white history events and figures. The story told by the respondents was that of the United Nations being born as non-violent (and often

explicitly referred to as non-partisan) defenders of human rights on the ashes of the Second World War and the Shoah. World peace was paramount with liberal values such as human rights, democracy, but also merit and individual achievement.

The second finding was that this common culture was remarkably strong; indeed, it is much stronger than expected. Yet, there was only little evidence that peacebuilders, whether on the ground or in headquarters, were cut off from the “reality on the ground”. On the contrary, respondents showed a high sensitivity for the complexities of the conflicts they were working in. Statements which linked civil wars to “greed” and criminality as narrated in several organizational writings were mostly refuted by the respondents; the interviewees also, when filling in the survey, commented negatively on these, pointing out that the reasons for civil wars and peacebuilding missions were much more complex and locally specific than what was captured in such general statements.

Further questions about the working routines revealed additionally that most staff on the ground had regular, daily contact with locals and used local sources of information as much as they consulted other sources of information (Table 3). Again, when commenting on the questions many pointed out the sheer necessity to rely on local information, hence showing awareness of the need to be close to local events. Claims that peacebuilders were not in close contact with local circumstances and far removed from local concerns could not be confirmed.

Table 3: Which information source do you use for your daily work?

Overall, the interviews revealed that peacebuilders were deeply convinced of the mission and shared strongly the liberal peace culture; they were strongly committed to their work with high work ethics and strong interest in local circumstances. The paradox that peacebuilding is often perceived as imperialist and arrogant even though peacebuilders see and present themselves as cosmopolitans becomes fully visible. If this organizational culture does not translate into practices of learning and change it might, so the hypothesis, that it fulfils a stabilizing function in an insecure working environment. To consider this hypothesis it is necessary to look at the working conditions of the interviewed staff.

Working Conditions

This section is based on open-ended questions in the questionnaire but even more on the narrative „chat“ around the questionnaire. For reasons of confidentiality (given that these statements concern their concrete job, interviewees would be easy to identify) and because of the diversity of narratives this data was only partly quantitatively exploited. The survey as well as open-ended questions and the “chat” during the interviews revealed, on the other hand, a picture of relatively high uncertainty about individual jobs, notably in the field. In the headquarters the majority of interviewees were on permanent contracts. However, almost all of them had experienced several years of precarious employment with the OSCE, the UN or similar organizations before achieving their current position. Only a small minority of interviewees had obtained their position through the official national competition

recruitment process or were seconded diplomats; of these most were on technical jobs (language translator / teacher, accountant, technician). More commonly, the current position had been achieved through internships, followed by fixed-term contracts for specific missions.

In the field, the majority of interviewees were or had been holding fixed-term contracts with the OSCE, UNMIK or other organizations with durations from a couple of months to two or three years. About one third of the interviewees were at the beginning of their professional career (first five years) and of these most had changed their contracts up to 5 times. About one half of the interviewees in the field had been switching between the OSCE, the EU and the UN, and had accumulated four or five contracts with durations from six months to two years.

The difficulty of obtaining a permanent contract was among the most often mentioned grievance when interviewees were asked if they liked their job. The diplomatic quota system which reserves a specific number of places to every nation in the OSCE and the UN was particularly seen as an impediment to future career perspectives as it was seen as undermining promotion on the basis of merit. Additionally, some interviewees said that they felt to be subject of gender and racial discrimination within the organizations. Generally speaking, satisfaction with career perspectives was higher among male staff in middle management positions, and dissatisfaction with career prospects was higher among beginners, and among female staff who often mentioned that they felt some degree gender discrimination.

In the field, long working hours, difficult and contradictory feedback from superiors and the headquarters, and the feeling of being ignored, as well as the personal stress associated with expatriate life were most often among the complaints. Yet, although seen as problematic, expatriate life seemed to be more easily accepted than the downsides of the job. The stress of expatriate life was often pointed out to be problematic for others, for instance when solitude and family life were discussed in general terms, but not for oneself. When talking about their own experience, doubts about the mission and the own role within it were common. Field staff feared that their work would not be properly acknowledged by superiors and headquarters. Material constraints, diplomatic hacking orders and communication difficulties were furthermore bemoaned as causes for the missions' difficulties.

When asked for their motivation for working under such difficult circumstances, the organizational culture of promoting peace, democracy and human rights came again to the forefront. "Doing good" in general, and being part of a larger community of people who are committed to promoting these values in the world was often mentioned as important motivation. Respondents compared their job with other occupations in civil service, business or finance, emphasizing the moral grounds of their own work. The survey question of what a good life means to the interviewees was often answered in this sense, as being satisfied with little material goods but "A life that is useful for society, is positively contributing to the general good of humanity in the world, and that has harmony, peace and happiness" (Interview 38). Half of the respondents affirmed that they had intentionally sought a career in the UN for that reason.

To sum up, the interviewees showed a very strongly shared culture across age, nationality, profession, organizational membership or time spent in the organization.

This common culture was concentrated in cosmopolitan and liberal values, and widely shared common historical references such as the Shoah, the fall of the Berlin wall and non-violent politics as symbolised by Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King. This common culture was stronger than could be expected simply by considering the recruitment process of these organizations. Alternative references to this dominant culture, for instance other “heroes” or historical events of particular national histories, were only marginally discussed.

However, many respondents also saw their own organization critically in terms of the sense of the mission, and in terms of its organizational structure and their own place in it. Job uncertainty and the difficult working environment were frequently mentioned as reasons for high levels of dissatisfaction with career prospects and working conditions. Job uncertainty is also reflected in the objective data with an average contract duration of 18 months and frequent changes of contracts. These downsides were compounded by a high enthusiasm for “making this world a better place” as one respondent put it (Interview 22); a task most saw as essential for their own well-being.

Organizational learning

What do these findings mean for the question if and how peacebuilding missions can learn? Is the strong common culture beneficial for organizational learning or is it “blinding” the peacebuilders against external challenges? What is the link between organizational culture and the individual working conditions? Do the latter put peacebuilders in the position to learn or to participate in an organization-wide learning process?

The question is if international organizations can react to external challenges, reform and correct themselves or if, as Barnett and Finnemore have echoed pessimist voices, they have to remain “inefficient” and ultimately “self-defeating” in their bureaucratic obsession with themselves (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 700). In organizational analysis, sociology and in most business studies the insight that organizations are ineffective, that they show a particular resilience to change and, nevertheless, have a great capacity to survive is since long a crucial research topic (Meyer and Zucker 1989). Wolfgang Seibel developed in the 1980s and 1990s, on the basis of four German cases, the argument that some of these organizations do not survive despite but because of their failures (Seibel 1992). “Successfully failing” organizations have important stabilising functions for the people who work in them (micro-level) and for the political and economic systems in which they are embedded (macro-level). This stabilisation function allows them to survive despite repeated and blatant failures.

Seibel argues that the third sector – not market, not state – provides a beneficial environment for failing organizations. In many cases there are sensible motivations for stakeholders to have little interest in having the non-profit institution perform well, and there are also a number of incentives for principals to voluntarily ignore this inefficiency. The principal’s interest in organizational dysfunction arises from the intractability of the problems which, if pushed out of the third-sector arena into politics or economics, would lead to major legitimacy and efficiency problems for the

principals. If these organizations were subject to market criteria their failure would lead to economic losses and eventually bankruptcy; if these organizations were political institutions in systems of effective administrative and electoral control, they would have to be legally and politically accountable for their failure.

In the context of peacebuilding Seibel argued that principals – states – have an interest in seeing peacebuilding missions succeed only partially as this allows to sustain the ambiguity prevailing over the questions whether the sovereignty norm of international relations should be subdued to the human-rights led intervention norm that has been promoted since the 1990s and since the UN has adopted the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. Far from being unanimously supported by all UN member states, interventionism remains hotly disputed and discussions over new cases of intervention often serve as arena for more general debates about international law and international power distribution. Lipson refers to this ambiguity as resulting from “chapter six and a half” meaning “Security Council resolutions that define mandates are themselves political documents, and mandated goals are often crafted in vague terms in order to embody political compromises” (Lipson 2010: 253).

Yet, for supporters of the Responsibility to Protect, successful peacebuilding would equally result in uneasy questions concerning the nature of sovereignty, the autonomy of government, the sufficient and necessary conditions of intervention, the levels of commitment, the accountability towards local, domestic and global publics etc (see for a number of arguments Bickerton, Cunliffe et al. 2007). Most of these questions contain complex, if not intractable problems for democratic states, notably with respect to the question of how to legitimately decide over the human and financial resources to “save strangers” and how far the commitment towards the “other” should go beyond national borders (Miller 2008; Armstrong 2009). At the same time, exposing the inefficiency of UN peacebuilding would certainly throw the UN into a major legitimacy crisis.

Hence, if Seibel’s argument is followed, all stakeholders (which in Lipson’s account include many more levels and institutions than those listed here) in peacebuilding have an interest in seeing the missions fail, at least partially, and they have also an interest in not remedying this failure (Lipson 2007; Seibel 2008: 514-525; Lipson 2010: 257). Both interests together culminate in what Seibel calls “successful failure”: an organization that underperforms because strong performance and high efficiency would cause intractable problems for the stakeholders, and which at the same time survives as its sheer existence is a necessary condition of the stakeholders’ legitimacy otherwise (Seibel 1996).

A successfully failing organization has to breed a peculiar organizational culture in order to overcome the contradictions and ambiguities resulting from being, at the same time, required to underperform and to perform well in this underperformance. This is all the more the case if the activity in which the organization is engaged is demanding high levels of financial, professional and maybe even physical commitment as in the case of peacebuilding. The questions that arises from successful failure is what the individual organization members have to do to be, on the one hand, working hard, and on the other hand, not achieving the goals set. How do individuals within the organization give meaning to their daily working practices and their organization under such conditions? What kind of organizational culture legitimizes

their actions and makes their activities seem sensible despite the apparent failure of the organization as a whole?

Seibel has argued that third-sector organizations, notably volunteer associations, offer niches of anti-modernization in which individuals are freed from pressures of rational efficiency which are usually applied to workplace and modern lives (Seibel 1992). However, in the context of peacebuilding missions this argument is less convincing. First, employment at the United Nations and other high-profile agencies is usually preceded by a severe selection process which can be assumed to sort out “dilettants”; second, the inter-governmental organizations are not exactly the same type of third-sector organization as those investigated by Seibel: even though neither a market organization nor an electorally accountable institution, they are not comparable to a neighbourhood soccer club. They are not built on a network of volunteers and, if not in all but in some categories, remuneration is at least equivalent to the same job family in private businesses and often much better than in national civil services. Far from being a niche for dilettants the structural outlook of employment in these organizations rather conforms to the image of elite public services. Instead of concluding that the organizational failure is the result of “functional dilettantism”, it seems rather appropriate to consider the hypothesis that the peacebuilding organizational culture provides means to make sense of the daily workings of the peacebuilding missions.

In order to understand the relationship between individuals and organizational culture it is useful to look at the literature on sensemaking in organizations which has been advanced by Weick, Boyce and others (Weick 1995; Weick 2001). Brown et al. have summarized sensemaking as “a kind of authoring on the part of individuals and groups who construct meaning from initially puzzling and sometimes troubling data” (Brown, Stacey et al. 2008: 1038). Weick argues that sensemaking is an ongoing process, nevertheless it gains particular salience as object of analysis in situations of organizational ambiguity and personal uncertainty about one’s role within the organization (Weick 1995). The sensemaking approach can offer explanations as to why individual peacebuilders continue their work despite the experience of failure, inefficiency, lack of result and sometimes even open hostility against their work and it can also offer an interpretive framework for the kind of sense that is made. The interest lies as well in dissecting the narrative by which individuals create shared understanding of their work as in the process itself by which they do so.

One important aspect of the sensemaking literature is to put forward the role sensemaking plays for the individual’s identity within an organization and its activity. Far from being simply a functional adaptation, sensemaking is deeply identity shaping and contingent on the individual’s personality, and cannot easily be altered through rational deliberation and discourse. Taking an interactionist approach to identity building (see Mead and Morris 1967) Weick points out that sensemaking allows creating, rectifying or justifying a *positive* self-appreciation (Weick 1995: 23, 107). The workplace and professional activity are important elements of an individual’s identity. The process itself is understood as continuous, yet only partly conscious and certainly not voluntarily steerable process by which the self-image and the other-image are harmonized in order to construct a consistent I-me relationship. Hence, individuals often tend to perceive their environment as to fit their ideas about themselves rather than adapt their identity to the environment so that world views, mind frames and perceptions of individuals are not likely to change easily through

argumentation or evidence. Yet, identity construction is a process of interaction and communication between the individual and society. Consequently, the process of sensemaking is contingent on the social surroundings of the individual. Collectively held beliefs, majority held views (group think) and authority play therefore a decisive role in shaping beliefs and in guiding sensemaking.

Similarly, individuals will seek past experiences for meaning in order to interpret current events. Meaning can be only conferred with reference to existing beliefs and mind frames. This process of interpretation is an individual as well as collective one, and in the setting of organizations, also an organizational process: “One of the three elements in organizational sensemaking is usually some ‘past moment’ (e.g. socialization, tradition, or precedent), (...) The combination of a past moment + connection + present moment of experience creates a meaningful definition of the present situation” (Weick 1995: 111).

Sensemaking is therefore not equivalent but compatible to framing or rational understanding (see similar Fiss and Hirsch 2005: 30). Frames, in the definition of Snow et al. (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000) allow people to “locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences in their lives” (Weick 1995: 109) but that is yet only one part of the sensemaking process. Sensemaking furthermore designates the process through which individuals will, through these frames (or some call them ideologies, ideas etc.), situate themselves within their social contexts, notably their organizational but also their private social and cultural environment. Whereas frames and beliefs give answers to the question “what am I to think about this?”, sensemaking answers the question “who am I to think like this?” (see similar Fiss and Hirsch 2005: 31).

Huzzard points out that power is equally an important factor of sensemaking (Huzzard 2004: 350). Power over discourse and narratives within the organization can even be seen as the single most influential factor of ordering sensemaking processes as it is through power structures, dominant discourses and patterns of authority that various discourses and narratives are appreciated or discarded. Processes of sensemaking are embedded in daily routines, practices and the recounting of stories within the daily work. Sometimes, unexpected events can prompt crisis situations in which narratives need to be adapted. Yet, in both cases power distribution and patterns of domination within the organization play an important role in *giving* sense (as counterpart to *making* sense) to the organizations’ activities, i.e., ordering and prioritising the discourses and narratives (Huzzard 2004: 351).

This dialectic of making and giving sense characterizes situations of situated learning, a wider concept for learning in organizations than the pure cognitive approach which conceives of learning and change as rational processes of knowledge acquisition. In theories of situated learning, the importance of “participating in the sociocultural practices of a community” (Huzzard 2004: 351) is emphasized and learning is conceived of as theories of situated learning see themselves social theories. Learning is not simply a cognitive process of accumulating information but a social process in which individuals interactively and collectively construct meaning and understanding, hence the importance of practice and of the community within which learning takes place (Lave and Wenger 1991: chapter 2). Situated learning are those processes which

instigate and maintain small-scale processes of change within organizations (Handley, Clark et al. 2007).

Theories of situated learning recognize the importance of power in organizations as they consider learning to be a relational process of dialogue and collective constitution of understanding. In this process, some actors have more authority than others to give sense, to offer interpretations and they have greater leverage in the “negotiation of meaning” that characterizes situated learning in organizations (Huzzard 2004: 351-352). Patterns of domination are partly reflected in organizational structures such as hierarchies, yet they are also related to the individual’s position in these.

As Blackler and McDonald point out organizational structures are neither uni-dimensional as simplistic models of hierarchies would imply nor can they be dissociated from the organizations and members’ activities and practices. Learning in organizations and the associated process of shaping narratives (understood as sequenced stories of events) and discourses (understood as public speech acts about reasons for behaviour and events) about the sense of the organizations’ activities are embedded in the socialisation and routinization processes of the organizations’ activities (Blackler and McDonald 2000: 838), in their practices. Consequently, it is not only important where people stand in organizations but also what they do and how they do it, if one is to assess their discursive power of shaping what the members of an organization think about the sense of their activity. Finally, the dialectic of sensemaking and sensegiving is better understood as relational process between actors which is characterised by what Snow et al. called frame alignment and by dominant discourses (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986). Yet, this process is not forcibly linear and is marked by negotiation over interpretation and, occasionally, subaltern resistance to dominance.

Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology offers a suitable vocabulary to conceptualize the relationship between individual’s position within a group or organization, the issue at stake, discourses and power. In his field approach, Bourdieu defines social fields as determined by the social activity around which actors are in relation with each other. He formulates a principled power relation between actors in the core of a social field, the orthodox, and other actors who are relegated to the margins of the field because they do not dispose over sufficient resources to contest the core, the heterodox, or who are even excluded from the field, the layperson (Bourdieu 1989; Bourdieu 2000). It is the actor’s capacity to command sufficient alternative resources to successfully contest core positions that will make her actively contest the orthodox discourse. Yet, in institutionalised organizations resources at the disposition of actors are streamlined through selection, socialisation and disciplinary processes which are centred and justified through the institutional activity (Bourdieu 1984). Bourdieu calls these resources „capital“ and distinguishes financial-economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. Capital in the Bourdieusan sense only receives its material and ideational value through the social field in which it is deployed (Wacquant and Bourdieu 1992: 101) and does not have an inherent value. It is, indeed, the ascription of values to capital that is at stake in symbolic struggles in social fields.

The “orthodoxy” of the field is best expressed in the similarity of the capital types and the corresponding homogeneity of mental, cognitive and ideological dispositions of the core group of actors. These are those who are the best equipped to defend the

institutional logic of exactly that selection, socialisation and disciplinary process that characterizes this specific institution (Bourdieu 1979). In highly formalised institutions with highly ritualised selection, socialisation and disciplinary processes, resistance to dominant discourses will be therefore very low and in any case incremental, often tacit and cautiously anchored in alternative practices which are apt to produce alternative resources in the same field, e.g. very specific professional knowledge or a competing social networks. Adherence and subordination to the real and symbolic power of the institution's orthodoxy are *conditione sine qua non* of entering that specific social field (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1996) and selection processes are usually explicit, through formal qualifications for instance, and implicit through aesthetic, behavioural, moral etc. judgments concerning the personality of the new entrant (Bourdieu 1984). Consequently, resistance (heterodoxy) to the core will most often remain marginal and always linked to the individual's capacity to mobilise alternative resources of socialisation.

The observation that social positions and hierarchical positions within organizations determine "the parameters of debate within organizations" (Blackler and McDonald 2000: 833) has to be therefore attenuated as any such debate is also *limited* by the parameters of the organization. Major discontent will result in either individual exit or splitting of the organization, to which Bourdieu refers as schism in continuity of the orthodox-heterodox image, or, alignment through assimilation to the dominant symbolic power.

Crucial moments for such debates and struggles within organization and fields are those marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. These are the moments which, according to Weick, prompt individuals to have to make sense of their role and activity in an organization, and these are also the moments in which, according to Bourdieu, alternative discourses, based on other power resources (knowledge, financial, social, reputational etc.) than those of the dominant core, are most likely to enter into contest with dominant discourses, yet without necessarily succeeding in replacing the dominant core. In terms of organizational innovation, reform and learning, such moments of ambiguity and uncertainty offer opportunities for change as well as massive realignment.

Following the Bourdieusan model, it can be hypothesised that successful change is only possible if the possibility of contestation through alternatives, which is turn expressed through the objective existence of alternative resources (financial, power, symbolic) and through a generalizable acceptance of alternative discourses, is strong enough to dislocate the orthodox core. It is therefore essential to consider the capacity of actors within organizations to build strength and to contest the orthodox discourse and practice, and to do so by considering their objective means, i.e., financial, power, administrative, legal etc. resources, and their capacity to author alternative frames and discourses.

In the absence of collective organization and imposition of alternatives from the margins, the result of such moments of crisis is more likely to be a realignment of the margins on the discourse and practice of the core, notably if alternatives at the margins are disparate and individualized (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008). Data, information and knowledge per se are therefore unlikely to induce an organizational change or learning process, and it is rather likely that, just in the sense of Weick's

analysis, any evidence that contradicts dominant discourses will be reinterpreted before the dominant discourse will change.

Bourdieu's field approach allows closing an important gap in Weick's sensemaking framework. Weick juxtaposes different types of discourses and narratives without providing an analysis to why certain speech acts make more sense than others and why other discourses, narratives, stories etc. are discarded at the expense of dominant ones. The relational power analysis inherent in Bourdieu's field approach allows capturing the dialectic between an authoring and authoritative core of an organization and its relationship to its margins. The resulting patterns of domination determine the opportunities for changing dispositions, discourses, attitudes etc. or not.

An interpretative framework for peacebuilding's organizational culture

In the context of UN peacebuilding missions, the above constitutes an interpretative framework to understand the very "thick" UN culture analysed in the first part and how this leads the organization to be responsive or not to external challenges. The sensemaking perspective shifts the focus away from the technical issue areas of peacebuilding – in this case: electoral monitoring, security provision, constitutional law etc- – to the social space that is constituted by the practices, activities, narratives, discourses and frames of the people that make up the organization – the UN mission in this case.

The individual provides a useful focal point of analysis as her sensemaking process reflects developments at the macro-level of the organization, in this case the principal-agent conflict over the role and mandate of UN peacebuilding missions, and the meso-level of organizational processes of collective sensegiving, framing and culture. According to Weick, in a sensemaking process the individual reacts to two external conditions, namely organizational ambiguity and professional uncertainty. In the case of peacebuilding, ambiguity clearly arises from the "successful failure" that is expected of UN missions whereas on the ground professional uncertainty is sustained by often precarious work conditions on the one hand, and complex, often contradictory work flows between the headquarters and the field offices, and between the UN and other institutions, on the other hand.

Both conditions can be observed in UN mission independently from an analysis of values and cultural ideas of the individual members of staff, and both conditions have been frequently documented in the past (Lipson 2007; Lipson 2010). Ambiguity is inscribed in the UN mission in Kosovo since its outset when the foundational Security Council resolution 1244 already reflected the tension between the protection norm and the sovereignty norm. The uni-lateral declaration of independence in 2007 and the International Court of Justice decision that this independence is legitimate has yet not changed very much this ambiguity as international administration continues through the European Union mission and powerful states like Russia or China continue to oppose Kosovo independence. From the outset, this situation forced the international mission to factually reign over the country by upholding the image of "only" administering transition and political institutionalization in the region which continues to be torn between Albanians and Serbs. As in this case, ambiguity is reinforced in the

context of most peacebuilding missions as the practical work is often contradictory to declared aims and principals, for instance if peacebuilders have to work with local personalities which would fit perfectly well the description of war criminals but are treated as politically valuable counterparts.

Personal uncertainty seems to be intimately linked to the ambiguous mandate of the mission as time frames are kept flexible and open, hence, employment contracts are often fixed-term and job descriptions variable and changing. Additionally, the huge variety of agencies and organizations working on the ground lead to major coordination problems, notably between military and civil actors but also between hierarchically distinct civil agencies, e.g. UN vs. OSCE, so that contradictions, communication problems, doubling of tasks or their complete omission etc. are typical for peacebuilding missions. Furthermore, expatriate employment in these circumstances inherently contains elements of uncertainty as cultural and communicative differences emerge between the “field staff” and the headquarters. This has been observed in other contexts of humanitarian and development work, too. In a study on humanitarian aid worker turnover in 1999, the following observation was made: „The most stressful events in humanitarian work have to do with the organizational culture, management style or operational objectives of an NGO or agency, rather than external security risks or poor environmental factors. Aid workers, basically have a pretty shrewd idea of what they are getting into when they enter this career, and dirty clothes, gun shots at night and lack of electricity do not surprise them. Inter and intra-agency politics, inconsistent management styles, lack of team work and unclear or conflicting organizational objectives, however combine to create a background of chronic stress and pressure that over time wears people down and can lead to burnout or even physical collapse.” (cited in Loquercio, Hammersley et al. 2006: 5)².

It is therefore possible to understand the “thick” organizational culture as expressed in the highly homogenous values and ideas of the interviewees as an indicator of a strong sensemaking process going on among the individual members of staff. The discourse concentrates on a limited number of values and ideas, commonly those, which can be considered intrinsically “good” and uncontested and which resonate with the dominant discourse of the UN. The dominant discourse also tends to be emphasising its general innocuousness by clustering around notions of non-violence and referring to indisputably evil historical events such as the Shoah or consensually “good” historical moments as the fall of the Berlin wall as ethical cornerstones. The narrative told here is that of the United Nations born on the ashes of Auschwitz and World War II, and committed to preserving world peace.

The liberal emphasis of individual liberty, democracy, law, human rights etc. furthermore suits the individual professional trajectories of most interviewed staff who have been trained and formed in law, political studies or other social science fields in universities in OECD countries, and who, practically, live the lives of cosmopolitans, i.e. of multi-cultural, mobile and post-national individuals (Nowicka 2005). The liberal peace discourse is therefore compatible with their individual biographies as well as the dominant symbolic capital in the UN.

² See also Bronner, U. (1999). Helfer in humanitären Projekten: Strategien und Probleme der Personalplanung. *WZB Discussion Papers*. Berlin, Social Science Research Centre Berlin.

In terms of seeing the peacebuilding mission as social field, interviewees find themselves at the margins of this field in several respects. They are geographically and administratively far away from the headquarters where decisions are taken, whether in the UN system, OSCE or European Union. They are administratively subordinated to the headquarters. They are professionally on the margins as they often hold fixed-term contracts and are employed for specific, time-limited tasks. And conceptually as well as politically they are not centrally involved in the formulation and decision-making on peacebuilding missions. Given their career options, many staff aim at moving closer into the centre of the peacebuilding field, notably to higher hierarchical positions within field missions and, in the mid- and long-run, to the headquarters. Adherence to the dominant discourse is therefore essential to their professional future.

Alternative resources, which would allow successful alternative discourses to the UN's and other organizations central discourses are scarce. Local knowledge, which some observers are advocating is certainly a specific resource that allows staff in the field to hold their positions there but it is only of limited value for developing alternative discourses as it is, by definition, particular knowledge. It is by its nature specific and locally bound and therefore difficult to transform into collectively shared frames. Assumed that there is a framing contest, of the kind Snow et al. (Snow, Rochford et al. 1986) describe, within the peacebuilding field, local knowledge has a strategically much more difficult position against more general "doing good" frames. That is why universal frames which appeal to commonly acknowledged and uncontested symbolic references of the liberal peace paradigm, such as the icon Mahatma Gandhi or the emblematic historical event of the Shoah, are much more stronger than local frames which require specific knowledge and lack universal recognition (Sending 2009: 5-14).

Second, the marginal position makes the communication of already specialised discourses much more difficult than the diffusion of universalised discourses from the centre. The hierarchical structure of the organizational field gives a communication advantage to actors in the centre, specifically actors close to states or emanating from states in the peacebuilding field. Because of their position core actors have more authority to "author" narratives of the organization and they have also greater gatekeeping power in deciding if for instance reports from the field are passed on or filed without action. In sum, local knowledge is not an appropriate resource to promote situated learning as it offers few frame alignment opportunities and as it lacks the social power to influence the core of the organizational field.

Other alternative discourses, for instance a critical legal understanding of human rights as defended by critical legal scholars such as Costas Douzinas (Douzinas 2000) or Hardt and Negri's Empire analysis (Hardt and Negri 2000) are difficult to mobilise in the peacebuilding context as are Gramscian or neo-Marxist perspectives on humanitarianism and peacebuilding (see also Duffield 2001; Harvey 2005; Duffield 2007). Those views do exist in academia but are entirely absent from the framing contest in the UN and similar organizations. These scholastic debates first of all do not correspond to the practices prevalent in peacebuilding field missions, which imply day-to-day administrative and management tasks rather than conceptual developments and deliberation processes. Interviewed staff indicated that they spent large amounts of their daily work in meetings and writing as well as filing reports. Hence, the complexities and fallacies of such abstract discussions over the meaning and nature of

human rights, the problems associated with democratisation as peacebuilding strategy, or the philosophy of freedom are by *practice* excluded from the work of peacebuilders. Some interviewed staff have drawn the conclusion from this that they can only pursue these alternatives by leaving the organization and entering into those types of organizations which enable such alternative discourses of critical legal studies such as universities, media or think tanks.

Conclusion

If the opportunities for situated learning are considered, then the above analysis of peacebuilding as organizational field makes clear that the prospects of learning from the field missions are slim. What is even more the above analysis shows that it is exactly the thick organizational culture of the United Nations, clustered around the values of human rights, democracy, and freedom that forms such a strong identity discourse that it is unlikely that contradictory information will be processed in order to induce organizational change; contrary to what could be expected from the content of this organizational culture, namely cosmopolitan worldviews, it does not open the field staff to new, diverse, contradictory and pluralist exchange with the outside world, but, given the circumstances of organizational ambiguity and individual uncertainty prevailing in peacebuilding missions, it serves as identificatory anchor and reference. Hence, it could even be argued that the stronger a peacebuilding mission is contested, the more the professional and personal identity of staff members are put to a test, the more staff on the margins of the organization will confirm the core values of the UN and stay immune against criticism. This means that the internal ambiguity reigning over peacebuilding will not be addressed from within but sustained. Learning and consequently changes of organizational behaviour cannot be induced from the margins, i.e., from the field missions and the experience of UN staff working in the field, at least not as long as those margins are organizationally structured as margins with high individual uncertainty over the personal career within the organization. Staff on the margins will seek to integrate the core or, if their discontents with the organization is great, rather quit the organization; they are from their positions not able to initiate and lead to terms a process of learning and change within the organization. In order to promote situated learning within the organization, individual uncertainty would need to be reduced and organizational ambiguity addressed. The present heuristic study indicates that learning and change either have to happen from the core or that, in order to make the periphery contribute to learning and change, the position of field staff has to be much more solidified. In situations where field staff is literally borderline between the local social field, in this case that of the peacebuilding environment, and the organizational field, and yet their professional future plays in the organizational field, the organizational narrative and discourse (in this case the liberal peace paradigm) will be rallying the staff around the core rather than leading it to contestation and alternative discourses. Hence, as long as organizational ambiguity persists and personal uncertainty is perpetuated staff at the margins of the organization will not be able to contribute to learning and change within the organization.

REFERENCES

- Armstrong, C. (2009). "Global Egalitarianism." Philosophy Compass 4(1): 155-171.
- Autesserre, S. (2009). "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention." International Organization 63(02): 249-280.
- Autesserre, S. (2010). The trouble with the Congo : local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Bain, W. (2003). Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Barnett, M., H. Kim, et al. (2007). "Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?" Global Governance 13: 35-58.
- Barnett, M. N. and M. Finnemore (1999). "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." International Organization 53(04): 699-732.
- Benford, R. D. and D. A. Snow (2000). "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." Annual Review of Sociology 26(ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: 2000 / Copyright © 2000 Annual Reviews): 611-639.
- Bickerton, C. J., P. Cunliffe, et al. (2007). Politics without sovereignty : a critique of contemporary international relations. Oxon ; New York, University College London Press.
- Biermann, F. and S. Bauer (2005). Managers of Global Governance. Assessing and Explaining the Influence of International Bureaucracies. Global Governance Working Paper. T. G. G. Project. Amsterdam, Berlin, Oldenburg, Potsdam, The Global Governance Project. 15.
- Blackler, F. and S. McDonald (2000). "Power, Mastery And Organizational Learning." Journal of Management Studies 37(6): 833-852.
- Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (2010). "Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding and the Analysis of State-Formation." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4(2): 111 - 128.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). "Sur le pouvoir symbolique." Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations 32(3): 405-411.
- Bourdieu, P. (1979). La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement. Paris Les éditions de minuit.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). Homo academicus. Paris, Editions de minuit.
- Bourdieu, P. (1989). "Social Space and Symbolic Power." Sociological Theory 7(1): 14-25.
- Bourdieu, P. (1996). Sur la télévision, suivi de L'emprise du journalisme. Paris, Liber.
- Bourdieu, P. (2000). Propos sur le champ politique. Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon.
- Bronner, U. (1999). Helfer in humanitären Projekten: Strategien und Probleme der Personalplanung. WZB Discussion Papers. Berlin, Social Science Research Centre Berlin.
- Brown, A. D., P. Stacey, et al. (2008). "Making sense of sensemaking narratives." Human Relations 61(8): 1035-1062.
- Campbell, S. (2008). "When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success." Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 4(2): 20-32.
- Chandler, D. (1999). Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton. London, Pluto Press.

- Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-Building. London, Pluto Press.
- Chandler, D. (2010). International Statebuilding. Oxon, Routledge.
- Chesterman, S. (2004). You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Douzinas, C. (2000). The End of Human Rights. Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century. Oxford, Hart Publishing.
- Duffield, M. (2001). Global Governance and the New Wars. London, Zed Books.
- Duffield, M. (2007). Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. London, Polity.
- Emirbayer, M. and V. Johnson (2008). "Bourdieu and organizational analysis." Theory and Society **37**(1): 1-44.
- Fine, R. (2007). Cosmopolitanism. New York, New York.
- Fiss, P. C. and P. M. Hirsch (2005). "The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging Concept." American Sociological Review **70**(1): 29-52.
- Goetze, C. and D. Guzina (2010). Statebuilding and Nationbuilding. The International Studies Encyclopedia. R. A. Denmark. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons. **10**: 6593-6614.
- Grant, A. M. and S. Sonnentag (2010). "Doing good buffers against feeling bad: Prosocial impact compensates for negative task and self-evaluations." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes **111**(1): 13-22.
- Handley, K., T. Clark, et al. (2007). "Researching Situated Learning." Management Learning **38**(2): 173-191.
- Hardt, M. and A. Negri (2000). Empire. Cambridge, Ma., Harvard U.P.
- Harvey, D. (2005). The New Imperialism. London, Oxford U.P.
- Held, D. (2005). Principles of cosmopolitan order. The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. G. Brock and H. Brighouse. Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press: 10-27.
- Howard, L. M. (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Huzzard, T. (2004). "Communities of domination? Reconceptualising organizational learning and power." Journal of Workplace Learning **16**(6): 350-361.
- Knaus, G. and F. Martin (2003). "Travails of the European Raj." Journal of Democracy **14**(3): 60-74.
- Lave, J. and E. Wenger (1991). Situated learning: legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.
- Lipson, M. (2007). "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?" European Journal of International Relations **13**(1): 5-34.
- Lipson, M. (2010). "Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping." The Review of International Organizations **5**(3): 249-284.
- Loquercio, D., M. Hammersley, et al. (2006). Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network Paper. H. P. Group. London, ODI. **55**.
- Mead, G. H. and C. W. Morris (1967). Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press.
- Meyer, M. W. and L. G. Zucker (1989). Permanently failing organizations. Newbury Park, Calif., Sage Publications.

- Miller, D. (2008). "National responsibility and global justice." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy **11**(4): 383-399.
- Nowicka, M. (2005). Transnational Professionals and their Cosmopolitan Universes. Frankfurt a.M., Campus.
- Nussbaum, M. (1994). "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism." The Boston Review.
- Paris, R. (2004). At War's End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge, Cambridge U.P.
- Paris, R. (2009). Understanding the 'coordination problem' in postwar statebuilding. The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations. R. Paris and T. D. Sisk. London / New York, Routledge: 53-77.
- Pouligny, B. (2005). "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies." Security Dialogue **36**(4): 495-510.
- Seibel, W. (1992). Funktionaler Dilettantismus, erfolgreich scheiternde Organisationen im 'Dritten Sektor' zwischen Markt und Staat. Baden-Baden, Nomos.
- Seibel, W. (1996). "Successful Failure: An Alternative View on Organizational Coping." American Behavioral Scientist **39**(8): 1011-1024.
- Seibel, W. (2008). Moderne Protektorate als Ersatzstaat: UN-Friedensoperationen und Dilemmata internationaler übergangsverwaltungen. Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt. G. F. Schuppert and M. Zürn, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 499-530.
- Sending, O. J. (2009). Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be Sensitive to Context. Security in Practice. Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Peace. **1**.
- Siebenhüner, B. (2008). "Learning in International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance." Global Environmental Politics **8**(4): 92-116.
- Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford, Jr., et al. (1986). "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." American Sociological Review **51**(4): 464-481.
- Wacquant, L. and P. Bourdieu (1992). Réponses. Paris, Editions du Seuil.
- Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications.
- Weick, K. E. (2001). Making sense of the organization. Oxford, UK, Malden, MA, Blackwell Publishers.
- Wilson, J. and M. Musick (2003). "DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD." Sociological Quarterly **44**(3): 433-450.
- Zito, A. R., Ed. (2010). Learning and Governance in the EU Policy Making Process. Oxon, Routledge.

Table1

Conservative	Cosmopolitan	Liberal1	Liberal2
Family	Tolerance	Competitiveness	Merit
Loyalty	Equality	Individuality	Fairness
State sovereignty	Solidarity		

Table2

Agreement with profiles		
Valid	N	Percent
Cosmopolitanism (Tolerance, Equality, Solidarity)	70	45,8%
Liberal 2 (Merit, Fairness)	69	45,1%
Conservative (Family, Loyalty, State Sovereignty)	63	41,2%
Liberal 1 (Competitiveness, Individuality)	62	40,5%
All frequencies: dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.		

Table3

Consultation of local newspapers as sources of information					
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	always	18	34,0	34,6	34,6
	most often	12	22,6	23,1	57,7
	sometimes	10	18,9	19,2	76,9
	rarely	7	13,2	13,5	90,4
	never	5	9,4	9,6	100,0
	Total	52	98,1	100,0	
Missing	System	1	1,9		
Total	53	100,0			
Information through personal contacts to local populations					
Valid	always	7	13,2	13,5	13,5
	most often	16	30,2	30,8	44,2
	sometimes	13	24,5	25,0	69,2
	rarely	9	17,0	17,3	86,5
	never	7	13,2	13,5	100,0
	Total	52	98,1	100,0	
Missing	System	1	1,9		
Total	53	100,0			