

**Emotional Responses to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks: Between Ideology and Political
Judgment**

Pavlos Vasilopoulos

CEVIPOF, SciencesPo Paris

George E. Marcus

Williams College

Martial Foucault

CEVIPOF, SciencesPo Paris

Introduction

Past experience has shown that terrorist events are frequently followed by a wave of anti-terrorist policies, often to the expense of civil liberties. France was no exception. The twin attacks at the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and a Kosher grocery store in Paris spurred a series of measures, including the prosecution of citizens who propagate terrorism on the internet and the authorization of intelligence services to gather mass online, phone and traveler data. At the same time, police and military presence in the streets of major cities was significantly increased. These restrictive measures were endorsed both by the French parliament. The major opposition party UMP was in full support of the government plans. In fact several of its members asked for the introduction of even tougher measures, while far right leader Marine Le Pen went a step further and suggested a referendum for the reintroduction of the death penalty in France. According to a poll conducted in April 2015, 63 per cent of the French public agreed with the restriction of civil liberties in order to fight terrorism¹.

As past research across the Atlantic has shown, uncovering the psychological mechanisms that dictate public opinion reactions to terrorist attacks is key in understanding support for the restriction of civil liberties. Existing studies investigating the effect of threatening events on public opinion have time and again confirmed the well-known hypothesis that threat increases levels of authoritarianism (Sales 1973; Doty et al. 1991; McCann 1997; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Merolla and Zeichmeister, 2009; Huddy et al. 2005; Hetherinton and Suhay, 2011). Despite receiving extensive empirical confirmation, individual-level variation in authoritarian receptivity in the light of threat as well as the psychological mechanism responsible behind it are not fully understood as current literature comes up with contradictory findings.

¹ CSA poll for Atlantico

This paper advances the literature on the impact of terrorist events on public opinion. Using the case of the *Charlie Hebdo* and the Kosher supermarket terrorist attacks in January 2015, we examine the effect of the emotional reactions to terrorism on authoritarianism in France. The paper aims at exploring the impact of terrorist threat on authoritarianism by drawing on theories of affect. Our results show that emotional reactions are key in understanding the authoritarian switch. In particular in the following pages we illustrate that anxiety and anger have differential effects in individual-level switches toward authoritarianism along with levels of political ideology. The rest of the paper goes as follows: In the next section we discuss the relationship between threat and authoritarianism and build our hypotheses on the differential impact of anxiety and anger. Next, we draw on a panel study that was conducted before and after the attacks to test our theoretical claims. Finally we reach a number of conclusions regarding the impact of threat on authoritarianism.

Threat and Authoritarianism

Past research points to the conclusion that authoritarianism is based both on deep and stable psychological convictions, related to personality (Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1988), but also on contemporary influences, related to the tenor of the times. Regarding the former, more than six decades of research on the authoritarian personality have brought up the importance of political socialization, early childhood experiences (e.g. Altemeyer, 1988) and even genetic influences (e.g. McCourt et al. 1999; Hatemi and McDermott, 2012) on the cultivation of a personality with a potential for prejudice, punitive behavior and anti-democratic receptivity. Dispositional authoritarianism concerns a minority of a population and is considered to remain relatively stable throughout the life cycle (Altemeyer 1981).

Authoritarianism however may also be an ephemeral attribute depending on the social context. The pivotal aggregate-level studies by Sales (1973) and Doty et al. (1991) illustrated

a significant increase in mass publics' authoritarian tendencies during periods of high economic and security threat, using a wide range of behavioral indices. Interestingly, when a period of high-threat is followed by a low-threat period, indices return back to normal levels (Doty et al. 1991). Other aggregate-level surveys have found that economic and political threat enhances authoritarian submission, tapped by support for active, forceful and strong political leaders (McCann 1997). Subsequent individual-level research has further illustrated that feelings of threat are associated with authoritarian attributes such as decreased political intolerance (Marcus et al. 1995) and increased ethnocentrism (Feldman and Stenner 1997). The dramatic events of 9/11 in the US further systematized the effect of threat on political behavior and offered some insights into period-triggered authoritarianism. The sense of threat was found to be linked with increased support for anti-terrorist policies (Huddy et al. 2005), censorship and the war on terror (Hetherington and Suhay 2011) in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist events. In parallel, political psychology studies integrated findings coming from experimental psychology and neuroscience, making efforts to separate between distinct affective reactions stemming from the same threatening stimuli (Huddy et al. 2005).

Yet, although the relation between threat and situational authoritarianism has been confirmed time and again, the questions of individual-level variation in authoritarian switching as well as the psychological mechanism behind this tendency are far less clear. Regarding individual-level change, current literature offers two contrasting conclusions. On the one hand a number of researchers have argued that what drives the aggregate level increase in authoritarianism during periods of high threat is the activation of dispositional authoritarians (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009). Using a heterogeneous set of indices both for threat and authoritarianism, Feldman and colleagues found that aggregate level-increase in support for punitive and aggressive policies, as well as the decrease in tolerance toward minorities, in the light of threat is due to the

expression of authoritarian preferences among those who already have an authoritarian disposition (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997). Hence, the argument goes, in the light of a threatening stimulus authoritarian citizens manifest their disposition, ending up supporting authoritarian policies. In other words, Feldman and Stenner find a *positive* interaction between authoritarian dispositions and threat, which increases support for authoritarian policies.

Recently however these findings were challenged. Contrary to Feldman, Hetherington and Suhay argue that due to their already held aggressive dispositions, those who score high on authoritarianism are unlikely to sway much in the light of threat (2011). Rather, they suggest, levels of authoritarianism increase due to an authoritarian switch by non-authoritarians. They test this hypothesis by assessing the impact of 9/11 on support for anti-terrorist policies in the US. By using panel data before and after the terrorist attack they illustrate that the aggregate-level increase in support for media censorship, military action and wiretapping is not due to an authoritarian switch among respondents without an authoritarian disposition. Hence, in statistical terms Hetherington and Suhay find a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism on the support for authoritarian policies.

A second controversy concerns the emotional mechanism by which threat is translated to authoritarianism. In early research, the concept of threat was not extensively elaborated but was simply referring to periods of economic stagnation or of increased chance of war (Doty et al. 1991). In their paper on their impact of 9/11 in public support for the war on terror, Huddy et al. separated between perceptions of national threat (measured as perceived likelihood of a terrorist attack), personal threat (the perceived likelihood of the respondent being a victim of a terrorist attack) and anxiety (2005). Their results showed that anxiety and threat had a differential standalone effect. Threat had a positive effect in the approval of George Bush's policies on the issue, support for military action and a more active American foreign policy.

On the other hand, feelings of anxiety had a negative impact on the same dependent variables. A number of cognitive psychology and neuroscience studies have illustrated that anxiety stimulates attention, interest and conscious effort in order to deal with a threatening stimulus (Le Doux, 1996). The theory of affective intelligence provides a framework for understanding why anxiety produced by threat might trigger authoritarian attitudes. The theory states that that when citizens find themselves in novel or threatening circumstances they tend to break habitual political attachments, such as ideological or partisan identifications, and actively attend to contemporary judgments about their environment, such as policy issues or the personal characteristics of politicians (Marcus et al. 2000, 2011). Time and again the premises of the theory of affective intelligence have received broad empirical confirmation. The fact that anxiety increases the need to search for information as well as to yield to messages and adopt behaviors that contravene one's predispositions or prior habits has been well documented in a large number of studies (Brader 2005, 2006; Valentino et al., 2008; Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson, 2010; Marcus et al., 2014), including in the case of France (Vasilopoulos, 2014).

However, based on personality dispositions and the appraisal of a situation, a threatening stimulus may also trigger anger (Kennedy 1992; Di Giuseppe and Tafrate 2010), which leads a different set of decision-making processes compared to anxiety. Anger has been found to create a sense of confidence, optimism and control of the situation that mobilizes the individual into risk-seeking actions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Huddy, Feldman and Cassese, 2007). Furthermore, in contrast with anxiety which enhances information-seeking processes, anger is associated with a tendency of coping with the threatening stimulus based on previously learned routines (Mackuen et al. 2010; Wagner, 2014). Specifically, anger has been found to reduce cognitive effort, prohibiting learning processes and enhancing the employment of fast and frugal heuristics (Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer 1994,

Mackuen et al. 2010). However, despite its demonstrated potential for explaining political behavior (e.g. Mackuen et al, 2010; Valentino et al. 2011; Wagner, 2014), up until now anger has not been added to the puzzle of the authoritarian switch in the light of threat.

Based on the above we hypothesize that the Charlie Hebdo attacks yielded different patterns of behavior among the French public according to affective reactions to the event and prior ideological convictions. In particular, based on the theory of affective intelligence we anticipate that anxiety (but not anger) triggered by the January attacks will be associated with breaking from past ideological convictions and reliance on contemporary assessments in convergence with the public mood. Hence, we anticipate that anxiety will sway left-wing individuals to support authoritarian policies. Further, we hypothesize that anger (but not anxiety) will enhance decision-making based on past ideological convictions, thus strengthening authoritarian tendencies among citizens who already have an authoritarian disposition and who are at the right of the political spectrum. We test these hypotheses using a panel study on a representative sample conducted before and after the January 7 attacks. Unlike experimental approaches, our study design allows us to gauge the causal effect of a terrorist event on a representative sample.

Methodology and Data

Data come from the CEVIPOF barometer of political confidence (*Barometre Confiance en Politique*). The survey was conducted in a representative sample consisting of 1524 respondents in two waves, one prior to the attack and one three weeks after it. Data were collected by the use of Computer Assisted Web Interview (CAWI). We use two dependent variables, which are both measured in four point scales, with higher values indicating an increase in authoritarianism. The first item asks respondents whether the death penalty should

be restored in France. This item taps authoritarian aggression and punitiveness, one of the components of the authoritarian syndrome (Adorno et al. 1950) and has been used to tap authoritarianism both in France (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992, Mayer, 2014) and elsewhere (Inglehart, 2003). The second item asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement that “*France should have a strong leader who does not have to worry about elections or the parliament*”. This question taps authoritarian submission, that is the “high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives” (Altemeyer 1981, p. 148), one of the key components of the authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; McCann 1997). The specific item has extensively been used as indicator of authoritarianism in past surveys both in France and elsewhere (Inglehart, 2003; Andersen and Evans, 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; McCann 1997). Emotional reactions over the attack have been tapped through an item asking “*Can you tell me how you feel when you think of the attacks that occurred in January?*” Respondents were provided with a list of emotions and had to choose whether they felt the emotion in question or not.

Dispositional authoritarianism is tapped by respondents’ self placement on the left-right scale. Our choice is not based on data availability alone. The bulk of studies measuring authoritarian disposition employ the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, originally developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1998). The scale taps three facets of authoritarianism: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. However, it has been argued that some of the items used in the scale are tapping support for authoritarian policies, rather than measuring a broad authoritarian disposition (Feldman, 2013). This constitutes a problem when this scale is employed in order to assess the interactive effect of threat on authoritarianism. As Feldman puts it: “The interaction model predicts that those with authoritarian predispositions will respond to threats to social cohesion by exhibiting (greater)

authoritarian attitudes. If a relationship is found between some type of threat and the RWA scale it could indicate a direct effect of threat on authoritarianism or it could be a result of the interaction of threat and authoritarian predispositions that generates the three attitudinal components of observed authoritarianism. Research using RWA measures cannot distinguish between these two models” (2013, p. 58). Further, a number of studies have illustrated that at least in the French case left-right self placement is a very strong predictor of libertarian-authoritarian values (Lagrange and Perrineau, 1989; Mayer et al. 2014), as well as other expressions of authoritarianism such as ethnocentrism, anti-semitism and reduced tolerance toward outgroups (Mayer et al. 2014). Hence, employing left-right placement as a proxy allows us to separate between a broad authoritarian disposition and the political attitudes that stem from it.

According to our theoretical expectations both dependent variables will be affected by the same independent variables. Hence, instead of estimating separate OLS regression models, we employ Seemingly Unrelated Regression, which is the appropriate method for these instances (Zellner, 1962). In order to assess the impact of the emotional reactions to the January events we construct two models. Model 1 measures attitude change regarding both dependent variables along demographic variables, ideology and emotional reactions. Model 2 measures attitude change using an interaction term between each emotion and the left-right scale. The expectation here is that the effect of fear and anger on authoritarianism will be conditional on prior ideological convictions. In order to assess attitude change before and after the attack both of the models use the following equation:

$$\text{Attitude}_{t2} = \text{demographics} + \text{emotional reactions}_{t2} + \text{ideological convictions}_{t1} + \text{ideological convictions}_{t1} * \text{emotional reactions}_{t2} + \text{Attitude}_{t1}$$

Results

{FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE}

Figure 1 presents attitudes toward the death penalty and authoritarian leadership before and after the attacks. Results suggest a moderate yet significant increase in the expected direction both in positive attitudes toward death penalty ($t = -4.24$, $\text{sig.} = .000$) and preference for a strong leader who will not have to bother with elections and the parliament ($t = -1.91$, $\text{sig.} = 0.056$). These findings are in alignment with past research indicating an increase in authoritarian attitudes during a high threat period (Sales, 1973; Doty et al., 1991) and specifically in the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). Figure 2 presents the emotional reactions by ideological self placement. As we move from the left to the right of the ideological spectrum, fear increases among the electorate. On the other hand, anger appears to be reduced among respondents who place themselves on the right and on the far left, yet does not fluctuate much for other ideological identities.

{FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE}

Moving on to examine the impact of emotional reactions to the attack on attitude change, Table 1 assesses the standalone impact of emotional reactions on post-attack attitudes. Results suggest that emotions played a significant role in the French public's authoritarian switch after the January events. Our findings show that all else equal people who felt fear after the attack are more likely to have switched their opinion in an authoritarian direction. The effect is consistent on both dependent variables. The respective coefficients for anger on the other hand, even though are positive, fall short of reaching statistical

significance. Further, results show that ideology is significantly associated with post-attack authoritarian attitude change, with right wing respondents being more likely to have switched in an authoritarian direction following of the attack. Figure 2 illustrates this finding by showing the marginal effect of ideology on attitude change for both dependent variables, indicating a strong and significant impact of prior ideological convictions on authoritarian switch.

{TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE}

Up to now we have shown that when emotions are entered independently in the equation, it is anxiety and not anger that drives the relationship between threat and authoritarianism. We now move on to test our main theoretical claim, that is, the conditional impact of emotions on attitudinal change. Based on the premises of the theory of Affective Intelligence we anticipate that anxious voters coming from the left of the political spectrum will be more likely to abandon their ideological convictions and change opinion to the direction of the momentary mood. Further, we anticipate that angry voters will exhibit the opposite behavior, that is strengthen their prior convictions. Consequently, we anticipate that right wing citizens will turn even more authoritarian when angry, but this will not be the case for left wing respondents.

{TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE}

Results of the interaction model are presented in Table 2. All in all, findings confirm our theoretical expectations. The two interactions between ideology and fear are negative and statistically significant for both dependent variables, while the respective interaction terms between ideology and anger are positive and significant. This highlights that the effect of threat on authoritarianism is conditional on both ideological predispositions and the emotional

reactions to the threatening stimuli. Non authoritarian citizens who felt fear after the attack were more likely to change in the direction of the momentary pressure and endorse authoritarian policies. This finding is in alignment with Hetherington and Suhay's hypothesis on the effect of threat on authoritarianism (2011). On the other hand, anger activates authoritarianism in citizens who already hold authoritarian dispositions in line with Feldman's claims. Figures 4 and 5 graphically illustrate the marginal effects of anger and anxiety on ideology with 95% confidence intervals.

Conclusion

Terrorist events have a robust influence on policy making. Following a terrorist act, governments tend to address the threat by adopting measures to enhance national security by electronic surveillance, increased policing and the introduction of draconian laws. While these measures often hurt civil liberties, there is little counter reaction on the side of citizens and the civil society. This is explained by the fact that time and again public opinion polls suggest an authoritarian switch after a threatening event that makes citizens more prone to accept policies they formerly rejected. Our data suggest that this was too the case in France. After the twin attacks in Paris, people became significantly more willing to support capital punishment and a forceful leader who would bypass the parliament and the public mandate.

The finding that threat increases levels of authoritarianism has been well established in political research. The questions of individual differences and the psychological mechanism behind this switch, however still remain open as current literature offers two contrasting views. One line of research argues that threat increases authoritarianism among those with an authoritarian disposition (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003). Another argues that it is the non-authoritarians who switch in the light of threat (Hetherington and Suhay 2011). By employing the theory of Affective Intelligence we argued that both trends occur

simultaneously. Indeed our results showed that both sides of the controversy are partly right and that the factor that drives the impact of authoritarian dispositions on support for authoritarian policies is emotional reactions. Anxiety lead respondents with a non-authoritarian ideological disposition to switch to authoritarianism following the attacks, yet produced no authoritarian change among right wing respondents. On the other hand, anger did not turn left wing voters more authoritarian, yet strengthened authoritarian tendencies among right wing respondents. These findings are in alignment with and provide additional empirical confirmation for the long literature arguing that anxiety causes the abandonment of habitual routines and increases the reliance on contemporary assessments based on the context and momentary mood, while anger increases reliance on extant ideological and partisan convictions, making respondents less likely to change political attitudes.

Our findings improve current understanding on the impact of terrorist events in public opinion in several ways. First, this is to our knowledge the first study assessing the emotional impact of a terrorist event outside the United States. It is impressive that despite the ample cultural and political system differences between the two countries there exists in France a link between threat and authoritarianism and it is shaped by the same psychological mechanisms as in the US. Second, it highlights the role of a less studied emotion compared to anxiety, anger, as a mediating variable acting between the ideological disposition and its manifestation to support for authoritarian policies. The bulk of studies examining the link between threat and authoritarianism focus only on the role of anxiety, which is only one emotional reaction to a terrorist event. Our results showed that on top of anxiety, the Charlie Hebdo attacks triggered anger for the majority of the French public and that anger was translated into support for the death penalty and anti-democratic receptivity for people with a right wing ideological anchor.

Nonetheless, some important questions remain. It is unclear why does the same event triggers anxiety for some people yet anger for others. Future research can systematize the study of emotional reactions to threat providing a framework on how personality traits, threat appraisals and characteristics of the enemy jointly produce different affective inclinations. Further, past literature has shown that when periods of high threat are followed from low threat periods, levels of authoritarianism return to their prior levels. This however has not been shown using individual-level research. An interesting question for example concerns the duration of both the increased authoritarian tendencies and the strong affective reactions to a terrorist event along political ideology. Finally, future research could further assess the role the media play in the cultivation of both threat and support for authoritarian policies. Emotional appeals in the mass media have been found to be particularly effective both in political behavior (Brader 2005) and in regard to authoritarianism (Gadarian 2010) yet more research will shed additional light on a potential interaction of media exposure, emotional responses and authoritarian reactions in the light of terrorist events.

Authoritarianism, both as a personality trait and a personality state, is one of the most extensively studied areas in political research. More than half a century into the study on support toward aggressive and potentially anti-democratic policies has provided a clear understanding on individual differences on dispositional authoritarianism. The use of diverse sets of theoretical tools from political science, sociology, media studies and neuroscience can further contribute to a full understanding of the elevation of authoritarian tendencies in the light of threatening events.

Table 1: The Standalone Impact of Emotional Reactions of the January Attacks on Authoritarianism (SUR)

	Death Penalty	Strong Leader
Left-Right Scale	0.0804*** (0.0188)	0.109*** (0.0237)
Fear	0.152*** (0.0366)	0.131*** (0.0485)
Anger	0.0669 (0.0483)	0.0905 (0.0643)
Attitude T1	0.782*** (0.0177)	0.412*** (0.0238)
Constant	0.373* (0.227)	1.168*** (0.305)
Observations		1,418
R-squared	0.689	0.260

Entries are OLS regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both models control for the impact of age, gender, education and profession.

Table 2: The Conditional Impact of Emotional Reactions of the January Attacks on Authoritarianism (SUR)

	Death Penalty	Strong Leader
Left-Right Scale	0.0256 (0.0442)	0.0830 (0.0586)
Fear	0.364*** (0.116)	0.629*** (0.154)
<i>Fear * Left-Right Scale</i>	-0.0697** (0.0358)	-0.163*** (0.0477)
Anger	-0.246* (0.148)	-0.287 (0.196)
<i>Anger * Left-Right Scale</i>	0.108** (0.0482)	0.130** (0.0640)
Attitude T1	0.780*** (0.0177)	0.406*** (0.0239)
Constant	0.545** (0.253)	1.284*** (0.338)
Observations		1,418
R-squared	0.69	0.27

Entries are OLS regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Both models control for the impact of age, gender, education and profession.

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality.
- Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Manitoba: University of Manitoba press.
- Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Altemeyer, B. (1998). The “other” authoritarian. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, 30, 47-92.
- Andersen, R., & Evans, J. A. (2003). Values, cleavages and party choice in France, 1988–1995. *French Politics*, 1(1), 83-114.
- Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 388-405.
- Brader, T. (2006). *Campaigning for hearts and minds: How emotional appeals in political ads work*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
- DiGiuseppe, R., & Tafrate, R. C. (2010). *Understanding anger disorders*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Doty, R. M., Peterson, B. E., & Winter, D. G. (1991). Threat and authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 61(4), 629.
- Feldman, S. (2003). Enforcing social conformity: A theory of authoritarianism. *Political psychology*, 24(1), 41-74.
- Feldman, S. (2013). Comments on: Authoritarianism in social context: The role of threat. *International Journal of Psychology*, 48(1), 55-59.
- Feldman, S., and K. Stenner. (1997). "Perceived threat and authoritarianism." *Political Psychology* 18 (4), 741-770.
- Gadarian, S. K. (2010). The politics of threat: How terrorism news shapes foreign policy attitudes. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(02), 469-483.
- Hatemi, P. K., & McDermott, R. (2012). The genetics of politics: discovery, challenges, and progress. *Trends in Genetics*, 28(10), 525-533.
- Hetherington, M., & Suhay, E. (2011). Authoritarianism, threat, and Americans’ support for the war on terror. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3), 546-560.

Huddy, L., Feldman, S., & Cassese, E. (2007). On the distinct political effects of anxiety and anger. In Neuman, R. Marcus, G.E., Crigler, A.N. and M. Mackuen, eds. *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, pp. 202-230.

Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C., & Lahav, G. (2005). Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies. *American journal of political science*, 49(3), 593-608.

Kennedy, H. G. (1992). Anger and Irritability. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 161, 145–153

Lagrange, H., & Perrineau, P. (1989). Le syndrome lepéniste. In Mayer, N and P. Perrineau, (eds.) *Le Front National à découvert*. Paris : Presses de SciencesPo, pp. 228-241.

LeDoux, J. E. (1996) *The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life*. New York : Simon & Schuster.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. *Cognition & Emotion*, 14(4), 473-493.

Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 81(1), 146.

MacKuen, M., Wolak, J., Keele, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2010). Civic engagements: Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2), 440-458.

Marcus, G.E., Mackuen, M.B. and R.W. Neuman. 2011. Parsimony and complexity: Developing and testing theories of affective intelligence, *Political Psychology*, 32 (2), 323-336.

Marcus, G.E., Neuman, R. and L. Keele. 2007. The third way: The theory of affective intelligence and American democracy. In Neuman, R. Marcus, G.E., Crigler, A.N. and M. Mackuen, eds. *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 124-151.

Marcus, G.E., Neuman, R. and M. Mackuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marcus, G. E., Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., & Wood, S. L. (1995). *With malice toward some: How people make civil liberties judgments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mayer, N., & Perrineau, P. (1992). Why do they vote for Le Pen?*. *European Journal of Political Research*, 22(1), 123-141.

McCann, S. J. (1997). Threatening times," strong" presidential popular vote winners, and the victory margin, 1824–1964. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 73(1), 160.

McCourt, K., Bouchard, T. J., Lykken, D. T., Tellegen, A., & Keyes, M. (1999). Authoritarianism revisited: Genetic and environmental influences examined in twins reared apart and together. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 27(5), 985-1014.

Merolla, J. L., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2009). *Democracy at risk: How terrorist threats affect the public*. University of Chicago Press.

Redlawsk, D. P., Civettini, A. J., & Emmerson, K. M. (2010). The affective tipping point: do motivated reasoners ever “get it”? *Political Psychology, 31*(4), 563-593.

Sales, S. M. (1973). Threat as a factor in authoritarianism: an analysis of archival data. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 28*(1), 44.

Wagner, M. (2014). Fear and anger in Great Britain: Blame assignment and emotional reactions to the financial crisis. *Political Behavior, 36*(3), 683-703.


Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation. *The Journal of Politics, 73*(01), 156-170.

Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., Banks, A. J., & Davis, A. K. (2008). Is a worried citizen a good citizen? Emotions, political information seeking, and learning via the internet. *Political Psychology, 29*(2), 247-273.

Vasilopoulos, P. (2014). Anxiety and the vote in the 2012 French presidential election. Paper presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Rome, Italy.


Zellner, A. (1962). An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias. *Journal of the American statistical Association, 57*(298), 348-368.

Figure 1: Public Attitudes toward the Death Penalty and Having a Strong Leader Before and After the January Attacks



Source: Baromètre confiance en politique, waves 6 and 6b

Figure 2 : Distribution of Emotional Reactions to the January Attacks by Ideological Self-Placement



Source: Baromètre confiance en politique, waves 6 and 6b

Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Ideology on Post-Attack Attitudes toward Death Penalty and Having a Strong Leader (95% Confidence Intervals)




Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Anxiety on Attitudes towards Death Penalty and Having a Strong Leader for Different Ideological Self-Placements




Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Anger on Attitudes towards Death Penalty and Having a Strong Leader for Different Ideological Self-Placements

